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Online social networks (OSNs) have become a massive repository of data con-
structed from individuals’ inputs: posts, photos, feedbacks, locations, etc. By
analyzing such data, meaningful knowledge is generated that can affect individuals’
beliefs, desires, happiness and choices — a data circulation started from individuals
and ended in individuals! The OSN owners, as the one authority having full control
over the stored data, make the data available for research, advertisement and other
purposes. However, the individuals are missed in this circle while they generate
the data and shape the OSN structure.
In this thesis, we started by introducing approximation algorithms for finding
the most influential individuals in a social graph and modeling the spread of
information. To do so, we considered the communities of individuals that are
shaped in a social graph. The social graph is extracted from the data stored and
controlled centrally, which can cause privacy breaches and lead to individuals’
concerns. Therefore, we introduced UPSS: the user-centric private sharing system, in
which the individuals are considered as the real data owners and provides secure
and private data sharing on untrusted servers.
The UPSS’s public API allows the application developers to implement appli-
cations as diverse as OSNs, document redaction systems with integrity properties,
censorship-resistant systems, health care auditing systems, distributed version con-
trol systems with flexible access controls and a filesystem in userspace. Accessing
users’ data is possible only with explicit user consent. We implemented the two
later cases to show the applicability of UPSS.
Supporting different storage models by UPSS enables us to have a local, remote
and global filesystem in userspace with one unique core filesystem implementation
and having it mounted with different block stores.
By designing and implementing UPSS, we show that security and privacy
can be addressed at the same time in the systems that need selective, secure and
ii
collaborative information sharing without requiring complete trust.
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Starting from 70000 years ago, social networks and living in groups are one of the
principal reasons for human survival, claimed Y. N. Harari [Har14]. N. A. Christakis
and J. H. Fowler have shown that the relationship between people in social networks
not only affects the weight and happiness of them but also someone can have an
influence on another’s taste, health, wealth and beliefs [CF09, FC08, CF07]. All
these studies show the tendency of human beings to live as groups and be affected
by other members of the group. The number of people that each person can have a
strong tie with in a group is defined as the Dunbar number, which is around 150
[Dun98].
Online social networks (OSNs) are platforms that attempt to simulate this social
life in a digital world by connecting people from different languages, beliefs and
cultures. They provide people with a new kind of socializing that is not limited to
real-life conditions, such as geographical distances and even the Dunbar number.
We can have more than 150 friends on those platforms and be sure that the platform
reminds us of them from time to time by showing us their life updates, thoughts, or
birthdays. However, these are not the only features of OSNs. They also enable us
to spread our ideas and thoughts very rapidly without worrying about not being
heard. There are examples of this kind, such as an Iranian movement started from a
1
Facebook page [Ali18], that one single person started a revolutionary movement by
just using social media. On the other hand, there is evidence that the spread of fake
news on social media can affect the election results [BM19, AG17]. Therefore OSNs
can be as a double-edged sword: they can be very beneficial in our lives, or they can
cause some concerns, such as privacy concerns that OSN users facing these days.
In this thesis we have demonstrated that we can design a secure and private
sharing and collaboration system such as an online social network in which the
users are considered as the main data owners with full control over their data, by
combining the research from distributed systems, cryptography and filesystems.
UPSS, as our solution, protects the users from the adversaries that need to be trusted
in the existing systems. More specifically, UPSS stores users’ data on untrusted block
stores and achieve confidentiality, integrity and availability without sacrificing the
performance and users’ privacy.
1.1 Definitions
The terms that are used frequently in this thesis are described in this section to give
a clear understanding of them.
Online Social Network (OSN) Online social networks serve as a medium for
modeling interactions between individuals, groups and organizations. A social
network can be modelled as a directed or undirected graph G = (V, E) where V
and E are the set of nodes and edges of G. Individuals are modelled as the set of
nodes V and the relationships between them are modelled as the set of edges E.
The relationships between individuals are established based on the friendships in
their real life, being co-tagged in a photo, being co-authored in a book, etc.
Trust We use the definition of trust that is presented in [CH96] that says if “A
trusts B” means that “B can act in such a way as to put things into A’s set of trust
2
assumptions without A’s explicit consent”.
Privacy The term privacy is a multifaceted and complex concept that can be
viewed from different perspectives. Based on the research which was done by
Gürses [DG10], privacy can be classified into three paradigms: privacy as control,
privacy as confidentiality and privacy as practice.
Privacy as control discusses the users’ ability to have control their data col-
lection, use and processing. Therefore the trusted organizations should provide
a mechanism for the users to address such needs. In privacy as confidentiality,
cryptography is used to minimize information disclosure and the organizations are
not trusted. However, in privacy as practice, the information flow is as transparent
as possible.
In this thesis, we consider the second definition of privacy that is privacy as con-
fidentiality and in some places, we use privacy and confidentiality interchangeably.
Storage A medium for storing individuals’ data that can be a hard drive on user’s
PC, a hard drive on a server, a usb stick, or a cloud storage account such as Google
Drive, Box, Dropbox or Amazon S3.
Distributed vs. central server These terms are more about the defined policies
about data storage/retrieval on the server and who controls it rather than the
physical location of the server. As an example, user data is stored on central servers
of a company such as Facebook and there could be data replication for availability
and locality, but all the servers are controlled and monitored by the company.
1.2 From social influence to influence maximization
As previously stated, individuals are influenced by their social connections in real
life. One example is our tendency to buy a product that is accepted by the majority
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of our friends. Marketing companies use the word-of-mouth effect to gain a large
number of adoptions in selling their products. Richardson et al. [RD02] defined this
effect as a fundamental algorithmic problem in the OSN context: what is the best
subset of individuals being selected and convinced to adopt a new product to gain
a larger cascade of future adoptions? Kempe et al. [KKT03] defined this problem
as an optimization problem called influence maximization and they proved its
NP-hardness. The problem is defined as
INFLUENCE MAXIMIZATION IN OSN
Input: A graph G = (V, E) and a positive integer k > 0.
Output: A subset S ⊆ V containing k nodes, such that, as the spread
of influence starts from S, the set of nodes that get activated, will be
maximized.
Then they modelled the spread of ideas and innovations through OSNs using two
basic models: Linear Threshold (LT) and Independent Cascade (IC). They proved
that the spread computation function f , that calculates the spread value of a node
in a social graph, is submodular for both LT and IC models. Submodularity means
that the marginal gain from adding an element to a set S is at least as high as the
marginal gain from adding the same element to a superset of S [KKT03].
f (S ∪ v)− f (S) ≥ f (T ∪ v)− f (T),
for all elements v and all pairs of sets S ⊆ T. Spread value of a node v is a
probabilistic measure to show how many other nodes can be affected by node v if
the spread of information starts from node v.
The other outcome of their work was a greedy hill-climbing algorithm that
approximates the optimum solution to within a factor of (1− 1/e). The main idea
of their algorithm was starting from an empty set, repeatedly adding an element
4
to the set that gives the maximum marginal gain. However, their approach was
impractical for large networks.
Having the influence maximization problem defined formally, researchers began
to present approximation algorithms for finding the top k influential nodes more
efficiently and accurately. The authors of the CELF (Cost-Effective Lazy Forward)
algorithm [LKG+07] improved the running time of the greedy algorithm. They
calculated the spread value of all nodes in the first iteration of the algorithm, and
in the further iterations, the spread value of some — not all — nodes is calculated.
However, the time complexity bottleneck of CELF is the first iteration. There are
some other approaches that construct a data structure for each node and localize
the search spaces of computing the influence spread to smaller subsets of nodes to
improve the performance of the greedy algorithm. Constructing a DAG (Directed
Acyclic Graph) [CYZ10], extract the vertex cover set [GLL11] and clustering the
input graph into communities [KLPL13, BHZR16] are in this category.
The other category of research for influence maximization problem is defining
propagation models that mostly are the extensions of LT and IC models. In com-
petitive influence maximization (CIM), two or more competitors try to gain more
influence spread in a network by choosing fewer nodes. In [CNWVZ07, SBV+12],
the CIM problem is looked from the follower’s perspective: there are two competi-
tors trying to find some influential nodes. The second competitor starts the process
with knowledge of the seed nodes selected by the first competitor and tries to find
some new seed nodes other than the ones selected by the first competitor to achieve
more influence spread. In [CCC+11, HSCJ12], the two competitors start spreading
the information and one competitor tries to block the effect of the second one. From
the host’s perspective, the owner of the OSN is responsible for allocating some
nodes to each competitor in a fair way, discussed in [LBGL13]. We defined a more
realistic scenario for CIM problem [BSKW17] in which the individuals have the
ability to think about the incoming influence spread for some time steps and then
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be adopted by the spread which is accepted by the majority of their neighbours.
1.3 Private online social network
For solving the influence maximization problem that is reviewed in Section 1.2, we
need to have a graph consisting of nodes as the individuals and the edges as the
relations between them. Such a graph structure is generated by OSN providers from
data and metadata authorized by them. Upon request, the providers can also share
more information about individuals to the requesters, which can be advertisement
companies, researchers, or governments. This is due to the centralized nature of
user data, which is stored on the company’s storages and is controlled by one single
authority. Users’ concerns about their private data increases in Healthcare Social
Networks (HSNs) as their personal health data are stored on OSN storage and are
vulnerable to any kind of breaches. These concerns go even beyond users’. The
Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic’s (CIPPIC) letter to Facebook
[Den09] about default privacy settings, collection and use of users’ personal in-
formation for advertising purposes, disclosure of users’ personal information to
third-party application developers, and collection and use of non-users’ personal
information is an example of this kind.
Violating users’ privacy in existing OSNs encourages us to find the answer
to this question: how can we protect user data in a practical way in the systems
with sharing, collaboration and interaction mechanisms so that the data can be
accessed by third parties only if the user – as the real data owner – is willing to?
We started by investigating the existing approaches that try to address the privacy
concerns of OSNs (see Chapter 4). These approaches are categorized into three
main groups based on the architecture of OSNs: centralized, decentralized and
hybrid. Centralized approaches put their trust in OSN servers and try to preserve
users’ privacy by sending encrypted data directly or an indirect reference to the data
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to OSN servers. Lockr [TGS+08], FlyByNight [LB08], NOYB [GTF08], Facecloak
[LXH09], Persona [BBS+09], EASiER [JMB11] and CP2 [RMJ13] are examples of the
works in this category.
In decentralized approaches, user data is stored on untrusted servers, users’
trusted storages, or friends’ storage. Most of these approaches build their decentral-
ized or peer-to-peer (P2P) network on public Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) and
use the DHT nodes for storage, such as PeerSoN [BSVD09], DECENT [JNM+12], Ca-
chet [NJM+12] and PESCA [RJM15]. In some approaches such as Safebook [Str09],
Soup [KLF14], Didusonet [GADS+16] and Narendula et al.’s works [NPA10, Nar12],
user data is stored on their trusted friends’ storages by applying some limitations
in the space usage. Among these, just a few of them can provide searching and
indexing in the P2P environment [NPA10], which is a critical requirement fo OSNs.
In hybrid approaches, user data or parts of it is stored based on users’ choices, that
can be on personal or untrusted servers, such as Vis-a-vis [SLC+11], Confidant
[LSC+11], Raji et al.’s [RMJM11] and Wilson et al.’s [WSW+11] works.
1.4 Private filesystem
None of the proposed approaches discussed in Section 1.3 can guarantee confiden-
tiality, availability and integrity, and some are sacrificed for the others. However,
we believe that by providing these properties not in the application level, but in
lower levels like a filesystem, we can create a functional system that can be the
backbone for higher-level applications as diverse as OSNs, redaction systems and
censor-resistant systems. In the filesystem level, we can control the data storage/re-
trieval and define suitable policies. Moreover, we have the flexibility to decouple
the storage from access control to provide confidentiality, availability and integrity,
as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Having such a filesystem, the existing applications
can have all the required properties just by interacting with it without applying
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substantial modifications to their code.
The main concerns of traditional filesystems are efficient read and write op-
erations and high availability, which are well-addressed in copy-on-write ZFS
[BAH+03] and Coda [SKK+90] filesystems. But privacy remains untouched. Ivy
[MMGC02] tries to embed privacy in its design, but sacrifices confidentiality. Ori
[MBHM13] could address most of the stated requirements with some extra features
such as synchronization, failures handling and data recovery. Another successful
modern filesystem is IPFS [Ben14] that synthesizes the key successful ideas behind
systems such as DHTs [SMK+01], BitTorrent [Coh03], Git [LM12], and SFS [MK98].
Studying these filesystems inspired us to design and implement UPSS: the
user-centric private sharing system that can provide secure and selective sharing in
collaborative environments (Chapters 5 and 6). Also, UPSS provides a conventional
filesystem API using copy-on-write operations around immutable DAGs; this API is
accessible directly as an embedded library or proxied via a FUSE interface. Storing
everything as fixed-size encrypted blocks on block stores, which are untrusted
content-addressable storages, without leaving any footprint about the data struc-
tures, guarantees the confidentiality and privacy of blocks’ content. In Section 6.5.5,
we show that the access patterns can be exposed to an adversary in the current im-
plementation of UPSS; however they can be protected in the next versions of UPSS.
The block stores can be individuals’ local storages, remote servers, or in scenarios
that availability is a strong need, cloud accounts. Using convergent encryption
[DAB+02], naming the blocks by the cryptographic hashes of their ciphertext, and
embedding the key and the block hash in block pointers, we avoid any central key
server. Our extensive evaluation (Section 6.3) shows that UPSS is comparable and
in some cases superior to heavily-optimized local, network and global filesystems
such as ZFS, NFS and Google’s Perkeep. Interacting with UPSS using the public




In this thesis, I started by studying how information can be propagated in OSNs.
The outcome of my studies is published in two papers [BHZR16, BSKW17], which
are presented in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. I co-authored these two papers with
other people, whose names are listed in the papers, and I was the principal author.
In the paper that is included in Chapter 2, I have the following contributions:
• Designing a new framework to incorporate the community structure of online
social networks for solving the influence maximization problem
• Developing and evaluating an scalable approximation algorithm called IN-
CIM (Influential Nodes using Community structure for solving Influence
Maximization problem) for finding the top-k influential nodes efficiently with
low memory usage
The contributions for the paper that is appeared in Chapter 3 are:
• Introduce a new propagation model called DCM (Decidable Competitive
Model) for competitive influence maximization problem that gives the decision-
making ability to the users
• Develop and evaluate an efficient approximation algorithm called CI2 to find
the influential nodes for competitive influence maximization, based on the
DCM model
• Prove the NP-Hardness of CI2 by considering the DCM as the propagation
model
The content of Chapter 4 explains my investigations about privacy-preserving
online social networks and comparing existing approaches from different points of
view. This paper is ready to be submitted and all the content is written by me and
is edited by Dr. Saeed Samet and Dr. Antonina Kolokolova.
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Our cryptographic and distributed filesystem, UPSS: the user-centric private
sharing system, is described and evaluated in Chapters 5 and 6. The contents of
these chapters are published and submitted respectively, as two papers, which I
co-authored as the principal author. The contributions of these two chapters are as
follows:
• Design and implement UPSS: the user-centric private sharing system as a
mechanism for sharing information securely and selectively without having
complete trust in central servers
• Implement a cryptographic hybrid (local, network, global) filesystem called
upss-fuse on top of UPSS
• Design and implement a novel and confidential version control system called
UVC: UPSS Version Control System with flexible and fine-grained access
controls
• Design and implement a benchmark framework for filesystem evaluation,
that can record a filesystem’s behaviour during time
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Datta. Peerson: P2p social networking: early experiences and insights.
In Proceedings of the Second ACM EuroSys Workshop on Social Network
Systems, pages 46–52. ACM, 2009.
[CCC+11] Wei Chen, Alex Collins, Rachel Cummings, Te Ke, Zhenming Liu,
David Rincon, Xiaorui Sun, Yajun Wang, Wei Wei, and Yifei Yuan.
11
Influence maximization in social networks when negative opinions
may emerge and propagate. In Proceedings of ICDM, pages 379–390.
SIAM, 2011.
[CF07] Nicholas A Christakis and James H Fowler. The spread of obesity in
a large social network over 32 years. New England journal of medicine,
357(4):370–379, 2007.
[CF09] Nicholas A Christakis and James H Fowler. Connected: The surprising
power of our social networks and how they shape our lives. Little, Brown
Spark, 2009.
[CH96] Bruce Christianson and William S Harbison. Why isn’t trust transi-
tive? In International workshop on security protocols, pages 171–176.
Springer, 1996.
[CNWVZ07] Tim Carnes, Chandrashekhar Nagarajan, Stefan M Wild, and Anke
Van Zuylen. Maximizing influence in a competitive social network: a
follower’s perspective. In Proceedings of the ninth international confer-
ence on Electronic Commerce, pages 351–360. ACM, 2007.
[Coh03] Bram Cohen. Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent. In Workshop
on Economics of Peer-to-Peer systems, volume 6, pages 68–72, 2003.
[CYZ10] Wei Chen, Yifei Yuan, and Li Zhang. Scalable influence maximization
in social networks under the linear threshold model. In Proceedings of
ICDM, pages 88–97. IEEE, 2010.
[DAB+02] John R Douceur, Atul Adya, William J Bolosky, P Simon, and Mar-
vin Theimer. Reclaiming space from duplicate files in a serverless
distributed file system. In Proceedings 22nd international conference on
distributed computing systems, pages 617–624. IEEE, 2002.
12
[Den09] Elizabeth Denham. Report of findings into the complaint filed by the
Canadian internet policy and public interest clinic (CIPPIC) against facebook
inc. Under the personal information protection and electronic documents
act. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2009.
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algorithm for influence maximization
problem under the linear threshold
model
(This chapter is based on a paper published in Information Processing & Manage-
ment, 2016 [BHZR16])
A social network is modeled as a graph G = (V, E) where V and E are the set of
nodes and edges of G. In a real world social network, people are modelled as the set
of nodes V and the relationship between them, e.g., friendship or being co-tagged
in a photo is modelled as the set of edges E of the graph. Information can propagate
via links between people which leads to word-of-mouth advertising and its famous
application, viral marketing. In viral marketing, the owner of a product, gives free
or discounted samples of a product to a group of people to gain a large number of
adoptions through the word-of-mouth effect. The influence maximization problem
is motivated by the idea of viral marketing. Kempe et al. [KKT03] defined the
influence maximization problem in a graph G = (V, E) as finding a subset of S ⊆ V
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containing of k nodes, such that, as the spread of influence starts from S, the set of
nodes that get activated, will be maximized.
Two propagation models are defined in [KKT03] by Kempe et. al., namely, the
Linear Threshold (LT) and Independent Cascade (IC) models. Also, different algo-
rithms have been proposed based on the IC model[CWW10], [CSH+14], [GZZ+13],
[KLPL13] and LT model[CYZ10], [GLL11b], [GLL11a]. Our proposed algorithm in
this paper is based on the Linear Threshold model.
The greedy algorithm [KKT03] needs to calculate the influence of every node
in the graph which is very time consuming for large graphs. In recent years,
several attempts have been made to solve the influence maximization problem
more efficiently. In CELF [LKG+07], first, the spread of each node is calculated
and in the next iterations, based on the sub-modularity of spread function, only
the spread of some nodes needs to be updated that causes CELF algorithm to run
faster than the greedy algorithm. However, the time complexity bottleneck of CELF
[LKG+07] is the first iteration.
In some approaches, the authors try to compute the spread of nodes in smaller
subgraphs to have a faster first iteration than CELF algorithm [LKG+07] and also,
improve the overall running time of their algorithms [GLL11b, YKK13, KLPL13].
In IPA [YKK13], the influence paths starting from each node v to other nodes are
found and each influence path is considered as an influence evaluation unit and the
node with maximum influence propagation probability over influence paths is a
candidate for a seed node. However, the results of our experiments in Section 2.4
show that the quality of seeds in IPA is not satisfying.
In SIMPATH [GLL11b], to avoid calculating the spread of every node in the
graph, the vertex cover of the graph is computed and the spread of each node
in the vertex cover is calculated. In this paper, we improve the running time of
the SIMPATH algorithm [GLL11b] by using the community structure of the input
graph.
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Despite useful and meaningful characteristics of communities in social networks,
very little attention has been made to incorporate the role of communities in in-
fluence maximization problem. In real social networks, people live in a cluster
with whom they have strong relations. Information circulates at a high velocity
within these clusters and each person tends to know what the other people know.
Therefore, the spread of information on new ideas and opportunities must come
through the weak ties that connect people in separate clusters. The weak ties so of-
ten ignored by social scientists are in fact a critical element of social structure. Weak
ties are essential to the flow of information that integrates otherwise disconnected
social clusters into a broader society [Gra73]. Furthermore, some communities in
social networks play a significant role, as they are central and other communities
monitor them to get the updates. Moreover, real networks contain a huge number
of nodes, and computing the influence of each node is very expensive. Calculating
the spread of each node locally inside its community can be done very quickly
which improves the running time.
Kim et al. [KLPL13] approached the influence maximization problem from a
community based perspective and their main reason is to limit the search space
to some nodes inside communities and decrease the running time. In [KLPL13],
first the graph is clustered into a set of communities, and then the most influential
node in each community is considered as the seed candidate for the influence
maximization problem. Finally, only k nodes from candidate nodes are chosen as
final seed nodes. In this model, the role of communities is ignored. For example, if
some communities are very small and have no influence on other communities, the
quality of seeds in that communities is expected to be lower.
Contribution. Our major contribution in this research is summarized as follows:
• We design a new framework to incorporate community structure in the influ-
ence maximization problem.
• We devise an efficient algorithm for finding the top-k influential nodes in a
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social network based on communities in the graph.
Methodology. In this paper, we incorporate the role of communities of the social
network in a meaningful manner and propose an algorithm under Linear Threshold
model. In our algorithm, first we find the local spread of each node inside its com-
munity. Then we construct the graph of communities, where each community is a
vertex and there is an edge between two vertices if there is at least one edge between
the corresponding communities in the actual graph. After that, we compute the
global influence that is the spread of each community in the graph of communities
and finally calculate the final spread of each node as a combination of its local
spread and its global spread. So, a particular node that belongs to a community
with higher spread, has more chance to be chosen as a seed node candidate.
We conduct the empirical studies on large real graphs. Extensive performance
studies demonstrate that the proposed algorithm significantly outperforms the
state-of-the-art algorithms in term of the quality of outputted seeds while still has
an acceptable running time and memory usage.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we
summarize the related works, and in Section 2.3, we devise a new algorithm for
finding the top influential nodes in the graph called INCIM. Section 2.4 introduces
the datasets which are used to examine our algorithm and presenting the experi-
mental results. The last section is devoted to conclusions and some directions for
future work.
2.1 Related Work
In the previous section, we mentioned some works closer to ours and in this section,
these works and other related works are reviewed in a more detailed way. The
greedy algorithm presented by Kempe et al. [KKT03] can guarantee a good quality
of seeds, but it is very time consuming for large graphs. Therefore, efficiently and
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accurately finding the influential nodes in social networks, under the LT and IC
models, has recently drawn a great deal of attention.
CELF algorithm presented in [LKG+07] owes to the fact that the influence spread
function is a sub-modular function, which means the marginal gain from adding
an element to a set S is at least as high as the marginal gain from adding the same
element to a superset of S [KKT03]. Therefore, CELF reduces the number of calls to
the spread estimation function (because only the spread of some nodes needs to be
updated in each iteration) and improves the running time of the greedy algorithm.
However, the time complexity bottleneck of CELF is the first iteration, where the
spread of every node is calculated and thus the CELF’s first iteration is the same as
the greedy’s first iteration.
In the heuristic approach in [CYZ10], for each node v, a DAG (Directed Acyclic
Graph) is constructed and the spread of nodes is computed locally within the
resulting DAGs and the seed nodes are selected based on the greedy algorithm.
This algorithm has a reasonable running time, but it takes a lot of memory to store
a DAG for each node in the graph. The main idea of the algorithm presented
in [CWW10] is making local trees with edges starting or ending at each node
called MIA; then the probability of activating a node by other nodes in each tree is
computed locally. Finally a node with maximum probability is chosen as seed node.
In SIMPATH [GLL11b], to reduce the number of calls to the influence estimation
function, first the vertex cover of G is computed, and only the spreads of nodes
within the vertex cover are calculated. Having the spread values, the seed nodes
are found in k iterations. In IMRank [CSH+14], an initial rank is assigned to every
node in the graph which is computed from a known heuristic; then, based on these
initial ranks, the spreads of nodes are estimated, while in the greedy algorithm
the spreads are computed exactly in each iteration. In IPA [YKK13], for each node
v in the graph, the algorithm finds the influence paths starting from v to other
nodes and computes an influence propagation probability for each node. The nodes
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with maximum influence propagation probability are selected as seed nodes. IPA
algorithm runs very fast and also is parallelizable to run faster in multicore systems,
but it achieves seed nodes with low quality over different datasets comparing to
other algorithms.
In [GZZ+13], the influence maximization problem is viewed from a new per-
spective. More specifically, k nodes are chosen as seed sets that have maximum
influence over a set of target nodes to obtain a personalized set of influential nodes.
The personalized influence is specific to its own applications where the seeds are
selected from a general social network for a specific type of product.
Very closely related to our work is [KLPL13], where communities of the graph
are constructed by Markov Clustering algorithm. Then, in each community, a node
with maximum spread is chosen as the seed node candidate. Finally, k nodes with
bigger influence spread are chosen from candidate nodes. The main problem with
this algorithm is that, it does not consider the role of each community as a unit to
spread the influence and the size of each community.
2.2 Preliminaries
In this part, we introduce fundamental concepts of influence calculation which are
needed for better understanding of the paper.
Community detection. Communities are subsets of nodes in the graph, with
more edges between them and fewer edges between nodes in different communities
[LP49]. Community detection is formulated as a clustering problem. That is, given
the full graph G = (V, E), partition the vertex set into k subsets S1, S2, · · · , Sk, such
that
⋂k
i=1Si = ∅ and
⋃k
i=1Si = V. A quality metric Q(S1, · · · , Sk) is defined over
the partitions and a community detection algorithm will try to find a partitioning
that maximize or minimize Q depending on its nature. This is for non-overlapping
community detection and one can simply remove the constraint
⋂k
i=1Si = ∅ to get
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the overlapping version [HCL14].
Linear Threshold model. In this model which is defined in [KKT03], activation
probability of a node depends on a uniform function of its neighbors that are
activated before. More specifically, a weight function fv maps the neighbors of
v to [0, 1], then assigns a threshold value θv ∈ [0, 1] to each node v uniformly at
random. Node v would be activated in time t if fv(S) > θv, where S is the subset of
neighbors v that have been activated in time t− 1. Based on [KKT03], the value of




where bv,u is the weight of edge (v, u) and sum of all edges between v and its
neighbors should be less than 1 as Equation (2.2).
∑
u neighbors o f v
bv,u ≤ 1 (2.2)
In some cases, the weight of the edges are not set in the input graph and they
should be computed. To do so, the number of edges from node i to node j is defined
as wij (in this chapter, we have one edge between each two nodes, therefore wij = 1).
Also, the number of input edges to node j is defined as dj. Finally the weight of





In this section, we devise a new algorithm, called INCIM (Influential Nodes using
Community structure for solving Influence Maximization problem) for the influence
maximization problem from a community-based perspective. First, we present a
general overview of the algorithm and then we explain each part in more details.
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2.3.1 Algorithm overview
Given a set of communities C = {C1, C2, · · · , Cl} in a graph G = (V, E), such that
C1 ∪ C2 ∪ · · · ∪ Cl = V, the intuition of INCIM can be explained using the charac-
teristics of community structure in G. Our algorithm proceeds in two phases. In
the first phase (preprocessing), we find the communities of the main graph by a
partition algorithm. In the second phase, we first find the influence of each commu-
nity among other communities based on the links between their nodes and then
find the degree to which each node spreads the influence inside its own community.
We determine the final spread of each node in the graph as a combination of its
community influence and its influence inside its community.
Our innovations (which will be explained in Section 2.3.2 in more detail) to
decrease the running time and increase the efficiency of our algorithm are as follows:
• Computing the spread of nodes locally in the communities which causes
a decrease in overall running time of the algorithm. Also, by determining
those communities whose nodes spread should be updated, we decrease the
number of calls to the SIMPATH algorithm which again results in decreasing
the running time.
• By using the idea of local and global spreads of nodes and their combination,
we track the role of communities and also, the influence of a node in its own
community.
• Using a combination of the SIMPATH [GLL11b] and CELF [LKG+07] algo-
rithms; more precisely, using the SIMPATH algorithm to compute the spread
of nodes and storing and updating these spread values by the idea of the
CELF algorithm cause our algorithm to find the seed nodes which have the




INCIM contains the following steps:
1. Preprocessing: In this step, we partition the input graph into its communities.
The partition algorithm we have used is SLPA [XSL11].
2. Computing spread of nodes: In this step, we create the graph of communities
whose nodes are the communities of the graph and then we calculate the
spread values. We use the manner of the SIMPATH algorithm [GLL11b] to
compute the spread of nodes which is done in 3 steps as follows:
(a) Computing global spread which is the spread value of each node in the
graph of communities, i.e., the spread values of the communities.
(b) Computing local spread which is the spread value of the nodes inside
their communities.
(c) Computing final spread which is a combination of local and global
spreads per each node.
3. Making CELF lists: We store the resulting spread values of the nodes by the
idea of the CELF [LKG+07] algorithm. For each community, we have a list
which the number of its elements is equal to the number of nodes in that
community.
4. Determining communities to be updated: We determine which communities
should be updated based on the nodes in the seed set.
5. Selecting seed nodes: In this step, INCIM iterates k times to finds the k most
influential nodes.
Now, we can describe INCIM algorithm by explaining the details of each step.
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2.3.2.1 Preprocessing step
To partition the input graph into communities, we use the SLPA algorithm as the
partition algorithm which is proposed in [XSL11]. The SLPA is categorized as a
dynamic and agent-based algorithm and is an extension of the Label Propagation
Algorithm (LPA). Both SLPA and LPA algorithms tries to maximize the modularity
measure Q. Modularity measure Q is defined as the difference between the observed
density of edges within communities and the expected density of edges within the
same communities but with random connections [NG04]. In SLPA, each node can be
a listener or a speaker. The roles are switched depending on whether a node serves
as an information provider or information consumer. A node can hold as many
labels as needed to decide which label to accept. The more a node observes a label,
the more likely it will spread that label to the other nodes. The input of the SLPA
algorithm is the input graph containing the id of the nodes and the edge weights
in the LT model. The weight of the edges are considered when a listener wants to
accept a label from its neighbors. For example, a listener x, has three neighbors y1,
y2 and y3, with edge weights 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 respectively. When node x consider the
labels from its neighbors, it will weight each label as 0.1/(0.1 + 0.2 + 0.3) for node
y1, 0.2/(0.1 + 0.2 + 0.3) for node y2 and 0.3/(0.1 + 0.2 + 0.3) for node y3. Then,
the listener accepts one label from the collection of labels received from neighbors
following certain listening rule, such as selecting the most popular label from what
it observed in the current step.
The main reasons to choose this algorithm are its less time consuming than the
other ones in finding communities and its high quality in finding communities of
the graph; the experiments done in [XSL11] confirm such specifications of SLPA.
2.3.2.2 Computing spread of nodes
In our framework, we use the approach of the SIMPATH algorithm [GLL11b] to
compute the spread of a node in the input graph. As mentioned in [GLL11b], the
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spread of a node v is computed by summing the weights of all simple paths starting





In Equation (2.4), P is a path and bvi,vj is the weight on edge (vi, vj).
Also the spread of a seed set S, that includes the influential nodes, is the sum of
that of nodes u ∈ S in subgraphs induced by V − S + u (considering just one node
u a time in S and removing the other nodes and their connections in S other than u).
So, by considering simple paths starting from nodes of set S, we can compute the
spread of set S in different subgraphs. To find simple paths in the graph, SIMPATH
uses BACKTRACK algorithm that is presented in [Kro67, Joh75]. As the problem
of enumerating all simple paths is #P-hard [Val79], in the SIMPATH algorithm, only
the paths are considered which their weights increase rapidly as the length of the
path increases. Thus, the influence can be captured by exploring the paths within
a small neighborhood, where the size of the neighborhood can be controlled by a
threshold value. The BACKTRACK algorithm gets a node u, a threshold value η
and a subgraph as input, find all the simple paths from node u by considering the
threshold value and output the spread of the node, which is the sum of the simple
path weights. In out algorithm, we use the SIMPATH default value for η, which is
10−3.
The SIMPATH algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.1. In Algorithm 2.1, S is the
seed set, η is the threshold value to control the size of the neighborhood, U is the
set of nodes of the input graph and δ(S) is the spread value of S.
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Algorithm 2.1 SIMPATH
Input: S, η, U, V
Output: δ(S)
1: δ(S)← 0
2: for each u ∈ S do
3: δ(S)← δ(S) + BACKTRACK(u, η, V − S + u, U)
4: return δ(S)
Algorithm 2.1 shows how the SIMPATH algorithm computes the spread value
of a seed set. In an iterative manner in line 3 of the algorithm, all the nodes of S are
given to the BACKTRACK algorithm and their spreads are computed. The final
value returned by Algorithm 2.1 is the sum of the spread values of all nodes in set
S.
As we mentioned in section 2, CELF algorithm [LKG+07] uses the sub-modularity
of the influence spread function. In our algorithm, we take the advantages of CELF
algorithm to reduce the number of calls to the SIMPATH algorithm. To achieve
this goal, in our approach the spread values of nodes computed by SIMPATH are
stored in a list sorted in decreasing order, as shown in Algorithm 2.3. Then, in
each iteration of CELF algorithm, only the marginal gain of the top node of the list
is re-computed and if needed, the list is resorted. If a node remains at the top, it
is picked as the next seed [LKG+07]. As we compute the spread of nodes in the
communities of the input graph, we have lists separated per each community. By
using the CELF idea to store the spread values and update the lists, we improve the
running time of our algorithm.
Next, we formalize the notions of local spread and global spread of each node and
describe the way we determine them in more details.
Global spread Once we identify the communities, we can determine which com-
munities are the central ones since they are monitored by individuals and other
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communities that look for ideas, news and innovations. For instance, consider a
big community of researchers working on social networks; it can play a central role
in spreading ideas and topics for other researchers as they follow this community
to monitor the recent trends. Therefore, it makes sense to consider the position of
each community inside these research groups and find the degree to which each
community can influence other communities. In this way, we can determine central
communities and find the influential nodes in these communities.
To determine central communities, we build the graph Gc = (Vc, Ec) of commu-
nities and compute the spread of each of its nodes. Each community Ci is a node of
Gc and if there is a directed edge from node u ∈ Ci to node v ∈ Cj in graph G, then
there is a directed edge from the corresponding node Ci to Cj in Gc. We define Wij as
the maximum weight of the edges from community Ci to Cj. We consider only the
maximum edge weight between the nodes of the graph of communities as the max-
imum influence spread that we can achieve can flow on the edge with maximum
weight. We also count the number of input edges to community Ci shown by dCi as




. At the beginning of the algorithm, a random threshold value is
assigned to each node Ci in Gc. As we mentioned before, the model of information
propagation which is used for the main graph is LT model, so we should also have
the same information spread model for the graph of communities. That is why we
use the LT edge weight computation manner for graph of communities.
The spread of nodes in graph Gc = (Vc, Ec) is computed by the SIMPATH
algorithm which takes Gc = (Vc, Ec) graph as its input. We call this spread as δ̄.
Local spread Suppose that there is a social network in which communities are
constructed based on research interests in the academia. An influential node in
a community has more influence on the nodes of its community than it does on
the nodes of other communities with different research interests; so, in INCIM
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algorithm, each node has a local spread which is its influence inside its commu-
nity. By computing the spread of nodes locally in the communities, we have an
improvement in running time and also, we choose the most influential nodes in
their own communities which results in choosing the most influential nodes as the
algorithm’s final output when combining the local spread with the global spread as
will be explained below. The results of our experiments in Section 2.4 confirm this
improvements.
In the first iteration of the algorithm, the spread of each node v in a community
is computed as δl(v) and stored in list δi based on CELF optimization. For each
community i, we have a list δi whose size is equal to the number of nodes in that
community. In other words, the input nodes of the SIMPATH algorithm are the ones
inside the communities separately for each community, and SIMPATH finds simple
paths in the communities locally. As Equation (2.5), the total number of elements of
all δi is equal to the number of all nodes in graph G, so the total memory needed by




|δi| = |V| (2.5)
In Equation (2.5), n is the number of communities, |δi| is the size of δi and |V| is
the number of nodes in graph G.
Since the communities in a network are not necessarily well separated, there are
some edges between them. Therefore, individuals in the same community can have
different influence on the neighbor communities. To tackle this issue, we consider
the notion of border nodes in the graph. A border node in a community has at least
one edge that connects it to another community in the network and influence can
enter or leave a community through border nodes. So, it is important to compute
the spread of border nodes over the graph. We call SIMPATH with graph G as its
input to compute the border node’s spread and store the spread values in a vector
called α with an element per each border node. These values will be combined with
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local and global spreads to track border node’s influence above nodes from their
linked communities. In Figure 2.1, node v is a border node as it has a link to another






Figure 2.1: A sample network with its communities
Final spread, combination of local spread and global spread Final spread of a
node is a combination of its local spread and spread of its community. By final
spread, we determine which nodes are the most influential nodes over the graph.
Definition 1. Given a social network G = (V, E) and a set of communities {C1, C2, . . . , Cl},
where δl(v) is the local spread of node v in community Ci and δ̄(v) is the global spread of
community Ci which v belongs to, along with α(v) which is the spread values of border
nodes, the final Spread of node v is defined as follows:
δ(v) = δl(v) + α(v).δ̄(v) (2.6)
In Equation (2.6), α(v) is equal to 1 if v is a non-border node; if v is a border
node, α(v) is equal to the influence spread from v to the nodes inside its linked
communities. As Goyal et al. showed in [GLL11b], the majority of the influence to
a node flows in from a small neighborhood and can be captured by enumerating
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paths within that neighborhood. Also, Wang et. al. discussed in their community-
based greedy approach [WCSX10] that the difference between the node’s influence
degree in its community and its influence degree in the whole network is small.
In INCIM, we compute the spread of nodes locally in their own communities, too.
But as we discussed earlier, the communities can also influence each other by the
links which exist between them and we can not ignore the influence which flows
between the nodes belong to different communities. Such influence is considered
by combining the global spread with the local spread of each node. The global
spread of a community is computed by summing up the edge weights of all simple
paths starting from the community. Also, the local spread of a node is computed in
the same way. So to combine the local spread and the weighted global spread of a
node, we should sum up them together, as we did in Equation (2.6). In Section 2.4.3,
we will show that by using Equation (2.6), we can achieve a good approximation
for spread computation near to the approximation achieved by simple greedy
algorithm [KKT03] which is (1− 1/e− ε), or of 63% of the optimized solution.
2.3.2.3 Seed nodes selection
After finishing the first iteration of the algorithm, the node with maximum spread in
community i takes the first place of δi, and the node with maximum spread between
all first elements of all δi is chosen as the first seed node.
After choosing the first seed node in the first iteration, the algorithm will be
executed k − 1 times to find the k − 1 remaining seed nodes. In each iteration,
the SIMPATH algorithm is called and the δi lists would be updated based on the
new marginal gains achieved by new nodes. Since the seed nodes are chosen from
different communities, the spread of nodes in graph of communities Gc = (Vc, Ec)
should be also updated. So, in the beginning of each iteration, SIMPATH is called
to compute the spread of nodes of graph Gc = (Vc, Ec).
Suppose that Figure 2.1 is a part of a network whose node v is chosen as a seed
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node at time t. As node v belongs to community C1, the spread of other nodes in
community C1 should be updated for the next iteration. Since there is a simple
path from node v to a node in community C2, so the spread of nodes in community
C2 should be updated, too. But for communities C3 and C4, such updates are not
required because there is no simple path from v to C3 and C4.
The INCIM algorithm calls SIMPATH to compute the spread of nodes in only
those communities determined by the getCommunitiesToUpdate subroutine; in this
way, the number of calls to the SIMPATH algorithm will be decreased remarkably
in each iteration. This is one of the contributions for decreasing the running time
of the algorithm for the graphs with connected communities structure, rather than
separated communities that are not reachable from each other. For the later case, our
algorithm should check all the disconnected communities in each iteration, which
increases the running time. The getCommunitiesToUpdate subroutine is shown in
Algorithm 2.2. In Algorithm 2.2, S is the seed set and Gc(Vc, Ec) is the graph of
communities.
Algorithm 2.2 getCommunitiesToUpdate




3: for each v ∈ S do
4: Ci = the community containing v
5: UpdLst = UpdLst ∪ Ci
6: Neighbours = every u that there is a simple path from v to u
7: for each u ∈ Neighbours do
8: Cj = the community containing u
9: UpdLst = UpdLst ∪ Cj
10: return UpdLst
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The UpdLst is the list of communities which should be updated and returned
by Algorithm 2.2. In the loop of line 3, the nodes which there is a simple path
starting from nodes of set S to them are considered. Then the communities of such
nodes and the communities of the nodes of set S are considered as the output of the
algorithm.
In the framework proposed in this paper, we consider the role of each community
by its global spread. Also, we track the influence spread achieved by each node in
its community as local spread. By combining global and local spreads, we choose
nodes as seed nodes that have most influence spread in their community and this
influence can spread as much as possible to other communities. This is why we
claim that our algorithm chooses the most influential nodes with higher quality
comparing to other state-of-the-art algorithms. Also, by computing the spread of
nodes locally in the communities and using the idea of CELF algorithm [LKG+07],
we have improvements in running time and memory usage. The experimental
results of Section 2.4 confirm our claims.
INCIM algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.3. In Algorithm 2.3, G(V, E) is the
input graph and S is the set of size k containing seed nodes returned by INCIM
algorithm.
In lines 3 and 4 of Algorithm 2.3, the graph of communities is constructed based
on the communities discovered by the SLPA algorithm. Then in lines 5–7, the spread
values of the nodes in the graph of communities are computed. The influence spread
of border nodes is computed in lines 9–11. In line 11, where δ̄(v) is the global spread
of v’s community, we multiply the spread value of each border node with the global
spread value of its community. In the beginning of each iteration starting from line
12, we call Algorithm 2.2 to determine which communities should be updated in
line 14 and store them in list CP. In the first iteration, after calling Algorithm 2.2,
CP contains all the communities of the graph because there is no seed node in the
beginning of the algorithm. In lines 15–29, for all nodes of the communities which
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Algorithm 2.3 INCIM




3: call SLPA algorithm to find the communities of G and store them in
CommunitiesSet
4: make graph of communities Gc(Vc, Ec) such that each community is a graph
node
5: for each u ∈ Gc do
6: call Algorithm 2.1 to compute δ̄(u)
7: add δ̄(u) to δ̄ which is ordered decreasingly
8: find border nodes and store them in BorderNodesSet
9: for each v ∈ BorderNodesSet do
10: call Algorithm 2.1 to compute δ(v)
11: δ(v) = δ(v) ∗ δ̄(v) that v belongs to
12: while |S| < k do
13: CP← ∅
14: call Algorithm 2.2 to determine the communities which should be updated
and store them in CP
15: maxSpread = 0
16: maxNode = ∅
17: for each c ∈ CP do
18: ∀x ∈ δc call SIMPATH(S, η, V − x, V) to compute δV−x(S)
19: for each x ∈ δc do
20: call SIMPATH(S, η, V − S, V) to compute δV−S(x)
21: if x /∈ BorderNodesSet then
22: α(x) = 1
23: δ(x) = δ(x) + α(x) ∗ δ̄ that x belongs to
24: update δc based on the new spread value of x
25: u = top node of δc
26: if δ(u) > maxSpread then
27: maxSpread← δ(u)
28: maxNode← u
29: S = S ∪maxNode
30: return S
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should be updated, we compute their spread values by the SIMPATH algorithm,
and the node with the maximum spread is chosen as the seed node. In line 18,
δV−x(S) is the spread value of seed set S in the graph containing nodes in set V
except node x and its edges.
2.4 Evaluation
To compare our algorithm with other approaches, we have done our experiments on
four real datasets and compared the algorithms based on running time, the quality
of seed nodes and memory usage. The code is written in C++ and all experiments
are run on a Linux (Ubuntu 10.04) machine with 3.2GHz Intel Xeon CPU and 128GB
memory.
2.4.1 Datasets
We have used four real-world datasets to run our experiments on; their speci-
fications are shown in Table 2.1 and available on the SNAP library of Stanford
University website1.Using SLPA algorithm, we find the communities of the datasets
to be used by INCIM algorithm. The specifications of the found communities of the
datasets are shown in Table 2.2. In both Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the # sign indicates the
number of elements.
2.4.2 Algorithms to compare
INCIM: The algorithm presented in this paper.
LDAG: The approach proposed in [CYZ10]. We set the parameter θ = 1/320 as
recommended by authors.
SIMPATH: The algorithm in [GLL11b] running with parameters η = 10−3 and l = 4
as recommended by authors.
1http://snap.stanford.edu/
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Table 2.1: Specifications of real standard datasets
NetHEPT Slashdot Amazon DBLP
#Nodes 15K 82K 262K 914k
#Edges 62K 948K 1.2M 6.6M
Average out-degree 4.12 9.8 9.4 7.2
Maximum out-degree 64 1527 425 950
#Connected components 1781 1 1 41.5K
Largest component size 6794 82K 262K 789K
Table 2.2: Specification of communities of the datasets
NetHEPT Slashdot Amazon DBLP
#Communities 2901 12K 32674 73489
#Nodes in the biggest community 407 6050 2852 771
#Edges in the biggest community 2938 16294 7169 3193
IPA: The proposed algorithm in [YKK13] running with threshold = 0.005 as recom-
mended by authors.
PageRank: The algorithm proposed in [BP98]. In this paper, nodes with maximum
ranking are chosen as seed nodes. The algorithm stops when the score vectors from
two consecutive iterations differ by at most 10−6 as per L1− norm.
HighDegree: This algorithm [KKT03] chooses the nodes with maximum out-degree
as seed nodes.
Our reasons to compare INCIM with the aforementioned algorithms are as
follows: PageRank and HighDegree are two well-known and basic algorithms
which are compared with most of the other works. SIMPATH is an algorithm with
good results in running time, memory usage and quality of seed nodes. Also, LDAG
has good results in quality of seed nodes and reasonable response time. At last, IPA
uses the idea of communities to find the most influential nodes.
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2.4.3 Experimental results
Comparison of memory usage The memory usage of HighDegree and the PageR-
ank algorithms is almost zero because they do not need to store any structures
when they are running, but LDAG has the most memory usage among compared
algorithms because this algorithm makes a DAG for each node in the graph. INCIM
uses higher amount of memory than SIMPATH but lower than LDAG. The results























Figure 2.2: Comparison based on memory usage in different algorithms
Comparison of seed set quality An algorithm with higher quality is the algorithm
that has higher influence spread. Based on the experimental results shown in
Figure 2.3, the INCIM algorithm has the highest quality seed set among other
algorithms, except in the Slashdot dataset where the IPA algorithm achieves the
best results. While INCIM uses the SIMPATH algorithm to compute the spread of
nodes, its spread of seed set is a little better than SIMPATH in most of the cases
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because INCIM uses a combination of local and global spreads and thus tracks both
the effect of each node in its community and the effect of each community.
(a) netHept (b) slashDot
Amazon
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(c) Amazon (d) DBLP
Figure 2.3: Influence spread achieved by various algorithms
The IPA algorithm has lower quality of seed sets than other algorithms in
all datasets, except the slashdot dataset. In netHept and Amazon, IPA has the
lowest quality of seed set and in DBLP, its quality is higher than the PageRank and
HighDegree algorithms but lower than INCIM, SIMPATH and LDAG. As we can
see, IPA has an uncertain behavior because for some datasets, the quality of its
seed nodes is higher than other algorithms while for most others, it results in lower
quality; hence, the IPA algorithm is not so reliable.
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Comparison of running times Figure 2.5 shows the results of comparisons based
on running times. In the NetHept dataset, the running time of PageRank and
HighDegree are considerably low, so the plots for these algorithms in NetHept
dataset are omitted. IPA has better running time than INCIM, SIMPATH and
LDAG and runs in a time close to that of PageRank and HighDegree. The INCIM
algorithm has the best running time among other algorithms, except IPA, PageRank
and HighDegree. These three algorithms have better running times, however
they fail in finding the seed nodes with high quality, which is the main target
of influence maximization problem. They trade off the quality of seed nodes for
running time. We plotted the running time versus the influence spread achieved
by different algorithms for seed set of size 50, which is the seed size used in our
other comparisons and also used by other approaches [GLL11b, CYZ10, YKK13],
in Figure 2.4.
As we see in Figures 2.5(a) and 2.5(d), INCIM performs slower than SIMPATH at
the beginning of its running time. For instance, in Figure 2.5(a), the time needed to
find seed nodes until the number of seed nodes reaches 15, is higher than the time
needed in the SIMPATH algorithm. The reason is that, the INCIM algorithm finds
the communities of the graphs in the preprocessing step. Also, in the first iteration,
INCIM computes the spread of the nodes of all communities, but in other iterations,
only the communities which are considered by Algorithm 2.2, should be updated.
Table 2.3 shows the running time improvement of our proposed algorithm for
choosing 50 seed nodes comparing with SIMPATH, which we used for calculating
the spread values. As we can see, our approach has an improvement in running
time between 27% - 68% based on different datasets.
The effect of communities As we mentioned in this paper, in the INCIM al-
gorithm, seed nodes are chosen using communities of the input graph. In each
iteration of the algorithm, computing the spread of each node is done locally in
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(a) slashDot (b) netHept
(c) Amazon (d) DBLP
Figure 2.4: Spread of influence vs. running time for seed sets of size 50
its community. Also, when node v is chosen from community Ci, the spread of
other nodes of community Ci along with the spread of nodes in communities with a
simple path from Ci, should be updated. Thus, the spread of only a limited number
of nodes would be updated in each iteration, instead of updating all of the nodes
in the graph. By this contribution, the algorithm runs faster in other iterations.
Figure 2.6 shows the number of communities that are updated in each iteration.
INCIM in its first iteration, computes the spread of all nodes in all communities,
but in other iterations, the number of communities to be updated is decreased, and
the number of spread computation calls is decreased, too. As the number of seed
nodes is increased, there are more simple paths from seed nodes to other nodes in
other communities. So, after some iterations, the number of communities which
should be updated, is increased in comparison to the second iteration where there
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Table 2.3: Speed up in different datasets
Algorithms Datasets
compared DBLP Amazon Slashdot NetHept
Simpath 29% 27% 68% 43%
is only one seed node; but the number of communities in later iterations is anyway
less than that of the first iteration.
The efficiency of final spread computation To study how efficiently we compute
the spread of nodes in our approach, we run INCIM and simple greedy algorithm
[KKT03] which uses Monte Carlo simulations (MC) on two moderate and two larger
datasets (Amazon and DBLP respectively) and compare the spread achieved by
them. We choose 5 different randomly selected set of nodes as seed sets of size 10,
20, 30, 40 and 50 and run INCIM and MC simulations 10000 times to compute the
spread of the seed sets. The results are shown in Figure 2.7.
As we can see in Figure 2.7, the values which are computed by INCIM are very
close to the values computed by Monte Carlo simulations for different sets of nodes.
For Amazon dataset, the differences between the values computed by INCIM and
MC are 0.68%, 0.5%, 0.8%, 0.62% and 0.85% for sets of size 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50
respectively. Also, For DBLP dataset, the differences between the values are 0.8%,
0.69%, 0.73%, 0.32% and 0.47% for sets of size 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 respectively.
Kempe. et al. showed that their approximation algorithm [KKT03], that we refer
as the Monte Carlo simulations, can achieve at most (1− 1/e− ε) of the optimal
solution and the other algorithms that can achieve near results are considered as
practical algorithms. By the experiments in this section, we showed that the INCIM
algorithm can calculate the spread values, which is a combination of local and
global spreads, with an approximation very close to the MC results.
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Figure 7. Comparison of running time of different algorithms
(a) netHept































































































Figure 7. Comparison of running time of different algorithms
(b) slashDot































































































Figure 7. Comparison of running time of different algorithms(c) Amazon































































































Figure 7. Comparison of running time of different algorithms
(d) DBLP
Figure 2.5: Comparison of running time of different algorithms
2.5 Conclusion and future work
We can categorize the recent works in influence maximization problem in three
groups. Some papers such as [LCL12, SBV+12, CCC+11, HSCJ12] study the influ-
ence maximization problem by considering competitors. In such papers, a com-
petitive model is described which is in most cases an extension of linear threshold
or independent cascade model. Some papers such as [CLZ12] study the influence
maximization problem with temporal constraints. The main goal of such works
is that influence propagation will be done in a limited time. Other works try to
propose an algorithm to solve the influence maximization problem in a reason-
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Figure 2.7: The spread achieved by different randomly selected seed sets
proposed algorithm, finds the influential nodes in communities of the graph. In
this algorithm, spread computation of nodes is done locally in communities of the
graph which causes a reasonable decrease in running time. Also, in each iteration
of the algorithm, the marginal gain of only a limited number of nodes is computed,
based on the communities they belong to, which causes the number of calls to the
subroutine computing the spread of nodes, to be decreased, and thus the running
time is also decreased.
For future work, we are interested in studying the competitive influence maxi-
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mization problem in which there is more than one influence spread from different
competitors. Considering the graph content and choosing the influential nodes
based on the topic given as input, is the other path for our future work.
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maximization in social networks
under a competitive linear threshold
model
(This chapter is based on a paper published in Knowledge-Based Systems, 2017
[BSKW17])
The effect of online social networks (OSNs) in our daily life is undeniable as they
have introduced new ways of communication and serve as a medium for propa-
gating news, ideas, thoughts and any type of information. Such information can
propagate via links between people, which leads to word-of-mouth advertising
and its famous application, viral marketing. In viral marketing, the owner of a
product gives free or discounted samples of a product to a group of people to
gain a large number of adoptions through the word-of-mouth effect. The influ-
ence maximization problem, which is motivated by the idea of viral marketing,
was introduced by Kempe et al. [KKT03] as finding a subset S ⊆ V contain-
ing of k nodes in a graph G = (V, E), such that the spread of influence from S
will be maximized. There exists a huge amount of work on solving the influ-
ence maximization problem [KKT03, LKG+07, YKK13, GLL11, CYZ10a]. Most of
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these works assume that there is only one party trying to find influential users
in the social network. However, in the real world, multiple parties typically com-
pete simultaneously with similar products. This is called competitive influence
maximization (CIM). Recently, several works have tried to solve the CIM prob-
lem [HSCJ12, CCC+11, LBGL13, BKS07, BAEA11, LYW+16, KAAB17, WLY+16] by
proposing new propagation models which are extensions of Linear Threshold and
Independent Cascade models [KKT03] or the Distance-based and Wave-propagation
models [SBV+12].
In this paper, we examine the CIM problem from the follower’s perspective
and propose a new propagation model called DCM (Decidable Competitive Model)
which is an extension of the Linear Threshold model. In DCM, each node has
the ability to think about the incoming influence spreads from its neighbors for d
timesteps and then decide to be activated by the neighbour with the majority of
adoption.
In real social networks, people interact with each other based on common
interests and strong ties between themselves. Such strong ties between individuals
create community structures in social networks, which in turn allow information to
circulate within these networks at a high velocity. We propose an algorithm called
Competitive Influence Improvement (CI2) which finds the minimum number of
influential nodes within their respective communities. Closely related to our work
are [BHZR16, KLPL13, WCSX10, HPZNN17, ZLJ16] which also exploit community
structure within social networks to find influential nodes.
Contribution. Our major contributions in this research are summarized as follows:
• We propose the DCM propagation model, the primary intent of this work,
which gives decision-making power to nodes based on incoming influence in
a competitive version of the LT propagation model.
• We prove the NP-hardness of competitive influence improvement under the
DCM model.
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• We propose the CI2 algorithm to find the minimum number of the most
influential nodes for a competitor C2. This algorithm uses knowledge of
the nodes selected by a competitor C1 so that C2 can achieve more influence
spread by spending less budget. Computing the spread of seed nodes is done
locally inside communities of the input graph, which results in a substantial
decrease in running time.
• We conduct experiments using three real and three synthetic datasets to show
that CI2 can find influential nodes in an acceptable running time. Synthetic
datasets are generated with the same number of nodes and edges but different
community structures in order to track the effect of community structure
of networks on our approach. Also, we consider the effect of the algorithm
which finds the seed nodes for the first competitor on the seed nodes which
will be selected by the second competitor by conducting different experiments
which use well-known algorithms [BHZR16, KKY13, CYZ10b] to extract the
first competitor’s seed set.
Organization. In Section 3.1, we review some background knowledge to enable
a better understanding of the upcoming concepts. In Section 3.2, we describe our
Linear-Threshold-based propagation model, prove that competitive influence im-
provement under this model is NP-hard, and propose our CI2 algorithm. Section 3.3
describes the experiments performed with real and synthetic data to evaluate the
proposed approach. Finally, in Section 3.4, we give our conclusions and directions
for future work.
3.1 Background and Related Work
In [KKT03], Kempe et al. introduced two propagation models to address the influ-
ence maximization problem, the Linear Threshold (LT) and Independent Cascade
(IC) models. In both models, a threshold value θ ∈ [0, 1] is assigned to each node
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and each node can be active or inactive. Also, each edge from node u to node v has
an influence weight pu,v ∈ (0,1]. At first, all nodes are inactive except the nodes in
set S which have been activated before as seed nodes and the propagation process is
started from them. In LT, an inactive node v can be activated at time t if fv(S) > θv,
where S stands for v’s neighbors which are activated at time t− 1. As Kempe et al.




where pv,u is the weight of edge (v, u). In the LT model, the sum of all edge weights
between v and its neighbors should be less than or equal to 1 [KKT03].
In IC, the activation process is the same as that in LT except that in IC, an acti-
vated node u has only one chance to activate its inactive neighbor v with probability
pu,v.
Community structure. In a graph, the communities are subsets of nodes with more
connections between them and fewer ones to the nodes in different communities
[LP49]. In community detection, a graph G = (V, E) is given and the target is to
partition the graph nodes into k subsets S1, S2, · · · , Sk, such that
⋂k
i=1Si = ∅ and⋃k
i=1Si = V. This condition is for none-overlapping community detection and for
the overlapping version, we can remove the
⋂k
i=1Si = ∅ constraint [HCL14].
Competitive influence maximization. Recently, several works have tried to solve
the competitive influence maximization by introducing new propagation models to
simulate the competitive manner of the competitors which are mostly an extension
of the LT or IC models. Some efforts such as the ones introduced in [CNWVZ07,
SBV+12] look to this problem from the follower’s perspective, i.e. they assume
that there are two competitors trying to find some influential nodes and the second
competitor starts his process with knowledge of the seed nodes selected by the first
competitor and tries to find some new seed nodes other than the ones selected by
the first competitor to achieve more influence spread. In some other works such as
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the ones presented in [HSCJ12, CCC+11] one competitor tries to block the effect of
the other competitor. In K-LT [LBGL13] and WPCLT [BFO10] models, the authors
solve the competitive influence maximization problem from the host’s perspective,
i.e. the owner of the social network is responsible for fairly allocating some specific
number of seed nodes to the competitors. In the next section, we explain K-LT and
WPCLT models in more details as they are more related to our work.
3.2 Propagation model and algorithm
In this section, we introduce the DCM propagation model (which is an extension of
the LT model), compare DCM with the Weighted-proportional (WPCLT) [BFO10]
and K-LT [LBGL13] models, and prove the NP-hardness of competitive influence
improvement under DCM. Finally, we introduce the CI2 algorithm to find the
influential nodes in a social network under our competitive propagation model.
3.2.1 DCM propagation model
In the DCM propagation model, each node can be in one of the following states:
inactive, thinking, active+ or active−. Suppose there are two competitors who try
to advertise for their products over a social network. We denote the first competitor
with the + sign and the second competitor with the − sign and each node v, picks
a threshold value θv uniformly at random from [0,1]. Let S1 be the seed set selected
by the first competitor and S2 be the seed set selected by the second one. At first all
nodes except those in the seed set are inactive. The activation process of node v is as
follows: at time t > 1 if the total incoming influence weight from the in-neighbors
of v which are active (Ninactive(v)) reaches the threshold value of v, its state changes
to thinking, which means the state of node v would be changed if
∑
u∈Ninactive(v)
pu,v ≥ θv (3.1)
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Node v remains in thinking state after this state change for d timesteps and after
that, it decides to become active+ or active− based on the maximum total incoming
influence weight from its in-neighbors. Let A+t+d be the set of in-neighbor nodes
of v with state active+, A−t+d be the set of in-neighbor nodes of v with state active
−,
and At+d be the set of all in-neighbor nodes of v that are active at time t + d. The
state of node v changes from thinking to active+ or active− as follows:
vstate =
active
+, if ∑u∈A+t+d pu,v > ∑u∈A−t+d pu,v
active−, otherwise
(3.2)
In the WPCLT model, which was proposed by Allan Borodin et al. [BFO10],
the state of a node v changes to active+ with probability ∑u∈A+t−1 pu,v/ ∑u∈At−1 pu,v.
This means that a node v would be activated as active+ (active−) at time t with
probability equal to the ratio between the total weight from the in-neighbors with
state active+ (active−) and that from all active in-neighbors. Wei Lu et al [LBGL13]
noted that in the WPCLT model, when a node is about to activate, the neighbors
which have been activated in all previous timesteps are considered; this, however,
does not assure recency, which is when the customer’s choice among competing
products relies more on recent than old information [PM11, HS09]. Hence, Wei Lu
et al proposed the K-LT model [LBGL13] in which the activation probability of node
v at time t relies on its in-neighbors which have just been activated at time t− 1
rather than all past exposures such that the state of a node v changes to active+ with
probability ∑u∈A+t−1\A+t−2 pu,v/ ∑u∈At−1 pu,v.
In both the WPCLT and K-LT models, a node cannot decide whether it would be
activated or not, while in the real world when people decide to whether to purchase
or consume a product, they are influenced by the decisions made by others. Even
when individuals seem to be making decisions separately, they are likely to be
mindful of the preferences of others [WH12].
As an example, imagine that the structure in Figure 3.1 is part of a social graph
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in which, nodes w1 and w3 have been activated before as active+ and active−
respectively and nodes w2 and w4 haven’t been activated yet and θv = 0.25 (we
show that nodes w2 and w4 are connected to other nodes of the graph by the
dotted lines around them). At time t1, in both WPCLT and K-LT models node v is
influenced by the total incoming influence which is larger than its threshold value
θv. Thus node v would be activated as active+, as pw1,v > pw3,v. Now imagine that
nodes w2 and w4 are activated as active− by other nodes of the graph at time t2; this
means that in both the WPCLT and K-LT models, node v is in active+ state at time
t2, while the majority of its neighbors have been activated as active−. But in DCM,
the state of node v changes from inactive to thinking at time t1 and its state remains
stable for d timesteps so that it can consider different influence spreads, after which
it decides to be activated by the influence spread which is accepted by the majority
of its neighbors. This causes the state of node v to change from thinking to active−
after d timesteps in the DCM model. Therefore, it is reasonable to give the ability to









Figure 3.1: An example graph substructure.
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3.2.2 NP-hardness of competitive influence improvement under
DCM
Let a vertex-labeled and arc-weighted community-structure graph be G = (V, A, l, p)
where V is the vertex-set, A is the arc-set, l : V → {inactive, thinking, active+, active−}
is the vertex-label function, and p : A→ (0, 1] is the arc-weight function. Consider
the vertex-labels in G after influence propagation under the DCM model is com-
plete, and let N− and N+ be the number of vertices in G with labels active− and
active+, respectively. We want to select a set of vertices S+ of size at most k relative
to a given set S− such that S+ ultimately has more influence than S− — that is, we
want N+ to be larger than N−. Let D(S−, S+) = max(0, N+ − N−) and ED(S−, S+)
be the expected value of D(S−, S+) (with this expectation arising from the various
θv being chosen uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1]1).
The problem of influence improvement under DCM can now be stated formally
as follows:
DCM COMPETITIVE INFLUENCE IMPROVEMENT (DCI-Imp)
Input: A community structure graph G = (V, A, l, p), a seed-set S−, and
positive integers d, k > 0 and c ≥ 0.
Output: A seed-set S+ of size at most k such that ED(S−, S+) > c, if such
a S+ exists, and special symbol ⊥ otherwise.
This problem looks easy, as we are only requiring some fixed amount of improve-
ment (which is the smallest possible, i.e., any improvement, when c = 0). However,
looks can be deceiving.
Theorem 1. If DCI-Imp is polynomial-time solvable when d = 1 and c = 0 then P = NP.
1Uniform choice of θv is consistent with previous linear-threshold-based models of influence
propagation such as that in [KKT03]. However, the results in this section apply relative to θv choice
under any distribution over [0, 1] (including, but not limited to a uniform distribution) as long as that
choice is ergodic, i.e., there must be a finite non-zero probability for every θv ∈ [0, 1] being picked,
including 0 and 1 as border cases.
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Proof. We first show that DCI-ImpD, the decision version of DCI-Imp (which asks
whether or not the requested S+ exists), is NP-hard by a polynomial-time reduction
from the following NP-hard problem:
DOMINATING SET [GJ79, Problem GT2]
Input: A graph G = (V, E) and an integer k.
Question: Is there a dominating set in G of size at most k, i.e., is there
a subset V′ ⊆ V, |V′| ≤ k, such that for each v ∈ V, either v ∈ V′ or
∃(v, v′) ∈ E such that v′ ∈ V′?
For any graph G = (V, E), let N(u) be the set of all vertices in G that are in-
neighbors of vertex u in G (including u itself). Given an instance (G = (V, E), k) of
DOMINATING SET, construct the following instance (G′ = (V′, A, l, p), S−, d, k′, c)
of DCI-ImpD:




2, . . . , v
2
|V|}, and
V3 = {v31, v32, . . . , v3|V|+(k−1)}.
• A = A1 ∪ A2 where A1 = {(u, v) | u ∈ V1, v ∈ V2, and v ∈ N(u)} and A2
ensures that each each vertex in V2 has incoming arcs from exactly two distinct
vertices in V3.
• The initial labeling l of V is such that all vertices in V3 have label active− and
all other vertices have label inactive.
• p is such that the weight of each arc in A1 is 1/2|V| and the weight of each arc
in A2 is 1/4|V|.
• S− = V3.
• d = 1, k′ = k, and c = 0.
This construction can be done in polynomial time in the size of the given instance
of DOMINATING SET.
By the construction of G′ above, the only vertices that can change label from
inactive to thinking (and thereafter to either active+ or active−) under DCM are the
vertices in V2. A vertex v in V2 will only be able to change label from inactive to
thinking if θv > 1/2|V|. Such a thinking vertex v will then have final label active−
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unless there is at least one vertex u in V1 with label active+ that has an arc to v (as
the weight of such an arc would outweigh the weights of the two incoming arcs
from V3 and hence force v to have label active+). As |V3| = |V|+ (k− 1), D(S−, S+)
can only have value 0 or 1 for a given S+, with the value of 1 occurring if and only
if θv > 1/2|V| for each vertex v in V2 and the k vertices in S+ force all vertices in V2 to
have label + under DCM. However, by the construction of G′, the vertices in such a
S+ correspond to a dominating set of size k in G. Given that θv is drawn uniformly
from [0, 1], there is a S+ such that for some values of θv, D(S−, S+) = 1 and hence
σ(D(S−, S+)) > c = 0 if and only if there is a dominating set of size k in the given
instance of DOMINATING SET.
The above establishes that DCI-ImpD is NP-hard. To complete the proof, note
that any polynomial-time algorithm for DCI-Imp can be used to solve DCI-ImpD
in polynomial time, which, by the definition of NP-hardness, would imply that
P = NP.
This result shows that if the conjecture P 6= NP is true (which is widely believed
within Computer Science [For09, GJ79]), the simplest type of competitive influence
improvement cannot be computed correctly for all inputs in polynomial time.
One might still hope that this problem is practically solvable in polynomial time.
Two senses in which this might be possible are:
1. DCI-Imp is solvable in effectively polynomial time under certain restrictions.
For example, there might be an algorithm for DCI-Imp that is exponential-time
in general relative to the number k of nodes in S+ but runs in polynomial time
when k is a small constant. Such an algorithm would have runtime f (k)nx
where f is an arbitrary function, n is the input size, and x is a constant. This
notion of effective polynomial-solvability is the fixed-parameter tractability
underlying Downey and Fellow’s theory of parameterized computational
complexity [DF99].
2. DCI-Imp is solvable in polynomial time by a probabilistic algorithm with
high probability, e.g., > 2/3. This notion of solvability is essentially what
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many types of stochastic heuristics (in particular, those based on evolutionary
computation) promise.
However, it turns out that these types of solvability are also unavailable to us, as
proved in Theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 2. If DCI-Imp is fixed-parameter tractable relative to parameter k when d = 1
and c = 0 then FPT = W[2].
Proof. In the reduction given in the proof of Theorem 1, the size k of the requested
dominating set in the given instance of DOMINATING SET is equal to the size
k′ of S+ in the constructed instance of DCI-Imp. Hence, this reduction is also a
parameterized reduction relative to parameter k′ in the constructed instance of
DCI-IMP. This result then follows from the W[2]-hardness of DOMINATING SET
relative to parameter k and the inclusion of FPT in W[2] [DF99].
Theorem 3. If P = BPP and DCI-Imp is polynomial-time solvable by a probabilistic
algorithm which operates correctly with probability ≥ 2/3 then P = NP.
Proof. BPP is considered the most inclusive class of problems that can be efficiently
solved using probabilistic methods (in particular, methods whose probability of cor-
rectness is ≥ 2/3 and can be efficiently boosted to be arbitrarily close to probability
one) [Wig07, Section 5.2]. If DCI-Imp has a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
which operates correctly with probability ≥ 2/3, DCI-ImpD is in BPP. However,
as BPP = P and DCI-IMPD is NP-hard by Theorem 1 above, the definition of
NP-hardness then implies that P = NP.
These results show that if, in addition to P 6= NP, the conjectures FPT 6= W[2] and
P = BPP are also true (both of which are widely believed within Computer Science
(see [DF99, DF13] and [Wig07, Section 5.2], respectively)), in general, the simplest
type of competitive influence improvement cannot be practically computed in either
of the senses above (the former relative to small-sized S+).
To summarize, the results in this section effectively rule out several popular
types of efficient algorithms for competitive influence improvement under the DCM
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model. As such, they also justify the search for and use of heuristic algorithms such
as the greedy community-based algorithm described in the remainder of this paper.
3.2.3 Community-based algorithm
Motivated by the useful characteristics of communities in social networks which
we mentioned previously in Section 3.1, we decided to base our CI2 algorithm
for competitive influence improvement on influential nodes in the community
structure of input graph G. An overview of CI2 is shown in Figure 3.2. At first, the
communities of the input graph are extracted; these communities are denoted by
labels C1, C2 and C3 in the figure. Then, in each community, the most influential
node is selected as a seed candidate. Finally, the node which has the maximum
influence spread among candidate nodes is selected as a seed node. The selected
seed node for the second competitor is denoted with a + sign in Figure 3.2. The CI2
algorithm is explained in more detail in the following section.
Community detection. Many approaches have been proposed to solve the com-
munity detection problem in online social networks. MLAMA-Net [MM16] is
an evolutionary algorithm, which solves the community detection problem in
a network of chromosomes using evolutionary operators and local searches. In
MLAMA-Net, each node includes a chromosome and a learning automaton. Each
chromosome explores a community for its corresponding node using evolutionary
operators and improves the community by a local search. The learning automaton
is responsible for saving the histories of local searches of each node. Very related
to MLAMA-Net, Khomami et al. proposed DLACD [KRM16], which extracts the
community structure of complex networks based on distributed learning automata.
To find the communities of the input graph, we use the listener-speaker approach
introduced in [XSL11] in conjunction with the information diffusion model. First,
each node v is considered as a unique community with community label equal to
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Figure 3.2: An overview of the CI2 community-based algorithm.
the community labels from its neighbors. To decide which label will be accepted by
the selected node, the weights of the incoming edges are considered. For example,
suppose a selected node v has four in-neighbors u1, u2, u3 and u4, with edge
weights 0.1, 0.05, 0.3 and 0.25 respectively. When node v considers the labels from
its neighbors, it will weight each label as 0.1/(0.1 + 0.05 + 0.3 + 0.25) for node u1,
0.05/(0.1 + 0.05 + 0.3 + 0.25) for node u2, 0.3/(0.1 + 0.05 + 0.3 + 0.25) for node
u3 and 0.25/(0.1 + 0.05 + 0.3 + 0.25) for node u4. Then, the selected node accepts
one label from the collection of the received labels from its neighbors based on a
specified listening rule, such as the popularity of the observed labels in the ongoing
step. This process is then repeated and at each step, one new node is selected as the
consumer of the information. The main reason for using the approach of [XSL11] to
find graph communities is its ability (verified by experiments done in [XSL11]) to
efficiently find high-quality communities.
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Seed selection. After constructing the community structure from graph G, we need
to find the minimum number of nodes for the second competitor which achieve
higher influence spread than the influence spread achieved by the nodes selected
by the first competitor. The spread value of node v is the number of nodes which
can be accessed and activated by node v and the spread of nodes in set S is the sum
of spreads of each node in the set.
In each community Ci, we locally run an algorithm which uses DCM as its
propagation model to find the most influential node in Ci and store the node ID and
its spread value in candidate seed set S′. In this step we can use any approximation
algorithms, even the simple greedy algorithm [KKT03], to show the applicability of
our propagation model in solving the competitive influence maximization problem.
Note that the node which is selected as a candidate node in this step should be
different from the nodes which have been selected for the first competitor. The size
of S′ is equal to the number of communities and in each step, this set is updated to
hold the new candidate seeds of each community. Among the candidate seeds, the
one which has the maximum marginal gain is selected and added to S2. S1 and S2
are seed sets of the first and second competitors respectively such that
S2 = S2 ∪ arg maxv∈S′(δ(S2 ∪ {v})) (3.3)
In Equation (3.3), δ(S2 ∪ {v}) is the marginal gain of adding node v to seed set
S2.
Stop criterion. The above seed selection process is continued until the influence
spread achieved by nodes in S2 reaches the influence spread achieved by nodes in
S1. The steps of our community-based algorithm are shown in Algorithm 3.1.
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Algorithm 3.1 The CI2 community-based algorithm.
Input: G = (V, E), S1
Output: S2
1: S2 ← {}
2: Construct the communities of the input graph G and store them in
CommunitiesSet
3: while δ(S2) ≤ δ(S1) do
4: S′ ← {}
5: for each Ci ∈ CommunitiesSet do
6: call simple greedy algorithm to find most influential node si /∈ S1 in com-
munity Ci
7: S′ = S′ ∪ {si}
8: S2 = S2 ∪ arg maxv∈S′(δ(S2 ∪ {v}))
9: return S2
3.3 Evaluations
To evaluate the efficiency of our community-based algorithm in finding high-quality
seed sets in an acceptable running time, we have done our experiments on three
real-world datasets. These experiments show that there is a trade-off between
running time and the quality of seed nodes selected by a competitor by changing
parameter d, the number of timesteps a node can think about the incoming influence
spread. To track the effect of community structure of networks on our approach,
we also have used three synthetic datasets with the same numbers of nodes and
edges but different community structures. Our code is implemented in C++ and all
experiments were run on a Linux (CentOS 7.0) machine with a 3.6GHz Intel Core i7
CPU and 16GB of memory.
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Table 3.1: Specifications of real standard datasets.
NetHEPT Slashdot Amazon
#Nodes 15K 82K 262K
#Edges 62K 948K 1.2M
Average out-degree 4.12 9.8 9.4
Maximum out-degree 64 1527 425
#Connected components 1781 1 1
Largest component size 6794 82K 262K
Table 3.2: Specification of communities in the real standard datasets.
NetHEPT Slashdot Amazon
#Communities 2901 12K 32674
#Nodes in the biggest community 407 6050 2852
#Edges in the biggest community 2938 16294 7169
Average out-degree in the biggest community 6.2 11.67 2.52
Maximum out-degree in the biggest community 48 1407 5
3.3.1 Experiments setup
Dataset. The real-world datasets that we have used in our experiments are available
from the SNAP library on the Stanford University website1 and their specifications
are shown in Table 3.1. Using the community detection algorithm described in
Section 3.2.3, we found the communities in these datasets; the specifications of these
communities are shown in Table 3.2. In both Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the # sign indicates
the number of elements.
To generate our synthetic datasets, we used LFR benchmark [LFR08], which
specifies the heterogeneity of the networks by the distributions of node degrees
1http://snap.stanford.edu/
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(a) µ = 0.03 (b) µ = 0.08
(c) µ = 0.15
Figure 3.3: Three networks generated by LFR benchmark with 1000 nodes and
different mixing parameter values.
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and community sizes. The node degrees and community sizes are taken from
power law distributions with exponents γ and β respectively. By assigning three
different values (0.03, 0.08 and 0.15) to the mixing parameter µ, setting N = 1000
(the number of nodes), γ = 2 and β = 1, and varying the in-degree of nodes
between 0 to 50 with average 15 and the community size between 20 and 50, we
generated three different datasets, which are visualized in Figure 3.3. Note that
the mixing parameter determines the fraction of one node’s links to other nodes
inside its community and nodes outside its community. More specifically, each
node shares a fraction of 1− µ of its links with the nodes inside its community and
a fraction of µ with nodes belonging to other communities.
Algorithms. We ran the implementation of our CI2 algorithm with the above
described datasets as well as the following algorithms:
• The greedy approximation algorithm [KKT03], which uses Monte Carlo (MC)
simulations to compute the spread of a node within a factor of (1− 1/e− ε)
for any ε > 0. In this algorithm, MC simulations were performed 10,000 times
to compute the spread of the seed sets.
• The INCIM algorithm [BHZR16], which computes the spread value of each
node such that it is very close to that computed by Monte Carlo simulations.
This algorithm finds the influence of each node as a combination of its local
and global influences to track the effect of each node in its community and
also, the effect of each community in the input graph.
• The IPA algorithm [KKY13], which selects as seed node the node which has
maximum influence propagation probability in each iteration. Based on the
recommendations in [KKY13], we set parameter threshold = 0.005.
• The LDAG algorithm [CYZ10b], which computes the spread of each node in
its belonging DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) locally and achieves good results
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in quality of seed nodes. Based on the recommendations in [CYZ10b], we set
parameter θ = 1/320.
• The HighDegree algorithm [KKT03], which selects as seed node the node
which has maximum out-degree.
The results of these algorithm runs are discussed in the next section. Two char-
acteristics of these algorithms are worth noting. First, both the INCIM and IPA
algorithms use the idea of communities to find influential nodes and like LDAG
have reasonable running times and find good quality nodes. Second, though the
HighDegree and greedy approximation algorithms are now almost 15 years old
and may thus appear to be obsolete, they are still very commonly used in compar-
isons involving recently-proposed approaches to competitive and non-competitive
influence maximization [OCC16, PHN+16, KAAB17, WLY+16, LYW+16].
3.3.2 Experimental Results
Setting parameter d As we mentioned in previous sections, in the DCM propaga-
tion model, each node can think about incoming influence spread for d timesteps
and then decides to be activated based on the majority of its neighbor’s adoptions.
When d = 1, information propagates the same as in the LT propagation model,
where nodes can think for only one timestep about incoming influence spread, and
we have the best running time. As the value of parameter d is increased, nodes have
more time to think about incoming influence, which allows the selection of seed
nodes with higher quality; however, this also results in increased running time. In
Figure 3.4, we can see the changes in influence spread and running time associated
with values of parameter d from 1 to 15. We did this experiment on the NetHEPT
dataset with a seed set of size 50.
As we can see in Figure 3.4(a), as the value of parameter d changes from 1 to 7,






















































Values of parameter d
Running time
(a): Spread of influence (b): Running Time 
Figure 3.4: The effect of parameter d on influence spread and running time.
parameter d from 8 to 15 provides a marginal increase in influence for a great cost of
increased running time (see Figure 3.4(b)). We performed the same experiment on
the Amazon and Slashdot datasets and got essentially the same results. Hence, we
set the value of parameter d to 7, the point of diminishing returns, in the remainder
of our experiments. The value of d may be different for other datasets.
Efficiency of proposed algorithm. To study how efficiently we compute the spread
of nodes by extracting seed nodes from communities, we randomly selected 5
different set of nodes as seed sets of size 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 from each of the
Amazon, NetHept and Slashdot datasets and ran CI2 and Monte Carlo simulations













































































































































































































































Number of randomly selected nodes
MC CI2 (Ours)
(a): Amazon (b): NetHEPT (c): Slashdot 
Figure 3.5: The influence spreads achieved by different randomly selected seed sets.
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Table 3.3: Differences between the influence spread values computed by MC and
CI2 (in percentage).
Datasets Seed set size
Used 10 20 30 40 50
Amazon 2.07% 2.63% 2.51% 1.81% 2.13%
NetHEPT 2.44% 1.54% 2.21% 3.33% 2.48%
Slashdot 2.15% 2.30% 3.56% 2.75% 1.35%
The differences between the values computed by MC and CI2 are shown in
Table 3.3. The results in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.3 show that the values which are
computed by CI2 are very close to the values computed by Monte Carlo simulations
which computes the spread of a node with a good approximation guarantee.
In these runs, calculating the spread of nodes locally inside the communities
they belong to seems to cause a huge decrease in running time. To verify this, we
used our CI2 algorithm to find a seed set of size 50 from the NetHEPT dataset
by (1) considering existing communities and calculating the spread values locally
inside communities and (2) calculating the spread of each node in the whole graph
without considering their own community. In the former case, CI2 finds the seed
nodes in approximately 22 seconds, while it finds such seed nodes in approximately
70 minutes in the later case. This clearly shows the effect of localizing the spread
calculations in running time, which is the result of considering community structure
in the CI2 algorithm.
Seed selection To simulate the competitive condition from the follower’s per-
spective, we chose some seed nodes randomly and activated them for the first
competitor as negative and ran CI2 to select the minimum number of nodes with
higher influence spread for the second competitor. The nodes selected for the sec-
ond competitor should be different from the ones selected for the first competitor.
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We also did the same process by running the greedy approximation algorithm and
the INCIM [BHZR16], IPA [KKY13], LDAG [CYZ10b] and HighDegree [KKT03]
algorithms with different values for k as their budgets. The generated seed sets are
of size 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50. The minimum number of nodes selected by CI2 to
defeat the first competitor in each case is shown in Figure 3.6.
As we can see in Figure 3.6, the minimum number of nodes which is required to
be selected by the second competitor to achieve higher influence spread depends
deeply on how the seed nodes are selected by the first competitor. In Figure 3.6(a),
in which the seed nodes of the first competitor are selected randomly, fewer nodes
in each set are required to defeat the first competitor. However, when we extract the
actual seed nodes by running the algorithms mentioned above, in each set of nodes,
more nodes must be selected by the second competitor. For example, in Slashdot
dataset in Figure 3.6(b), 72 seed nodes must be selected to achieve higher influence
spread than the spread achieved by an actual seed set of size 50, while only 13
nodes need to be selected to achieve higher influence spread when the nodes in the
set of size 50 are selected randomly. Also, the algorithm which is used to extract the
actual seed nodes for the first competitor affects the number of seed nodes that need
to be selected by the second competitor, as different algorithms achieve different
levels of quality in their seed node extraction. In Figure 3.6(c-f), the number of seed
nodes that need to be selected to defeat the first competitor are 69, 67, 64 and 61 if
the seed sets of size 50 are extracted by the INCIM, IPA, LDAG and HighDegree
algorithms respectively from the Slashdot dataset. These figures tell us that as seed
nodes are selected with higher quality for the first competitor, more seed nodes
other the selected ones must be selected by the second competitor.
The effect of community structure on seed selection To study how the structure
of communities can affect the quality of seed nodes, we ran CI2 on three synthetic
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Figure 3.6: Minimum numbers of nodes which need to be selected by the second




























µ = 0.03 µ = 0.08 µ = 0.15
Figure 3.7: Influence spread achieved on LFR networks with different mixing
parameter values.
ent values to the mixing parameter in LFR benchmark. If the value of the mixing
parameter is smaller, the communities are loosely connected to each other and there
are few links between nodes in different communities. The results of our runs
on LFR networks in Figure 3.7 show that CI2 is better at finding seed nodes in
networks whose community structures are more prominent. This is demonstrated
by the observation that in the first network with the smallest mixing parameter, the
influence spread achieved by the extracted seed set is higher than the two other
networks with larger mixing parameter values. One way to help CI2 act better
in networks with less prominent community structure is to consider the effect of
border nodes [BHZR16] on influence spread computations. Border nodes have at
least one link to nodes in other communities, which allows the spread of influence
from a border node’s own community to others and vice versa. As the main point
of this paper is to propose the DCM propagation model and our aim of using
community structure in CI2 algorithm is to improve the running time of finding
seed nodes, we will address the issue of border nodes in future work.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we studied competitive influence maximization from the follower’s
perspective and introduced the Decidable Competitive Model (DCM), an extended
version of the LT model, for influence propagation in a competitive fashion. To find
the influential nodes in a social network graph, we proposed an efficient algorithm
which extracts the communities of the input graph and finds the most influential
node in each community as a seed candidate. Then the final seed nodes are selected
from the set including seed candidates. The size of the final seed set should be as
small as possible, i.e. we assign the seed nodes to the second competitor so as to
achieve higher influence spread comparing with the spread achievement of the first
competitor’s seed set by spending less budget. The ability of nodes to think about
incoming influence in the DCM propagation model simulates a realistic situation
in which a node’s tendency is toward the spread of influence which has been
adopted by the majority of their neighbors after d timesteps. Adding parameter d
to simulate the thinking ability of nodes results in finding influential nodes with
higher quality; moreover, by calculating the spread values of each node locally
inside its community, we achieved an acceptable running time. The results of our
experiments on different real and synthetic datasets prove the effectiveness of our
propagation model.
There are several promising directions for future research. First, faster algo-
rithms than the greedy algorithm used here could be used inside communities to
find influential nodes. Second, the effect of border nodes on the quality of seed
nodes should be investigated in networks with different community structures.
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Networks: Challenges and Solutions
(This chapter is ready to be submitted as a paper to a suitable journal or conference)
Online social networks (OSN) such as Facebook, Google+ and Twitter have attracted
billions of users which are using their free services. Such OSNs allow their users
to communicate with each other in different ways such as sending messages, pub-
lishing their ideas which can be seen by huge number of people, sharing photos,
like other user’s activities, etc. Besides these general-purpose social networks, there
are some other social networks which are made for professional purposes such
as Linkedin which is a business-oriented social network or Sermo 1 and Doximity 2
which are social networks for healthcare providers with over half a million users.
The centralized nature of user data which is stored on the company’s storage
servers and is controlled by one single entity causes a range of privacy concerns.
The administration cost of general-purpose social networks like Facebook, forces
the providers to monetize user data far beyond the user’s sharing interests. Users’
concerns about their private data increases in Healthcare Social Networks (HSNs)





The worry about OSNs privacy concerns goes beyond the users’. In July 2009,
the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) complained about
Facebook approaches to default privacy settings, collection and use of users’ personal
information for advertising purposes, disclosure of users’ personal information to
third-party application developers, and collection and use of non-users’ personal
information [oCD09]. Also, in April 2010, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
and the heads of the data protection authorities in France, Germany, Israel, Italy,
Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain and the United Kingdom sent a letter to
the chief executive officer of Google Inc. to express their concerns about privacy
issues related to Google Buzz [Car10].
Based on the importance of OSNs in people’s daily life and the sensitivity of
their data, a mechanism which can block or at least minimize the users’ privacy
violation while preserve the OSN advantages is strongly needed. In the last few
decades, a huge amount of work has been devoted to research on privacy and to
address the privacy problems over OSNs. The term privacy is a multifaceted and
complex concept which can be viewed from different perspectives. Based on the
research which was done by Gürses [DG10], privacy can be classified into three
paradigms: privacy as control, privacy as confidentiality and privacy as practice.
Privacy as control states that there should be a mechanism to enable individ-
uals to control and oversee the collection, processing, and use of their data. The
organizations that collect and process user data are supposed to act honestly. This
paradigm relates to the definition of privacy by Westin: “the right of the individual
to decide what information about himself should be communicated to others and
under what circumstances”[Wes68]. In privacy as confidentiality, trusting organi-
zations is avoided and disclosing any information by individuals is prevented or
minimized by some mechanisms such as cryptography. This paradigm is related
to the definition of privacy in [WB90]: “the right to be let alone ”. In both privacy
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as control and privacy as confidentiality, the main focus is on security and both
concepts try to allow individuals to prevent information disclosure or organizations
to enhance the security of data they hold and prevent its abuse for illegal purposes.
However, privacy has some other social dimensions beyond the decisions made in
isolation [DG12]. Technologies in the privacy as practice paradigm try to make the
information flow more transparent instead of concealing and controlling it. This
paradigm relates to Agre’s definition of privacy: “the freedom from unreasonable
constraints on the construction of ones own identity ”[AR98].
The architecture of OSNs can be viewed from different points of view based on
the way user data is stored and supervised. In most known OSNs such as Facebook,
Google+ and Twitter which use centralized client-server architectures, the users’ data
and their interactions are stored on OSN servers and are supervised by a single
entity, i.e., the OSN provider. In such centralized architectures, users’ privacy is
always facing potential privacy violations by the provider. To protect user data
from a ”big-brother” scenario with OSN providers, decentralized or peer-to-peer (P2P)
architectures for social networks have begun to emerge. In such OSNs, user data
can be stored on data owners’ computers, friends’ computers, random peers over
the social network or any trusted third-parties’ external storage [BB13]. Diaspora
[RG] with over 400000 users is the most successful decentralized OSN. A mixture
of centralized and decentralized architectures is called hybrid architecture which
stores user data on both providers’ dedicated servers and users’ trusted servers.
To the best of our knowledge, just a few studies have been done to address the
privacy concerns about Healthcare Social Networks (HSNs) [Li13, Cha16, LBL+12,
Li15]. However, the users of such online communities share sensitive information
about their health conditions which may negatively affect their job opportunities,
reputation, relationships and insurance choices if the data would be revealed to
unauthorized entities.
In this chapter, we explore different privacy solutions proposed for OSNs and
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explain each solution and their pros and cons in applying them to OSNs. In
Section 4.1 we discuss concepts that the reader should be familiar with to better
understand the paper. Section 4.2 is the section in which we will introduce known
privacy solutions for OSNs in three categories and we discuss the applicability of
each solution for different types of OSNs in Section 4.3. Then in Section 4.4, we
explain in detail why we recommend the decentralized architectures for OSNs and
discuss the design limitations and how to overcome them to have a practical P2P
architecture. We discuss what can be a suitable approach for healthcare OSNs in
Section 4.5. We conclude our chapter in Section 4.6.
4.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce fundamental concepts of security and privacy and re-
view some basic encryption approaches which are needed for better understanding
of the chapter.
4.1.1 Online Social Networks (OSNs)
Social networks serve as a medium for modeling interactions between individuals,
groups and organizations. A social network can be modeled as a directed or
undirected graph G = (V, E) where V and E are the set of nodes and edges of
G. Individuals are modeled as the set of nodes V and the relationships between
them is modeled as the set of edges E. The relationships between individuals
are established based on the friendships in their real world life, being co-tagged
in a photo, co-authoring a book, etc. The edges in graph G can be weighted or
unweighted based on the problem which needs to be solved.
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4.1.2 Peer-to-Peer (P2P) overlays
P2P overlays can provide solutions for pervasive environments like wireless and
mobile networks which need a flexible and extensible underlying network to sup-
port different levels of diversity and personalization concerning both the users and
the applications [Mal15]. In such environments, P2P overlays allow for multiple
virtual network topologies to be built on top of the actual physical networks.
The P2P overlays are classified into four groups: structured P2P, unstructured
P2P, multi-layer and bio-inspired P2P [Mal15]. In structured overlay, the nodes
are connected to each other in a specific way like Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs)
which allow the uniform distributions of the resources among the nodes. However,
these tight structures between nodes make these overlays inefficient for dynamic
networks [Mal15] like social networks in which the churn rates are high, because in
each churn, the network should be updated to fix the structure.
Unstructured overlays are the second type of overlays in which the node rela-
tionships and lookup operations are more flexible in comparison with structured
ones. There are some pros and cons in using such overlays over the underlying
network. The flexibility of the connections guarantees resilience and robustness in
dynamic networks and reduces the maintenance costs such as the overhead of the
message exchanges. But the lookup operations are done by flooding [Mal15] which
make them less inefficient for lookups in comparison with structured overlays.
These types of operations are useful for single- and multi-attribute range queries
[Mal15].
In some networks in which different types of applications need to work together,
two or more overlays can be employed to minimize the management overheads and
also, benefit from efficient resource discovery of structured overlays and flexible
membership of unstructured ones together [Mal15]. These are called multi-layer
overlays.
The bio-inspired overlays are inspired from the biology field and are character-
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ized by their adaptive and reactive behaviour in distributed operations, that are
resilience to failure of components and are self-organized. These features make
them suitable to be used in heterogeneous environments with distributed operations
[Mal15]. The resource discovery in these overlays is done using swarm intelligence
techniques which make their implementation computationally difficult as they are
based on self-organization and the plethora of independent agents interact with
each other using indirect means [Mal15].
4.1.3 Group Key Management
One of the important functional building blocks for secure multicast architectures
like video conferencing, software updates and broadcasting stock quotes is group
key management protocol. In group encryptions, there exists a sender which sends
the data to a group of receivers in a secure multicast session handled by two main
entities called Group Controller and Key Server [CS05]. The sender sends a secret
symmetric key SK to all group members and asks the key server to generate another
secret key Ki per each user i and all the keys are stored in the key server. The secret
symmetric key itself is communicated to the group member on a secured public
channel between the server and the group members, that can be established by
DiffieHellman key exchange protocol [Res99]. To multicast a message, the sender
encrypts data with SK using a symmetric encryption algorithm so that the receivers
can decrypt the data with key SK. When a group member leaves the group, re-
keying is required as follows: the key server generates a new SK′ and encrypts it
with Ki of each user except the leaving member and broadcasts the new key to the
group members. So, the next encryptions will be done by the new generated key.
Another scenario in which re-keying is required is when a new member wants to
join an existing group. In this scenario, a key server generates a secret key Kj for the
new member j and generates a new key SK′, then encrypts SK′ with previous SK to
the existing members and encrypts it with Kj for the new member and broadcasts
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the new keys. By this way of key broadcasting, new members cannot decrypt the
previous messages sent in the group [CS05].
4.2 Privacy Solutions
To address the privacy concerns over OSNs, several approaches have been proposed
in recent years. Some of these approaches try to present a framework which
can be integrated with centralized architecture of current OSNs and preserve the
privacy of users by some mechanisms like data encryption [TGS+08, LB08, GTF08,
LXH09, BBS+09, SZF10, JMB11, BKW11, RMJ13, RMJ14]. These approaches trust
the OSN provider and user data is stored in OSN servers. However, there are
some other approaches which believe that the privacy concerns of OSNs are related
to their centralized nature. Such approaches presented a decentralized or peer-
to-peer architecture for OSNs and try to introduce new features which cannot be
supported by current OSNs to motivate users to use the new architecture [BSVD09,
Str09, JNM+12, Nar12, BB13, RJM15, NJM+12, GADS+16]. In such frameworks,
user data is stored on peers or user-trusted storage servers. Besides these two
categories, some other approaches have been proposed which are a hybrid of
centralized and decentralized architectures which use a hybrid of OSN providers’
storage servers and users’ trusted storages which can be users’ machines, users’
friends’ machines or cloud storage servers which are managed by users themselves
[RMJM11, SLC+11, WSW+11, LSC+11]. In the reminder of this section, we will
introduce the known approaches, which have been done to the date of this paper
with the aim of preserving users’ privacy in OSNs, and categorize them based
on the way they store user data into three groups, centralized, decentralized and
hybrid. Finally, we conclude this section with discussing the privacy solutions
presented for health-care OSNs.
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4.2.1 Centralized OSNs
In Figure 4.1, an overview of centralized approaches is shown. In the centralized
architectures, user data is stored on the servers which are controlled by the provider












Figure 4.1: An example of centralized approaches: encrypting user data before
storing on centrally controlled storage servers, but the relations between users can
be seen by the provider.
Lockr [TGS+08] is a browser plug-in in which users can define social access
control lists (ACL) to restrict their friends access to specific data and the defined
ACLs are reusable in different websites. A user who wants to grant access of her
published content to one of her friends should define a small piece of meta-data
called ”attestation” including an issuer, a recipient, a social relationship between
two parties, an expiration date, a relationship key and a digital signature. The
attestation is signed by the sender’s private key and encrypted by the receiver’s
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public key and is stored by the receiver after verification and decryption. This
approach can hide private data but the relationship between users is plain and
the data is stored on OSN servers in plain-text form. Lockr needs to reissue the
attestations with new relationship keys when a revocation is done and supports
only one-to-one communication, which means one attestation is issued for one
receiver, not a group of receivers.
flybyNight [LB08] uses a JavaScript implementation of AES and RSA and their
own implemented El Gamal to transmit encrypted messages to Facebook using a
Facebook API. The El Gamal algorithm is used for encrypting one-to-one commu-
nications while for one-to-many communication (group encryption), the authors
uses proxy cryptography. To to so, the user generates a group key for each group
member which would be the public key and a proxy key. Then encrypted data
is transfered along with the public key to a proxy server. In the proxy server, the
encrypted data would be re-encrypted again with the proxy key, n times for each
group member. flyByNight does not support efficient revocation as a new group
key and new proxy keys are required per each group member after revoking just
one member from the existing group.
The idea behind NOYB (short for ”None Of Your Business”) [GTF08], which
was introduced at the same time as Lockr [TGS+08] and flyByNight [LB08], is that
the profiles of users are partitioned into smaller clusters called atoms. The atoms
of one user are substituted with atoms of another user in the same cluster pseudo-
randomly and then the encrypted index of each atom is stored in a dictionary. The
dictionaries are stored on a different server and key exchange between users is done
out-of-band (OOB). NOYB does not introduce any mechanism to define permissions
to different friends or groups of friends. Also, the completeness of the dictionaries
is related to the number of users which use NOYB. Therefore, the number of NOYB
users affects its effectiveness.
Persona [BBS+09] is another framework for centralized OSNs in which users’
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private information is hidden using ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption
(CPABE). Using ABE allows friend-of-friend interactions without requiring enumer-
ations of friend and attribute lists. A friend may limit who may read a response to a
wall post to a more restricted group. The dynamic grouping feature of Persona is
the result of using an attribute-based mechanism for encryption. But Persona does
not support an efficient revocation mechanism. Persona OSN is a Mozilla plugin
which can also work with other social networks such as Facebook and can integrate
with Facebook applications.
Submitting encrypted data to OSN servers may attract the attention of the
providers and cause some profile tracking, which may worry the users. Therefore,
the authors of FaceCloak [LXH09] introduced a mechanism in which the users’
private data is encrypted and stored on a third-party server which is trusted by
the user herself while some other fake data related to encrypted data are stored in
OSN servers in plaintext form. The fake data is generated using some dictionaries
for replacing sample texts such as names, but for more complex texts such as a
poem, some related fake text is replaced from Wikipedia. FaceCloak consists of
three phases: setup, encryption and decryption. In the setup phase, three keys are
generated: a master key and personal index key that are distributed to the user’s
friends by some out-of-band mechanism and an access key that is stored locally in
the user’s machine. In the encryption phase, text that starts with a unique separator
such as @@ is encrypted and stored in a third party server, and fake data is sent
to the social network server. Private data is stored as an index-value pair on a
third-party server, where the value is the data encrypted by the master key and
the index is a unique number generated from a cryptographic hash of a personal
index key and the type of private data. In FaceCloak, modifying the real content
of posts published by other users on one’s profile is not possible. Also, there is no
mechanism to define one-to-many communication.
One of the weaknesses of the previous approaches is that none of them support
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an efficient revocation mechanism which would be suitable for the frequently
changing social group memberships. The need of such a principal feature for
encryption-based systems which are used to preserve the privacy in social networks
encourages Sun et al. [SZF10] to introduce a privacy preserving approach which
supports dynamic revocation and search over encrypted data without decrypting it.
The main difference of this approach is in using broadcast encryption for efficient
revocation coupled with role-based searchable encryption. When a member is
revoked from a group, her public key is also revoked. So, in the decryption phase
of the broadcast scheme, she cannot obtain the renewed secret key to decrypt the
ciphertexts anymore.
EASiER [JMB11] is another approach which supports efficient revocation by
introducing an attribute-based encryption approach, in which the decryption pro-
cess is done by the participation of a minimally trusted proxy server that handles
revoked users and attributes. In EASiER, the centralized OSN provider acts as the
proxy server which cannot decrypt the messages directly since it doesn’t have the
attribute keys. When an unprovoked user wants to decrypt a ciphertext, she sends
a part of the ciphertext to the proxy server and receives some information, which
can be combined with the secret key of the user so the ciphertext can be decrypted.
In each revocation, just the proxy key would be renewed and the users re-key their
proxy keys. The superiority of EASiER’s attribute-based approach, compared to the
role-based approach of [SZF10], lies in its ability for multiple encryptions per each
role, which may be needed on same scenarios.
Scramble [BKW11] is a Firefox extension which allows users to define access con-
trol lists (ACL) of authorized users for each piece of data, based on their preferences,
and guarantees confidentiality of users’ data towards the social network site (SNS)
providers by storing encrypted data in a TinyLink server and its corresponding link
in the OSN servers. PGP’s web-of-trust (Pretty Good Privacy)[Zim95], which is a
data encryption and decryption concept that provides cryptographic privacy and
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authentication for data communication, is the key distribution mechanism used in
Scramble. There is no efficient revocation mechanism in Scramble and users are
required to distribute a new public key upon key revocation or key update.
CP2 (short for ”Cryptographic privacy protection”) [RMJ13] introduces a public
key broadcast encryption scheme which protects not only users’ private data from
the OSN provider and unauthorized users, but also the relationships between users
in the OSN. To protect the relationships, the user’s friends are determined by a
unique index which is a pseudonym other than the friend’s real name. Then the
mapping between users’ real names and their pseudonym is stored securely on
OSNs servers. Also, the groups’ names are specified by a pseudonym so that no
one will be aware of the user’s relationship with her friends. Using flexible access
controls of CP2, users can define new access policies using the combinations of
friends and relations with some boolean operations such as AND, OR, NOT. CP2
supports one-to-many communication and also provides an efficient mechanism
for group revocation.
Raji et al. [RMJ14] introduced another public key broadcast encryption scheme
which enables users to protect their shared data while keeping their connections/re-
lationships with other users anonymous. Also, users can employ the privacy setting
of other users in the same group. This is done by using a proxy server. When a user
wants to share data for the first time in a group in which another user has already
specified a privacy setting, the proxy server runs an algorithm to prepare some
parameters for the user and sends the result and the header information related
to the group to the user. This way, the user can use the defined policies of the
group to which she belongs to share her own data. The approach of this paper
[RMJ14] supports one-to-many communication and employs an efficient revocation
mechanism.
Table 4.1 gives a comparison of the illustrated solutions for centralized OSNs
based on different privacy concerns. There are different types of key distributions
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which we categorize into two groups: in-band and out-of-band. In in-band dis-
tribution, the encryption keys are generated and stored on OSN servers and are
distributed to the users. In out-of-band distribution, the key generation is done on
a third-party server and the keys are distributed by an out-of-band mechanism like
email, phone call, letter or via a third-party server. Also, based on the number of
senders of encrypted data in a group, communications can be one-to-one, one-to-
many and many-to-many [RMJ14]. In one-to-one communication, a sender encrypts
her data which can be decrypted by one specific receiver, while in one-to-many
communication, just one user can send encrypted data to the group and the other
members of the group can only be the receivers. But in many-to-many communica-
tion, each user in a group can be both sender and receiver. As we mentioned, most
of the privacy-preserving approaches for centralized OSNs use some encryption
mechanisms to protect user data. By encrypting data, some functionalities of OSNs
such as searchability are not accessible, especially in the cases where private data is
stored on a third-party server. Among the summarized approaches in the current
section, just Sun et al. [SZF10] presented a solution to search over encrypted data
without decrypting it in OSNs.
Methods Protect from Protect Efficient Search Key Communication
OSN Provider Relationships Revocation without Decryption Distribution Support
Lockr [TGS+08] – – – – In-bound One-to-one
flyByNight [LB08] – – – – Out-of-bound (proxy server) One-to-many
NOYB [GTF08] X – – – Out-of-bound One-to-many
FaceCloak [LXH09] X – – – Out-of-bound Many-to-many
Persona [BBS+09] X – – – Out-of-bound Many-to-many
Sun et al. [SZF10] X – X X In-bound One-to-many
EASiER [JMB11] X – X – Out-of-bound (proxy server) One-to-many
Scramble [BKW11] X – – – Out-of-bound (PGP) One-to-many
CP2 [RMJ13] X X X – In-bound One-to-many
Raji et al. [RMJ14] X X X – Out-of-bound (proxy server) Many-to-many
Table 4.1: Comparing the privacy approaches proposed for Centralized OSNs
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4.2.2 Decentralized OSNs (Peer-to-Peer)
The centralized nature of OSNs in which all user data is accessible by a single entity,
i.e. the OSN provider, encourages researchers to change their way of thinking
about preserving user data, which leads to a shift from client-server to a peer-
to-peer architecture coupled with encryption so that the users can protect their
own data and can have direct data exchange with other users without constant
Internet connectivity. The idea of decentralized social networks comes from the
P2P file sharing systems like Napster1 and Soulseek2 which were mostly used for
music. There are also other file sharing systems like Groove3, which is the Microsoft
project for music sharing that supports some communication mechanisms such as
discussion forums and search features. This way, Groove fulfills the requirements
of OSNs. Figure 4.2 shows a big picture of decentralized approaches.
In this section, we discuss the decentralized approaches that try to address the
OSNs’ privacy concerns with the main focus on data availability, users’ privacy and
searching in distributed environments. The approaches that are selected are the
state-of-the-art ones that have attracted significant attention in this scope.
PeerSoN (short for ”P2P Social Networking”) [BSVD09] tried to overcome two
limitations of OSNs which are privacy issues and the requirement of Internet
connectivity while keeping OSN features like searchability. The main properties
of PeerSoN are encryption, decentralization, and direct data exchange. Encryption
provides users’ privacy and decentralization based on a P2P infrastructure. This
limits the full accessibility of an OSN provider to user data and makes it easier
to integrate direct data exchange between users’ devices into the system without
the need for Internet connectivity. PeerSoN benefits from a two-tier architecture





Distributed Hash Table (DHT)
Figure 4.2: An example of decentralized approaches: user data is stored in users’
storage servers
Hash Table (DHT), which is implemented using OpenDHT1, is used in which the
meta-data about users and their data are stored. Users’ offline messages are stored
on DHT for further accessibility.
To protect users from potential privacy violations by the provider, Safebook
[Str09] introduced a three-tier decentralized architecture relying on cooperation
among some social network users called peers. Safebook nodes form three types
of overlays: matryoshkas, P2P lookup service, and trusted identification service
(TIS). Matryoshkas form concentric rings of nodes surrounding each central node.
Matryoshkas act as trusted data stores, and as interaction points with other central
nodes. Direct contacts of each node shape the innermost shell of a matryoshka
called mirrors, which stores the core’s data in an encrypted form. Entrypoints
are the nodes in the outermost shell of a matryoshka, which acts as a gateway
for all data requests addressed to the core. In Safebook, each node is known by
an unambiguous identifiers or pseudonym which the mapping between nodes
and their pseudonyms are stored on TIS. In Safebook, each user has to trust other
1www.opendht.org
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nodes as her private data are stored encrypted on other node’s storages and all
data transfers are done through those nodes. This may be one of the weaknesses of
Safebook which causes some worries for its users.
LifeSocial.KOM [GGS+11] is another P2P architecture for OSNs with a number
of plugins that provide critical features of OSNs such as search, chat and group
generation. The core network layer of LifeSocial.KOM is a structured DHT-based
P2P overlay. Each user can define a privacy policy for their contents and include
the public key of the users authorized to access the contents.
LotusNet [AR12] is a P2P architecture for OSNs with a flexible and fine-grained
access control system. The framework is shaped by three layers: identity man-
agement, services and application logic. Identity management resides in a DHT
structure for handling interactions. Content is grouped by content type. Upon
sharing, the identity of the owner and the receiver, an expiration time and a regular
expression that specify the granted content types, is grouped into a grant certificate.
In this way, grants are paired with social contacts, rather than with shared resources
and limits the number of grant certificates.
Like LotusNet, the Prometheus access policies are a combination of some el-
ements, such as type of relationship, weight that specify the trust level of the
relationship and the users locations [KFA+10]. The user is able to define both white
lists and black lists to include or exclude specific users. The P2P architecture of
Prometheus is based on a DHT overlay. In their overlay, each user has a group
of trusted peers that act as user’s replicas and are responsible to provide the data
availability in the when the user is offline.
Porkut [NPA10] is another decentralized OSN which focuses mainly on avail-
ability by replicating user data on trusted friends’ storages. This approach considers
the geographical locations and online time patterns of users to select the best replica
nodes by different greedy algorithms, each of which concentrates on different cost
minimization objectives such as access cost, number of replicas and storage cost.
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Also, a privacy preserving indexing mechanism is introduced which facilitates
content discovery among friends. The indexes are stored on a DHT-based table in
the form of (key, value) pairs. Search terms are the keys of the index table and the
user profile identifiers are mapped to the value fields. In order to protect content
and owner privacy, the pairs are K-anonymized and will be published into index
table. By K-anonymizing the pairs, each pair is identical with at least K− 1 other
pairs [Swe02].
DECENT [JNM+12] is a modular and object-oriented architecture which uses a
DHT to store user data and supports flexible attribute policies and fast revocation.
There are three access policies for each object in DECENT: Read policy (R-Policy),
Write policy (W-Policy) and Append policy (A-Policy). R-Policy is an attribute-
based policy which describes the read access policy of each object. W-Policy is
an identity-based policy which is assigned to the object owner and describes who
can modify or delete the content of an object. A-Policy is an attribute-based policy
which describes who can add a comment/annotation to an object. DECENT uses
a mechanism for fast revocation which is the same with the one used in EASiER
[JMB11] with attribute delegation support. So, the users can define a friend-of-
a-friend attribute and ask all her contacts to delegate it to all of their contacts.
DECENT can protect users’ relationships from third-parties that may have no
relationship with the object owner and are therefore untrusted, such as storage
nodes.
As we stated earlier, one of the final goals of P2P architectures is to introduce a
mechanism to make social networks available without the need for Internet access.
To achieve this goal, users’ profiles should be accessible even when they are offline.
Rammohan Narendula [Nar12] introduced a mechanism to model user online times
in OSNs from their activity times. As in a decentralized architecture, user data
is stored in replicas which are mainly users’ friends, the online time of each user
depends on the online time of their replicas. Therefore, there should be an overlap
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between user’s online time and, at least, one of the nodes which is selected as
a replica node. The solutions which are suggested in [Nar12] to choose the best
replicas are: selecting the minimum number of replicas which have a time overlap
with the other replicas, selecting the top-k most active friends and finally, selecting
random friends which should be connected in time.
The authors of Pesca [RJM15] believe that the techniques which are used to
consider the availability of content in decentralized OSNs without Internet access
should consider not only the user’s status in terms of being online/offline in the
network but also the access control assigned to the published data. Therefore, they
introduced PESCA which enables the privacy of user data while considering its
availability by employing a broadcast encryption mechanism. In this framework,
the availability of each user is defined as a user online table (UOT) consisting of
users’ online patterns. Users’ online patterns are extracted from the times each
user communicate with her social friends by tracking her resource usages such as
storage or processing power usage. In PESCA, the best candidates to be selected
as replicas are the ones which are online at the time of sharing a content and also
are online when data audiences may access the content. A dynamic algorithm
selects the minimum number of online friends as replicas based on the union of the
up-times of data owner and her friends.
The main focus of eXO [LNTM11] is on searching and content discovery in
distributed OSNs. It uses a DHT overlay resource discovery for retrieving stored
content and they also enable the users to add tags to the content. However, tags are
not included in the global indexer and are stored on the owners’ computer. These
tags are used for query expansion: upon receiving a response form the DHT, the
user can contact the corresponding owner in the query response to retrieve the
related tags and issue a new query based on those tags.
Cachet [NJM+12], which is the improvement of DECENT [JNM+12], is an archi-
tecture which protects confidentiality by an attribute-based encryption, integrity
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by digital signature and availability of data in distributed OSNs. User data is
stored encrypted on untrusted nodes which shape a DHT. The authors argued that
showing a newsfeed to the user with hundreds of friends in a decentralized OSN
protected by an encryption mechanism, requires fetching the wall updates from all
their friends’ profiles and decrypting them, which takes minutes to be completed.
This process would be non-practical if the number of updates increases. Therefore,
they introduced a gossip-based social caching algorithm, which increases the perfor-
mance of newsfeed displaying. More specifically, when a user posts content on her
wall, online contacts who satisfy the ABE policy defined by the user provide cached,
decrypted content to other contacts who also satisfy the policy. So when an offline
contact gets online and wants to view the latest newsfeeds, an algorithm locates
other online contacts which have a cached version of new updates and query them
to be retrieved. The DHT is used for retrieving updates which may not be cached,
which ensures higher level of data availability.
Self-Organized Universe of People (SOUP) [KLF14] is another framework to
guarantee data availability with minimal replication overhead and without assum-
ing any permanent online storage. This framework is able to handle both high
churn of regular participants and attacks from malicious users. The replica nodes
are selected in two modes: bootstrapping mode and regular mode. When a node
joins the network newly, it is entered in the bootstrapping mode in which the node
begins to learn from the experience of its neighbors about their mirrors. After that,
the node goes into the regular mode and in this mode, the set of mirrors may be
changed periodically based on the exchanged experiences between nodes. SOUP
also employs a protective dropping algorithm to enable the nodes to decide they
accept extra mirror requests which may need to drop the data of some of the nodes.
The authors of My3 [NPA12] also put their focus on providing the data availabil-
ity in distributed OSNs and also try to solve the data inconsistency problem. Based
on their results, the authors believe that with having 4-5 replicas for each user, they
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can achieve availability higher that 90%. In their replica placement algorithm, the
minimum number of replicas are selected among the user’s trusted friends and the
content is stored on the replicas as plaintext. Therefore there is no confidentiality
involved in the My3 approach, in contrast to the previous approaches in this chapter
such as Pesca [RJM15]. To provide data consistency, when a replica comes online,
it notifies all other online replicas and updates its content with updates from the
others.
A recent work discussing the availability problem in decentralized OSNs is
DiDuSoNet, proposed by Guidi et al. [GADS+16]. In this work, the authors pro-
posed a Dunbar-based, specific kind of sub network with a limited number of
relations per each user. The dynamic framework in which the replicas are selected
from a user’s trusted friends in a way that the replica set is changed dynamically
due to users churn. When a user u joins the network, it selects a user among its
online friends, say v, as a replica and replicates its profile on that node. When v
becomes offline, u is responsible to select another replica when online, otherwise v
should select another replica and replicate u’s profile on the new replica and then,
v can leave the network. It means that the set of replicas for each user is selected
dynamically and the users’ profile is replicated each time on one’s storage. The best
candidate to be a replica node in each join/leave is selected based on a combination
of common friends between the data owner and the replica, online duration periods
of nodes and the number of contact frequencies between nodes. It is stated in the
paper that by replicating a user’s profile on only two online replica, maximum
availability is guaranteed in this framework. The authors also introduced FRoDO
[AGGR15], which is a protocol that can be applied to any P2P systems including
structured and unstructured P2P networks.
In Table 4.2, we can see a comparison of proposed approaches for decentralized
OSNs. This table clearly shows that just a few of these approaches can present a
mechanism which preserves the search feature of OSNs. Using search features in
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OSNs, users can find their friends from real life in the OSN or make new connections
based on common interests [BD09].
Methods Storage Interaction Availability Search
Method
PeerSoN [BSVD09] Nodes in DHT DHT – –
Diaspora [RG] User trusted storage (pods) DHT – –
Safebook [Str09] Trusted friends DHT – –
LifeSocial.KOM [GGS+11] DHT DHT – X
LotusNet [AR12] DHT DHT – X
Prometheus [KFA+10] Trusted peers DHT X –
Porkut [NPA10] DHT Trusted friends X X
DECENT [JNM+12] Random nodes in DHT DHT – –
Narendula et al. [NPA10] Trusted friends Direct or using a third-party server X X
Narendula et al. [Nar12] Trusted friends Direct or using a third-party server X –
PESCA [RJM15] DHT resides in users’ storage space DHT X –
eXO [LNTM11] DHT DHT – Partially supported
Cachet [NJM+12] Untrusted nodes in DHT DHT X –
SOUP [KLF14] Trusted friends DHT X –
My3 [NPA12] Trusted friends DHT X –
DiDuSoNet [GADS+16] Trusted friends DHT X –
Table 4.2: Comparing the privacy approaches proposed for decentralized OSNs
4.2.3 Hybrid OSNs
In most hybrid approaches, users can decide about where to store their private data.
In Figure 4.3, an overview of hybrid approaches is shown in which user’s private
data is stored on personal servers, while public data is stored on the provider’s
servers which are controlled centrally.
Raji et al. [RMJM11] proposed a privacy protection mechanism which employs
an identity-based broadcast encryption in which the relation keys are not stored
anywhere and they are obtained by a broadcast encryption algorithm in each
request. In this approach, the setup algorithm of the BE scheme is responsible
for generating the public/secret key pair for each user and the users can choose a
storage server for storing their private data. The selected storage server can be a















Figure 4.3: An example of hybrid approaches: private data is stored on personal
storages
Vis-a-Vis [SLC+11] is a decentralized framework for OSNs which is based on
the privacy-preserving notion of a Virtual Individual Server (VIS). A VIS is a virtual
machine which is running in a paid cloud-computing utility such as Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2) or Rackspace Cloud Servers. The main focus of Vis-a-Vis
is to protect users’ shared locations from unauthorized entities by storing them
encrypted on VIS. Also, Vis-a-Vis allows users to apply range queries to data items
by using a hierarchical structure rather than a distributed hash table (DHT).
Polaris [WSW+11] is another distributed OSN which improves users’ privacy
and preserves economic incentives for the OSN providers. In Polaris, users can
select different types of storages based on different application domains. As an
example, users can store their public photos on the photo sharing websites and
store their private data on their own mobile devices. In the end, there is a trade-off
between users’ sensitivity about their data and their economic preferences.
In Confident [LSC+11], two different types of servers are used for their decen-
tralized architecture: desktop and enterprise storage servers and cloud-based name
servers. The storage servers host user data and the authentication information are
selected from the users’ trusted friends. Confident relies on the social trust between
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friends. Therefore, data is stored plain on the storage servers. A list of available
replicas and a logical clock per each user are stored on the name servers, but name
servers cannot access the plain data as they are not trusted to access them.
4.2.4 Healthcare online social networks
To the best of our knowledge, a limited number of studies have been done with
the main focus on preserving users’ privacy in Healthcare online Social Networks
(HSNs). Most of the works try to present some recommendations to protect the pri-
vacy of health data and make the users aware about the potential privacy breaches
over HSNs and teach them how to protect their data using different settings pro-
vided by OSNs.
In [WWJ10], Williams et al. discuss the existing challenges of information
management in HSNs and explain how software developers can design a built-
in privacy protection OSN. The authors suggest that all the organizations which
deal with user data must adopt certain privacy principles such as: proactiveness
of privacy not its reactiveness, which means to fix privacy problems before they
happen, privacy by default, privacy by design, end-to-end lifecycle protection and
respect for users’ privacy.
The authors of [Li13] believe that policy makers and stakeholders are responsible
for keeping the online health data private and they should consider the suggestions
below in designing a secure OSN:
• Privacy awareness: minimize the amount of data which is shared by users to
accomplish the intended purpose.
• Privacy by education: prepare the users with a user-friendly way of privacy
settings.
• Privacy by design: building data protection and privacy by design into the
platform.
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• Privacy by regulation: using users’ data with their consent and prohibiting
inappropriate uses of health data.
Charbonneau et al. [Cha16] report a content analysis of privacy policies and
disclosure practices for 25 online ovarian cancer communities and they present a
coding sheet instrument to collect data from online ovarian cancer communities.
The data were collected based on four primary areas:
• notification to participants about how personal information is collected, used,
or shared
• choices for participants to opt out from sharing their data with third parties
• details about security measures used to protect personal health information
• ability for participants to access, modify, or delete the personal information
The results of the studies in this paper show that 96% of sites collect personal
information from their users and share them with third parties, 56% of them use
cookie technology to track users’ behaviors, 36% of them offered opt-out choices
for sharing data with third parties and just 28% of them allow users to delete their
accounts whenever they want.
Jingquan Li [Li15] also analyzes the privacy and security characteristics of
HSNs and believe that an effective protection for both the HSNs and their users
is accessible based on a shared responsibility between the OSN provider and the
users. Loiselle et al. [LA17] apply decentralization to protect users’ sensitive data
and they suggest to create HSNs on existing blockchain architecture.
HealthShare [LBL+12] is one of the approaches which presents a practical so-
lution to protect HSNs user data by two attribute-oriented authentication and
transmission schemes. The attribute-oriented authentication scheme enables users
to generate a tree structured attribute proof for themselves to anonymize their
105
sensitive attributes. The attribute-oriented transmission scheme enables the users to
encrypt their health information into a ciphertext bonded with a customized access
policy with two modes: direct and indirect. For direct mode, users create the access
policies by themselves; for indirect mode, a delegated user may help to create an
appropriate access policy for the received ciphertext without having an access to
the content.
The most recent work on designing a healthcare-focused application is a Mind-
fulness Virtual Community (MVC) that Morr et al. [EMMA+20] have presented.
They have developed a user-centered platform for York University students that
enables them to interact with other students and psychologists in a P2P environ-
ment. As with previous approaches, the authors of MVC employ decentralization
for solving the privacy problems in healthcare environments.
4.3 Discussion
Privacy Education. As we stated before, one of the main concerns of OSN users
is about where their private data is stored and for which purposes their personal
information is used. However, in general-purpose OSNs such as Facebook and
Instagram, users trust OSN providers to keep their data private and control the
spreading of their data using pre-defined settings of the platform. But the fact
about how users’ data is used is far beyond the users’ thoughts. Based on an
article which was published by ProPublica1 in late 2016 [AMPJ16], Facebook is
buying data about users’ online and offline life from commercial data brokers to
enhance its advertisements. One of the brokers which Facebook signed a deal with in
2012 is Datalogix which filed a complaint with Federal Trade Commission alleging
Facebook’s violation of privacy. This article indicates that Facebook is willing to tell




These facts show that in a general purpose OSN like Facebook, an educating
mechanism is needed to teach new users how to protect their own data using
default settings of the platform and make the users aware of the way OSN provider
may use their data for other purposes.
Types of relationships. In each type of OSN we have different types of users. In
general-purpose OSNs such as Facebook users are connected to each other based on
their common language, the geographical region in which users are living and the
friendship relations which they have with each other in real life. In professional
OSNs such as LinkedIn, relationships are based on common professional skills and
job preferences of the users. Sermo and Doximity connect experts and patients to
each other based on their medical concern or their users’ expertise. More specifically,
we investigate the type of relationships in some HSNs and we compare them with
the type of relationships in general-purpose OSNs. A notable difference between
HSNs and general-purpose ones is in the type of friend relationships between users.
In general-purpose OSNs, the relations between users are mostly based on the
friendship relations which they have with each other in real life. But in HSNs, the
relations are mainly based on common health problems and expertises.
In some HSNs like PatientsLikeMe, the users are people which have some health
problems and want to find other people with the same problem in order to benefit
from each others experiences about how to deal with their problem. If we call these
type of users as patients, the relationship between users is of type patient-patient.
In some other HSNs like Doximity1 and Sermo, users are health-care professionals
which want to stay connected to each other and broaden their expertise by sharing
their thoughts and experiences. If we call these users as experts, the relationship
between users are of type expert-expert. Besides these two types of HSNs, there are
some other OSNs like Inspire which provides a platform to connect patients to other
1https://www.doximity.com/
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patients and experts to access online help from other users. The type of relations
between users are patient-patient and patient-expert in such platforms.
Privacy Solutions. As the type of users are different in different OSNs, their
privacy concerns are different, too. Moreover, new types of requirements may
emerge to fulfill the users’ needs. For example, a more powerful group and friend
recommendation is needed in HSNs in comparison with general-purpose OSNs.
The reason is that in HSNs the relations are established based on some common
health problems between the users who do not know each other in real life, while in
general-purpose OSNs, the relations are mostly established based on the relations
the users have in their real life. Therefore, it is not applicable to design a unique
privacy framework which can be applied to all types of OSNs.
Another important factor in designing a privacy-enabled framework is its appli-
cability in current OSNs. As we discussed in previous sections, remarkable efforts
have been done to protect user data by encrypting it before they would be stored
on providers’ storages. However, in most OSNs such as Facebook, the provider does
not allow the users to send encrypted data to their storages and if any application
leaves some traces of encryption or other means which prevents the provider from
learning user data for different purposes including advertisements, they may be
removed by the provider [LXH09].
4.4 Recommended Privacy Solution
If we want to present a user-centric architecture with the main purpose of pre-
serving users’ privacy and overcome to some limitations such as need for Internet
connectivity, P2P architecture would be a good choice; while in HSNs where users’
generated contents are used for researching and analyzing purposes by other com-
panies, a hybrid approach would be a better choice for protecting user data with
the possibility to provide users’ generated content for researchers if the user apply
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permissions on releasing her private data anonymously.
However, there are still some limitations to design an acceptable architecture for
decentralized OSNs to convince users to shift from traditional client-server to P2P
infrastructure. Some of the limitations that we can mention are:
• Privacy approach: what mechanism should be used to preserve users’ data
privacy while it should be dynamic and flexible?
• Key management and distribution: what mechanism should be used to store
encryption keys confidentially and how to distribute them among users?
• Interaction method: how to handle communications between users?
• Storage: how and where user data should be stored?
• Topology: how the users should be connected to each other?
• Availability: how to guarantee the availability of published content even when
the users are offline?
• Searching: how to search for your real life friends in OSN or find new friends
based on common interests?
• Openness: how to design an open platform to support other third-party
applications?
• Robustness: how to handle disruptive behavior of users while there is no
single entity to define the rights?
In Figure 4.4, an overview of the recommended P2P architecture is shown. Our
architecture consist of a two-tier architecture: Data Exchange Tier (DET) and Lookup
Tier (LT). User data is stored encrypted on users’ devices which are located on DET
and the lookup operations are done on LT. The colors which are used for the nodes
in LT are related to the color of the users’ stored documents in DET. In this section,
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we will introduce the steps needed to overcome most of the above challenges to
design a P2P architecture and discuss the possible solutions in each step.
DET
LT
Figure 4.4: Recommended privacy solution: user data is stored on Data Exchange
Tier (DET) on users’ devices and the lookup operations are done on Lookup Tier
(LT). Data replication is used to increase the data availability.
4.4.1 Encryption mechanism
Using a P2P architecture for OSNs, we eliminate the privacy breaches caused by
OSN providers which act as a big-brother for all the users and we give back data
control to the users. However storing user data on storages other than central
storages cannot guarantee the data privacy for users as there may be other unau-
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thorized data accesses based on where data is stored. So, an important issue which
should be considered in designing a P2P architecture is choosing an appropriate
encryption mechanism as well as a good approach for key management and distri-
bution. Moreover, data availability and searching are the other important concerns
in P2P architectures. In the remainder of this section, we propose our solution for
these challenges.
To provide the data confidentiality and access control for OSN users, we have
to employ a suitable encryption technique to support group encryption. Such
type of encryption techniques are called secure group communication, which is
the first requirement for secure data communication in OSNs. Also, the technique
which is used should have following features so that it could be applied to the OSN
platforms:
1. Dynamic: OSN platforms are dynamic environments in which the relation-
ships between users are changing frequently during time. So, the selected
technique should be able to handle such dynamic changes efficiently.
2. Efficient: the cost of encryption/decryption should be independent of the
number of recipients.
3. Low storage: the overhead storage which is needed to store encryption head-
ers should be minimum so that the cryptosystem would be scalable.
4. Stateless: revoking some users from a group should not cause the remaining
users to update their private keys.
5. Fully collusion resistant: all the users other than group users cannot collude
to decrypt a broadcast message.
6. One-to-Many communication: the initializer of a communication group would
be the broadcaster in her group and can encrypt her data and broadcast it to
other group members.
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7. Forward/backward secrecy: a newly joined member should not be able to
decrypt former encrypted data (forward free) and a revoked member from a
group should not be able to decrypt later encrypted data.
One of the encryption mechanisms which can be applied to decentralized OSNs
is the adaptive public-key broadcast encryption which was introduced by Gentry
et al. [GW09]. This approach is secure against any number of colluders and
the ciphertext generated by this approach is of constant size for any number of
receivers. The randomized algorithms which made the broadcast encryption are
Setup, keyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt. The details of each algorithm is as follows:
Setup(λ, n) → 〈PubK, SecK〉. This algorithm runs GroupGen(λ, n) to generate
two groups G and GT, which are of prime order p with bilinear map e : G×G→ GT.
Then picks α R←− Zp and g, h1, · · · , hn
R←− Zn+1.
PubK = (g, e(g, g)α, h1, · · · , hn)
SecK = gα
The Setup algorithm takes n, which determines the number of receivers in
the group, and λ as security parameter, which determines the maximum size of
broadcast group, and it outputs a public/secret key pair 〈PubK, SecK〉, which is
kept by the broadcaster.
KeyGen(i, SecK) → PrvKi. Picks ri
R←− Zp. Then
PrvKi = 〈di,0, · · · , di,n〉
PrvKi,0 ← g−ri , PrvKi,i ← gαhrii , ∀j 6=iPrvKi,j ← h
ri
j
The KeyGen algorithm takes index i ∈ {i, · · · .n}, which is member’s identity,
and secret key SecK. It outputs a private key prvKi for member i of broadcasting
group.
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Encrypt(S, PubK) → (Header, K). Picks a random t R←− Zp. Then







The Encrypt algorithm takes an S ⊆ {1, · · · , n} as the subset of users and PubK
as a public key and outputs a pair (Header, K). Header contains the data needed to
help users in S find the message encryption key and K is the message encryption
key, which is a symmetric key.
Decrypt(S, i, PrvKi, Header, PubK) → K. If we imagine Header = (C0, C1), then
K = e(PrvKi,i. ∏
j∈S,j 6=i
PrvKi,j, C0).e(PrvKi,0, C1)
The Decrypt algorithm takes S ⊆ {1, · · · , n} as the subset of users, user id
i ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, private key PrvKi of user i, a header Header and public key PubK
as inputs and the output of the algorithm is the decryption key K if i belongs to S.
The proofs of correctness of the above algorithms are explained in [GW09].
4.4.2 Topology
The way the nodes communicate with each other establishes an overlay on top of
the underlying physical network and is different from the connectivity between
nodes in the physical network which is called network infrastructure [Mal15]. For
P2P architectures, we can apply a two-tier architecture: Data Exchange Tier (DET)
and Lookup Tier (LT). In DET, the peers are connected to each other for direct data
exchange and in LT, peers are connected to a structured overlay such as DHTs for
lookup services.
Data Exchange Tier (DET). The connections between peers in DET are based on
their friendship connections, i.e., there exist a connection between two nodes v1
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and v2 in DET in our P2P overlay if a friend request was exchanged between these
two nodes through a secure channel and the friendship was established. Here we
only consider undirected edges for our graph. This rules out the both parties are
involved in establishing the connection. For other types of connections, such as
follower-followee in Twitter, we need to have directed edges, which we do not
consider in this chapter. Following this strategy causes our social network graph to
be partitioned into communities of friends and the size of the communities depends
on the number of peers collaborating to each other within them. The existence of
such communities affects directly the data availability in our P2P overlay [BD09] if
the replica placement strategy selects the replicas among users’ friends. Imagine
that one of the generated communities, say Ci, would be small in size because of
the number of its participants. The data availability in Ci would be low as data
is stored on a small number of replicas, which have been selected from Ci’s peers.
Therefore, in the replica placement strategy, we should consider the community
size and the availability rate of the data.
Lookup Tier (LT). Most of the structured overlays provide a key-value interface
to work with them. Therefore, in our solution we need a key-value pair for each
piece of meta-data related to a user, which can be stored in LT. The key is the
corresponding index of a value and is used for searching the value. The keys could
be a hash function of users’ UIDs which we discussed in previous section.
The structured overlay we choose for our LT affects the overall performance of
the overlay. In [KR07] the authors did some experiments to investigate the perco-
lation effect in two known structured overlays, Chord [SMK+01] and Symphony
[MBR+03] and they found out that 4% of peers are not reachable in a same com-
ponent with the network size of 106. Also, in [WCZJ04], it is shown that direct
communication between 36% of peers is impossible because of the blocks caused by
firewalls and Network Address Translators (NATs). These experiments show the
defects of the structured ring-based overlays in some special cases. Moreover, the
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maintenance cost of rings is high in the environments with high churn, because in
each join/leave of the peers in the overlay, their successors and predecessors should
be updated. Therefore, in dynamic environment of OSNs, we need an overlay for
our LT which can handle lookup and write operations correctly and its maintenance
cost would be low.
In [GGD+08], a ring-less structured overlay called Fuzzynet is presented, which
has all the functionalities of ring-based overlays, while achieving better performance
in its lookup and publish operations with no explicit maintenance. As it is stated in
the paper, Fuzzynet is ideal for high churn environments in which joining/leaving
of peers are done frequently. This approach can be applied to the Lookup tier of the
overlay.
4.4.3 Data availability
A crucial feature of OSNs is their need to a mechanism to make data available for
all the users whenever it is accessed even if the data owner would be offline. In cen-
tralized OSNs, the providers are responsible for guaranteeing the data availability
for their users by employing different data storages and distributing the overload
between them. But in decentralized OSNs, the users themselves are responsible for
storing their own data on their storages and ensure the data availability. However,
one user which contributes to the OSN by generating a content is not online 24/7 to
ensure the data availability for other users who want to access to generated content.
Therefore, profile replication is a good solution to keep the data available when
the data owner is offline, meaning that the data can be replicated on other users’
storages, called replicas. Thus, we need a strategy to choose the best replicas for
each user to make the data available whenever it is accessed.
The set which is selected as replica nodes for each node u should satisfy the
following features:
1. At least one of the replica nodes should be online with high probability at the
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time of sharing data items by u.
2. There should be time overlaps between u’s friends which are authorized to
access the data items and the replica nodes so that in each time, one or more
replica nodes are online to serve data accesses by authorized users.
3. The size of replica set should be minimum as the nodes in our P2P architecture
are ordinary users which use devices with limited amount of storage (even
the device can be a cellphone) and we can not replicate users’ data as much as
possible just to increase the data availability.
4. The selected replica nodes should maximize the data availability. Our strategy
may find different replica sets with the same size but different availability in
the case of the overall online time periods of the replicas. In such cases, the
set should be selected which achieves maximum availability.
5. The replica set should be resilient to dynamic nature of OSNs and the se-
lection strategy should keep the set updated upon each join/leave without
performance decrease.
We can model our decentralized OSN as an undirected graph G = (U, E, T),
where U is the set of users that have joined the OSN and are represented by the
vertices in the graph, E is the set of friendship relations between users and are
represented by graph edges and T is the set of online time patterns of each user
with predefined granularity (e.g., seconds, minutes, hours), which can be stored
in a table. As the online times are not certain and the status of one user may be
changed, in each slot of the table, we can store the probability of the user being
online or offline in that specific time period.
The replica placement problem can be stated formally as follows:
PROBLEM 1. (REPLICA PLACEMENT). Given an undirected graph G = (U, E, T) and a
node u, select a replica set Ru ⊆ Nu such that
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1. ∀v ∈ Nu, ∃ri ∈ Ru that is online with a probability bigger than a threshold value for
each time slot
2. ∀t ∃ri ∈ Ru, which the data stored on ri should be consistent with the data stored on
u
3. |Ru| would be minimized
In Problem 1, Nu is the set of u’s neighbors. The list of nodes in set Ru should be
stored in u’s storage. Table 4.3 shows an example of the online time patterns for
three nodes v1, v2 and v3. Let us assume that v2 and v3 are some of the neighbours of
v1 and we want to find a replica set for node v1 that satisfies the conditions stated in
Problem 1. As the three nodes are online in the first time slot with a low probability,
the replicas that are chosen does not need to guarantee a high availability for that
time slot. This means that nodes v2 and v3 are less likely to request v1’s data in the
first time slot. We can calculate the probability values of two nodes v1 and v2 being
online in a specific time slot as:
Pr(v1 or v2 being online) = 1− Pr(v1 not online).Pr(v2 not online) (4.1)
We calculate the online probabilities for all v1’s neighbours using Equation (4.1)
to find the online threshold values per each time slot. Then the replicas should be
selected in a way so that the online probability of the replicas be bigger than or
equal to the threshold value for each time slot.
In Section 4.2.2, we introduced and analyzed some approaches such as the ones
proposed by Narendula et al. [Nar12, NPA12] and Raji et al. [RJM15] that try to
solve Problem 1. In the later case, the authors consider extra parameters, such as
the list of authorized users for each data item.
Discussion 1. As we stated before, online time availabilities of the users are
initialized by themselves when joining the OSN, but it is very probable that the
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Table 4.3: The online time patterns for three nodes
v1 :
Time slot 1 2 3 ... 23
Online probability 0.5 0.2 0.75 ... 0.4
v2 :
Time slot 1 2 3 ... 23
Online probability 0.05 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.75
v3 :
Time slot 1 2 3 ... 23
Online probability 0.01 0.3 0.65 0.35 0.5
online time patterns would be changed due to the possible changes in users’ habits
in using the platform or changes in the users’ geographical locations. Thus, we
should consider such changes in online time patterns if we want to guarantee the
data availability provided by the replicas. To keep the online time patterns updated,
we can track the log records of the system, which hold some data of when a specific
user goes online or offline in the system. Using such records of data, the online time
patterns of users can be extracted automatically and if the changes in the online
time patterns of user u exceeds a threshold value, the replica selection algorithm
should be run again to update the set Ru.
Also, joining new users or leaving current users to/from the OSN platform is
another scenario which causes some changes to the replica set Ru. If one of the
users, which leave the OSN, would be a replica node, the data availability would
be affected based on the storage space and time availability provided by the leaved
node. Also, if a new user is added to the set which has access to the data item,
new replicas might be needed if online time of this new user has a portion not
overlapping with any existing replicas or u. These are the other cases in which
the replica placement algorithm needs to be run again for the user which has been
affected by the other nodes’ leave or join.
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Discussion 2. The replica placement algorithm finds the replica nodes for user
u to guarantee the availability of u’s data for all her friends, but as we stated in
Section 4.4.1, a user can encrypt her data in order to be accessible by just a specific
group of users who are determined in the Setup phase of the broadcast encryption
mechanism. This means that by defining such access levels, u’s data is not needed
to be available for all her friends, but for users in encryption group. In such cases,
the replica placement algorithm should find the replica nodes for u to guarantee
the availability for a smaller group of nodes called Authorized nodes (Authu). Also,
for each data item which is shared by u, we need to have a different set of replicas.
Following this approach, we store the data items of one user on different sets of
replicas, which prevents the overloading of a particular replica set if all data items
would be stored on one replica set. On the other side, we have a decrease in the
overall performance of our platform as the replica placement algorithm needs to
be run per each data item. Therefore, there should be a trade-off between the
performance and the load balancing.
Discussion 3. We replicate user data to increase the availability, but this replication
brings with itself some downsides such as managing data consistency on all replica
nodes, which is costly in terms of performance. Data consistency means that the
data on all replicas should be the same and any modification on data should be
carried out on all the copies to ensure consistency [TVS07].
As we stated before, the list of replicas for each node u is stored on its storage.
Therefore, node u can act as a master node for other replica nodes in the set Ru
and nodes ri ∈ Ru are backup nodes. The reason that node u can be a master node
is that u is the data owner and can make any modifications to its own data. The
master node is responsible to hold the list of replicas, list of changes to its own
storage including updating a data item or creating new data item and should be
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able to track which replica nodes have applied the changes to their local storage.
Discussion 4. Another important factor which needs to be considered in selecting
the best candidates as replicas is the relation between node u being replicated and
the candidate nodes. In some papers such as [BSVD09, JNM+12, NJM+12] the can-
didate nodes are selected from the random nodes or untrusted nodes and evaluating
their effectiveness as a replica node is done by the replica placement algorithm.
However, in most of the recent studies ([Nar12, KLF14, GADS+16]), the replica
nodes are selected from the trusted friends of u. De Salve et al. [DSDGR16, DSGR17]
discussed that there is a strong relationship between each user and its direct friends
by considering online times patterns. They showed in their experiments that the
stronger ties exist between a user and its friends, the more probable those users are
similar in their online times. Also, they concluded that users have more probability
to be online when at least 10 of their Dunbar friends [Dun98] are online. Dunbar
friends are defined as the direct friends of a user with strong tie strength, where the
tie in OSNs is measured as the contact frequency or the number of direct interactions
and the number of social interactions such as posts, comments and tags.
4.4.4 Searching
An important feature, which all OSNs should support, is a mechanism to enable
users to search for their friends from social life or find new friends based on common
interests. In centralized architectures, enabling this feature is possible without too
much effort as the list of users and the metadata related to each user is stored
centrally and executing queries on stored data to extract required results is possible.
But in P2P architectures where data is stored decentralized, executing such queries
efficiently is hard to achieve. Therefore, we need a mechanism to relate each data
item to its owner and determine each user by its interests based on what he/she
had published to enable efficient searching. In meanwhile, users’ privacy should be
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preserved and the relations between them should not reveal any information.
One of the ways for annotating content in OSNs is data tagging. In [GSS08], the
authors introduced a tagging approach for decentralized environments, which is
based on vector space model [SWY75], to characterize users, tags and resources.
This approach can be applied to our decentralized OSN as it can provide the
requirements we need for our architecture. In this framework, each feature (user,
tag or resource) is represented as a feature vector and the weight of elements is
calculated as a combination of item-to-item frequency and inverse item frequency. Then
the similarity between feature vectors is calculated based on the common notion of
IR-style cosine measure [NTW06]. The users which have bigger similarity values
can be considered as users with common interests based on what they have tagged
on their published data.
To preserve users’ privacy in our search framework, we can use unique identi-
fiers for users, tags and resources. This identifiers can be obtained from a hashed
value of a unique attribute of the features and should be stored encrypted in our
overlay. Another way to protect the identifiers and to hide the relations between
each identifier and its main source is to K-anonymize each identifier [Swe02].
4.5 Requirements of a privacy-enabled approach for
healthcare online social networks
In Section 4.4 we explained how to construct the required foundations of a P2P
architecture, which preserves users’ data by distributing and storing it on users’
storages. It also enables users to apply a broadcast encryption approach to their
private data whenever needed. The privacy requirements of Healthcare online
Social Networks (HSNs) are almost the same with the privacy requirements of
general-purpose OSNs. In both environments, users have some concerns about
how their data is accessed and for which purposes their data can be used. However,
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there are some differences between these two types of OSNs. In this section, we
investigate the HSN requirements.
4.5.1 Privacy Policies
The users of HSNs have more privacy concerns in comparison with general-purpose
OSNs as the data which is stored on HSN storages are related to health conditions
of users and are needed to be kept as private as possible. In order to know how
existing HSNs respect to their users’ concerns, we investigate the privacy policies
of four known HSNs, which have a reasonable number of active users:
• PatientsLikeMe1: a sharing web site with the aim of providing a platform for
patients to interact with each other and benefit from each others’ experiences.
• Sermo2: a platform to enable doctors to virtually meet each other and exchange
their knowledge.
• Inspire3: an online community for patients, family members, caregivers and
health professionals, which is provided by ClinicaHealth, Inc.
• QuantiaMD4: an online physicians’ community provided by Aptus Health
Holdings, Inc.
Advertisement and Third party companies. All the above platforms need user reg-
istration to let them write comments, communicate with other users, post messages,
upload photos, etc. In the process of registration, the users are required to input
personal information about themselves which is stored and kept in companies’






information of the users would be provided for third parties with whom the com-
pany has business relationship and the company’s sponsors. Also, in some special
cases, users’ information would be accessible to governments or other entities in
connection with a legal process. Interestingly, the companies assert that the users
themselves are responsible for what they share in the platforms and there is no
guarantee to keep their data private.
In the privacy policy of PatientsLikeMe, it is stated that “Members are encour-
aged to share health information but should consider that the more information
that is entered, the more likely it is that a Member could be located or identified”
[Tea20b].
Cookies and session cookies are the other technologies which are used in above
platforms in order to not only improve their platform’s functionality, but also to
track the users’ behavior in seeing advertisements provided by third parties and
as its result, to improve the advertisement policies. Besides these technologies,
Inspire uses the “tracking feature of Google AdWords to measure the effectiveness
of AdWords advertisements” [Tea20a].
Account deactivation. In all the introduced platforms, there is no option for ac-
count deactivation in the user profile and if a user wants to deactivate her account,
it can be done by sending an email to the provider with a keyword like “DEACTI-
VATE” in its subject line. However, deactivating an account does not mean user
data also is deleted from the servers. In the privacy policy of PatientsLikeMe, it
is stated that “If a Member chooses to deactivate their account, PatientsLikeMe
will not display or sell the Members Personal Data as of the date of deactivation.
However, the Members Personal Data, including Shared and Restricted Data, will
remain in the system unless you contact our community team to request that your
data be deleted.” [Tea20b].
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Opt-out options. As a user is registered to one of the introduced platforms, her
information is available for third parties and companies’ sponsors, as they stated in
their privacy policy, and there is no opt-out option for users to disallow the company
in selling their information to third parties. In privacy policy of PatientsLikeMe, it
is stated that “When a Member chooses to share Personal Information via a free text
field (e.g. forum, treatment evaluations, annotations, journals, feeds and adverse
event reports) and photos or images, the information shall be treated as Shared
Data” [Tea20b]. The only option which is provided in Sermo is that “We may
then provide our partners with engagement effectiveness metrics that include the
sharing of some minimal personal data for performance assessment purposes. To
the extent required by law, we will collect your explicit consent prior to providing
such identifiable information” [Tea20c].
Merging. In the privacy policy of all above companies it is stated that users’ data
including personal information collected from them would be completely transfered
to another company which buys the company as a result of sale, acquisition, merges
or bankruptcy. Upon merging, “PatientsLikeMe may transfer the Shared Data,
Restricted Data, and Platform Use Data to any successor to its business as a result
of any merger, acquisition, asset sale, bankruptcy proceeding, or similar transaction
or event, with such successor bound by the terms of this Privacy Policy with respect
to its use and disclosure of such information” [Tea20b], “ClinicaHealth will seek
to obligate the acquiring company to use any personal information transferred by
this Site in a manner consistent with this Privacy Statement, but cannot guarantee
that it will be able to impose that requirement, or that the acquiring company will
comply” [Tea20a].
All the above items clearly demonstrate that users do not have any control over
their personal data as the data would be stored in the companies’ storages and
there is even no settings or options for the users to define access levels for their data.
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Moreover, user data is accessible by third-party companies for advertisement and
research purposes upon the user’s registration. While in the P2P platform that we
introduced in the previous sections, user data is stored on the storages under their
own control and the users can also define fine-grained access levels for each part of
their data to determine who can access to what data. Furthermore, users can delete
their shared data whenever they want and remove accesses just by defining new
keys for the data items. Therefore, it is reasonable to apply our P2P architecture to
HSN platforms to preserve users’ privacy.
4.5.2 Friend and group recommendation
As we stated in Section 4.3, the main difference between HSNs and general-purpose
OSNs is in the type of friend relationships between users. Based on the types
of relations in HSNs, which are expert-expert, patient-patient and patient-expert, a
powerful searching mechanism is strongly needed in decentralized HSNs to enable
the users to find others which they don’t know before but have common health
problems or common expertises. The approach which was discussed in Section 4.4.4
can be applied to decentralized HSNs to support the search feature. When a new
user wants to join the platform, she should define her role in the HSN as patient
or expert. Then the user should selects some attributes for herself from the tag set
T. The attributes are stored as tags and annotations for the user. For example, if a
user, which has some heart problems and wants to join the platform to benefit from
the experiences of other user with same problem and be tracked by an expert, she
should introduce herself as a patient and assign herself some attributes about heart
problems from the existing tag set T. The profile of the user is interpreted as the
resource in our search framework which is tagged with appropriate attributes. The
tags help users to find other patients and experts related to their health problems.
Moreover, by combining the results of extracted tags related to specific users with
extracted resources related to specific tags, we can find communities of users which
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annotated themselves with tags related to the same health problems. Thus, new
users can join to the communities of existing patients and experts with the same
concerns.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we reviewed the existing solutions which have been presented
to overcome the privacy problems which Online Social Network (OSN) users are
facing with. A significant number of these solutions try to preserve user data by
applying encryption mechanisms to existing client-server architectures. This type
of solution is suitable for general-purpose OSNs which their services are freely
available for their users. However, user data is controlled centrally by a unique
authority. Therefore, decentralized approaches try to store user data on the servers
controlled by the users and provide additional features such as enabling P2P and
direct communications between users. Hybrid approaches try to combine these two
approaches by encrypting just sensitive data and storing it on trusted servers.
The solution which should be applied to the OSN platform depends on the type
of relationship between the users and the features which the OSN should provide
for their users. By investigating the privacy policy of well-known general-purpose
OSNs as well as Healthcare Social Networks (HSNs), we observe that the users are
responsible for what they share on online platforms and the providers make user
data available for third-party companies for advertisement and research purposes
upon user’s registration. Therefore, we recommend decentralized solutions to
enable the users to have full control over their own data. However, defining a
practical decentralized approach for OSNs is possible by overcoming the existing
challenges which are explained in this paper. Also, in order to be able to apply
a decentralized architecture to HSNs, a powerful search, and friend and group
recommendation is needed as the friendship relations are established based on
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common health problems or common expertises, and not based on the friendships
in social life.
In Chapters 5 and 6, we will present a solution for storing users’ data securely
on untrusted content-addressable storage servers and provide partial sharing/sub-
setting in the filesystem level. That is our first step for designing and implementing
a distributed private online social network.
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Chapter 5
Challenges in designing a distributed
cryptographic file system
(This chapter is based on a paper published in Twenty-seventh International Work-
shop on Security Protocols, Trinity College, Cambridge, UK, April 2019 [BJA19])
Private information about individuals is, today, stored in centralized repositories
that must be trusted fully to perform access control faithfully. Alternative ap-
proaches have been proposed that distribute data in peer-to-peer networks, but
they lack the availability required by real-world systems that process personal
information. Online social networks, censorship resistance systems, document
redaction systems and health care information systems have apparently-disparate
requirements for confidentiality, integrity and availability. However, we believe
that these problems are tractable if re-cast as filesystems problems, with a research
goal of developing filesystems that incorporate both centralized and distributed
components without sacrificing user privacy.
The four use cases we have identified have differing, even contradictory, require-
ments (Section 5.1). For example, the requirement for centralized auditing of access
to health care data is in direct opposition to the needs of a censorship-resistant
online social network. However, we believe that there is a set of filesystems and
cryptographic techniques that can be employed together, in various combinations,
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to meet each use case’s requirements individually.
Techniques from modern copy-on-write filesystems can be combined with cryp-
tographic capabilities, convergent encryption and distributed systems concepts in
order to implement filesystem primitives with untrusted storage at global scale
(Section 5.2). Untrusted block stores may be centralized for high performance
or distributed for availability in the face of a censor, with local storage acting as
either a cache or a seed as appropriate. Subsets of both files and directory trees
can be selectively shared among users and applications, with mutability controlled
by application-specific policy enforced only on user- or organization-controlled
systems. Separating the control plane of policy enforcement from the data plane
of bulk storage yields a hybrid filesystem that can be applied to centralized or
distributed use cases.
We have begun to build a prototype of such a hybrid filesystem: UPSS: the
user-centric private sharing system. This filesystem can be accessed as a traditional
Unix filesystem or — perhaps more compellingly — incorporated directly into
applications as a library. The UPSS API allows applications to interact with the
system without knowledge of underlying structures such as the storage medium,
and to provide more sophisticated sharing protocols than can be supported by the
traditional POSIX filesystem API. Combining the research in both filesystems and
security protocols, the UPSS project strives to enable systems with rich collaboration
and strong user control in contexts as disparate as health care and censorship-
resistant social networks.
5.1 Motivation: use cases
The requirements for our privacy-preserving distributed filesystem stem from four
use cases that are not well-served by the state of the art:
• online social networking with untrusted service providers,
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• censorship-resistant social networking with network partitioning,
• corporate file sharing with redaction integrity and
• health care data sharing with privacy and audit requirements.
A summary of the four use cases’ requirements can be found in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Requirements derived from OSN (S), censorship-resistant network (C),
redaction integrity (R) and health care (H) use cases
Requirement S C R H
High availability (connected network) ! ! !
Availability in network partition !
Untrusted storage ! ! !
Partial/subset sharing ! ! ! !
Scalable to large user base ! ! !
Sharing reciprocity (“merge requests”) ! ! ! !
Peer-to-peer storage and caching !
Access auditing !
5.1.1 Online social network
General-purpose online social networks require high availability, frictionless content
sharing and high overall standards for ease of use. Users — and the applications
they employ — interact with shared content; any social application platform must
be able to provide this access while still allowing for user control over that sharing.
In addition to the above, however, it is desirable for any design incorporating
centralized elements to not trust the provider. That is, although a central store of data
may be required for availability and performance reasons, that provider need not
have access to the plaintext of users’ data.
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As we describe in Section 5.2.1, it is possible to share immutable directory trees
among users of a centralized data store while maintaining strong confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability properties. This can be accomplished with well-understood
cryptographic and filesystem techniques. The challenge of building a practical
OSN from these raw materials is in the handling of shared mutable content. It must
be possible to describe mutation in terms of operations that can be checked for
consistency when performed by multiple authorized users. For example, updating
a tree of shared content can be expressed as a “merge request” that replaces one
immutable tree with another one, as long as the new tree references the original as
its predecessor.
Thus, we make the following observations about the requirements for a privacy-
preserving distributed filesystem being used as the basis for an OSN:
1. The requirement for high availability rules out techniques that base their
security and functionality guarantees on the use of peer-to-peer networks —
some centralized storage may be required to achieve better performance.
2. Centralized providers must only have access to encrypted data, ideally with-
out information about metadata such as file sizes.
3. Users should be able to easily delegate access to shared content, both to
applications and to other users.
4. The requirement for massively scalable performance rules out techniques that
impose heavy computational or network burdens on servers, such as secure
multi-party computation or private information retrieval.
5. It should be possible to manage mutable directory trees with operations that
can be checked for consistency, e.g., “merge requests”.
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5.1.2 Censorship-resistant social networking
Reliable and widely adopted information systems need to be resilient against any
censors by authorities such as governments. Decentralization of server modules
could be an effective approach for this issue, as any central point is a kind of weak-
ness for the system. Inevitably, most systems contain centralized management
and decision making modules, for example, user authorization on the cloud stor-
age should be done centrally. Peer-to-peer connections are a solution to reduce
the risk of being blocked. Along with this idea, caching techniques are another
effective ways to improve system’s high availability. Thus, to provide a reliable
and safe censorship-resistant information system, we can accommodate the follow-
ing fundamentals about the system’s underlying filesystem to support the stated
requirements:
1. The requirement for decentralization leads to a different sharing protocol on
the filesystem that lets users to have peer-to-peer data sharing. Necessarily,
we need a backup storage for those cases in which one or more principals are
offline. The sharing approach should handle backups as well. The connection
protocol should work for different users behind NATs (Network Address
Translators). Similar inspiring protocols have been introduced before, such
as Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RMMW08], for finding users’
public IP addresses and ports. Figure 5.1 shows this situation, in which the
connection between the users and the cloud storage account is blocked and
users are able to interact with each other in a peer-to-peer environment.
2. Along with peer-to-peer connections, availability in a network partition can be
supported by different caching techniques which support various periods of
time for cached data. The filesystem can handle data caching based on users’
share requests. In this way, having permanent cached data is also possible.
Expired cached data could be removed in different ways such as having a
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Client File System Client File System
Cloud storage account
Alice's Storage device Bob's Storage device
Figure 5.1: Applied censorship to the central point of the system
garbage collector that runs periodically.
5.1.3 Redaction with integrity
A common requirement for large organizations — both commercial and governmen-
tal — is the ability to release documents and information selectively in response to
information requests and legal discovery. Current approaches to such information
sharing involve the redaction of documents and a one-way release of information.
Linking redacted documents to their original versions is a manual process that
provides little technical assurance of integrity. A chain of custody for such infor-
mation may be asserted by the releasing organization but may not, using current
techniques, be verified by the receiving party.
It is desirable to be able to release portions of documents in a manner that
provides strong integrity verification and linking to the original document. Sharing
part of a file or a directory hierarchy should be efficient and should allow linking to
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commitments for unredacted versions without revealing any redacted information.
In addition, it may be desirable to provide a mechanism for changes to released
content to be shared back to the original, unredacted document, enabling new com-
munication patterns and — potentially — better strategies for internal information
compartmentalization. We can thus observe that:
1. Directory hierarchies and even files should be sharable in part, as subsets of
their unredacted originals.
2. Shared subsets should be linkable to original, unredacted documents with
strong integrity.
3. Changes to redacted documents should be re-sharable back to redacting
parties in a way that permits two-way collaboration over partial views.
5.1.4 Health care data sharing
Health care information systems have several requirements in common with OSNs
such as high availability and data sharing within the network. One additional
requirement, however, is the need for auditing of accesses to patient data. This
acts as a disincentive for health care workers to access the private information of
patients they are not caring for. However, in the context of a privacy-preserving
system, the requirement for audit records should not cause arbitrary patient data to
be exposed to the network security team.
One barrier to innovation in the health care context is the dichotomy between
“trusted” and “untrusted” systems and the enormous effort required to certify a
system as “trusted”. A filesystem that afforded the ability to securely share strict
subsets of patient data could enable new innovations. Applications running on
such a platform could be executed with lower stakes, as the impact of an application
accidentally leaking data without context, e.g., image data with no patient identifiers
attached, would be less than if the application implicitly had access to complete
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patient records. This is anologous on the partial data sharing requirement described
in Section 5.1.3, but in a very different environment.
We thus make the following observations about the challenges of building health
information systems atop a privacy-preserving distributed filesystem:
1. Confidentiality must be maintained from both system administrators and
health care workers who do not require patients’ information in the course of
providing care.
2. Access to patient data should be auditable without revealing patient informa-
tion to auditors.
3. It should be possible to provide new applications with access to data subsets
without implying access to complete patient records.
5.2 UPSS: the user-centric private sharing system
To design a system which can provide a fundamental basis for the majority of the
requirements discussed in Section 5.1, we use some key ideas of existing systems,
mainly discussed in Section 5.3, to design our system as a new filesystem asso-
ciated with efficient sharing mechanism. By introducing UPSS, we try to meet
confidentiality, high availability, data integrity, and an efficient sharing mechanism,
all integrated into a system to serve a wide range of applications.
To support confidentiality, we use cryptographic techniques to provide an end-
to-end sharing system, which stores user data in a secure way on the storage, with
user-controlled privacy. To provide a high level of availability, users’ storages or
cloud storage accounts can be used as temporary or even permanent caches to
maintain other users’ data online. Consequently, this data replication leads to data
inconsistency problem which is reduced to a version control problem by storing
user data in immutable objects in our system. UPSS suggests a content-addressing
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mechanism for data blocks on storage through cryptographic hashes obtained from
blocks’ content and their physical locations on storage.
Our system is constructed out of four main layers, which are depicted in Fig-
ure 5.2. In this section, we discuss UPSS, a User-centric Private Sharing System in
more detail and explain how UPSS can meet the discussed requirements.
Encrypted Block Store













Figure 5.2: Layers in the UPSS prototype. Encrypted block store stores ciphertext
blocks, which are generated from plaintext blocks in immutable Merkle DAGs
(thick arrows represent block pointers). A mutable filesystem is exposed as a library




Data is stored in UPSS as a set of fixed-size immutable encrypted blocks. These
blocks, which are encrypted and named according to a hash of their ciphertext,
are linked together in a Merkle DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph). Merkle DAGs
are used to describe files, directories and versions of both. Immutable blocks
are encrypted using symmetric keys derived from cryptographic hashes of their
content, a technique known as convergent encryption [DAB+02], and named using
the cryptographic hash of their ciphertext, a technique known as content-addressable
storage. The name of a block and the key that can be used to access it are referred to






where B is the plaintext block, E is a deterministic symmetric encryption, nB is the
name of a block and kB is the key used to decrypt it. A block pointer can thus be
seen as a cryptographic capability [DVH66] to read a block, though not necessarily
to modify it (see Section 5.2.3). The block pointer to the root node of a file or
directory implies the ability to access arbitrary quantities of content, up to an entire
filesystem.
Convergent encryption does not provide semantic security as it is vulnerable to
content-guessing attacks [BDPR98]. However, the de-duplication effect of the con-
vergent encryption makes it suitable for storage efficiency. For making a trade-off
between the security and the storage efficiency, Stanek et al. [SSAK14] introduced a
convergent threshold cryptosystem in which popular files — identical files that are
uploaded to the storage server by many users — are encrypted using convergent
encryption, while unpopular files are protected using another symmetric encryption
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around the inner convergent encryption. However, for enabling a the storage server
to identify the popular and unpopular files, two central server components need
to be fully trusted by the users, which is the opposite of our target. Currently, we
are not using the convergent threshold encryption. However, we are embedding
random padding inside the blocks with content size lower than the UPSS’s block
size. We can choose the deterministic and non-deterministic random padding,
where in the former case the de-duplication is enabled.
By defining blocks to be immutable, we reduce the data inconsistency problem
to a version control problem. A file modification causes a new version of the file
to be created and this modification affects the whole path up to the parent blocks
until the root block. We borrowed this feature from the Copy-on-Write (CoW) file
systems. The modifications are done with the block size granularity, means that
even if one bit in a block is modified, a new block is generated and the CoW updates
are applied. Version controls are met by keeping a pointer to the previous version
of the modified files in their corresponding root blocks.
The symmetric key of each block is stored inside its preceding block. In the
same way, the symmetric key of the root block in a sub-tree is stored in the blocks
of the parent directory. In this way, we avoid any central server to keep the chain of
our decryption keys. Moreover, we avoid duplication of same blocks generated by
different users as the blocks would eventually have the same ciphertext.
5.2.2 Mutable Filesystem API
All the details about the immutable DAGs and the underlying storage model
are hidden from the top level applications. UPSS provides an object view of the
underlying encrypted blocks for the applications and enables them to interact with
the system through the provided API. Each file and directory in mutable filesystem
layer is interpreted as an object called FSObject. The FSObjects are in-memory
objects constituting the mutable DAGs for our system. In this layer, the following
147
metadata attributes are defined and used for each file or directory: access time,
creation time and the modification time.
Applications interact with UPSS using FSObject references. In case of any
modification on the content of a file or directory, the inner state of the corresponding
FSObject is changed and the modifications is applied to the underlying layers to
reflect the file/directory’s modification. However, the object reference remains the
same. This process is done in background and is transparent from the top level
applications. The results can be returned by callback functions provided by the
API’s methods. This approach can also make a non-blocking modification process
from the applications’ viewpoint running on the upper level.
The FSObjects enables us to have structured files, which can support some
functionalities not supported by the classical Unix filesystems that interpret the
files as unstructured byte arrays. One of the functionalities supported by UPSS
is guaranteeing the data consistency of the shared files between users. To do so,
the system should define a consistency model, suitable for distributed systems.
One applicable solution is to define the file structures as a Conflict-free Replicated
Data Type (CRDT) [SPBZ11b, SPBZ11a, KB17] to guarantee that shared files on
different replicas converge, by defining a Strong Eventual Consistency (SEC) model,
which leverages mathematical properties such as monotonicity in a semi-lattice
and/or commutativity, which ensure the absence of conflict. An add-only DAG
is an example of a CRDT data type [SPBZ11a] suitable for a distributed filesystem
with file sharing and redacting integrity.
5.2.3 Share Control Module
Providing a mechanism to share data, either on a multiuser system or over the
network in distributed systems, is a crucial feature for various information systems.
According to the requirements described in Section 5.1, a sharing module on top of
our filesystem is responsible to support different scenarios for both centralized and
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peer-to-peer data sharing. To have a very flexible, and also extensible design for the
future, we considered the sharing module as another application above the UPSS
API library, shown in Figure 5.3, along with other applications such as Unix VFS or
FUSE VFS, etc. Thus, the subsequent integrated system potentially supports a wide
range of required use cases for information systems.
As a primary prototype, this module is divided into two principal sub-modules
that handle share requests and data transmissions separately. The share control
module is an application, mainly responsible to manage share requests, in terms
of the sharing protocol, version control, users’ privileges and access controls. This
module receives or sends share requests. Once the request is processed and the user
and privileges are authorized, the share control module makes related modification
on shared data through the UPSS API.
On the other hand, data transmission is accomplished using the sharing block
store which communicates with the local block store or the local caches of the
system and other remote block stores. Figure 5.3 represents this module. These
features distinguish UPSS from the other systems described in Section 5.3.
As another important issue that rises about data sharing, this module handles
users’ access controls. When we talk about data sharing between users and their
privacy, accessibility appears as the other important issue. In UPSS, the concepts
of permissions and privileges are raised in different layers and vary based on the
scope in which the user is defined. For example, for local users in a multiuser
system, a file can be shared with traditional POSIX permissions such as “read”,
“write” and “execute”. However, for non-local users in the network involved with
share and merge requests, we need to define additional policies and definitions to
provide a user-centered privacy scheme through access controls. For example, any
user can share data with others, but nobody obtains or modifies data without the
right privileges. Data modification would be done after user authorization, which















Figure 5.3: Sharing module includes two sub-modules, share control module and
sharing remote block store, to manage share procedure and data transmission
control
For remote users, modifying data could be followed with merge or pull requests.
The sharing protocol considers users’ access rights before the main procedure of the
request is accomplished. The rest of the procedure would be done in the mutable
layer, as it is implicitly shown in Section 5.2.2. The corresponding mutable block
would be added to the mutable Merkle DAG associated with the block pointer to its
ciphertext block. Here, the application of block pointers is identical to capabilities
[DVH66], as unforgeable references to ciphertext blocks of our system. Therefore,




Classical filesystem abstractions — files, directories and directory entries — rep-
resent a subset of the abstractions that can be represented in UPSS, but they are
important abstractions. These can be exposed to applications and users using exist-
ing virtual filesystem (VFS) layers provided in userspace (FUSE) or kernels (Unix
VFS). Higher-level applications may prefer to interact directly with the UPSS API,
but existing applications can work with UPSS without modification via an existing
VFS.
Requests from VFS layers can be addressed with inode numbers which are
the low-level files or directories identifiers. Mapping the low-level names to UPSS
entities enables the VFS and FUSE APIs to interact with UPSS. Besides the mappings
from low-level names to object references, VFS layers also provide metadata that
is only meaningful for the local system and its users, such as permissions for local
users.
5.3 Related Work
As a primary target of our study, we investigated existing privacy-preserving
approaches mainly in online social networks. First, we started with studying
different systems and modules regardless of their type, scope and the system
level in which they are integrated and employed, to find their key ideas, cons,
and pros. The only common feature between all of them is their effort to place
additional user privacy, especially against OSN server providers. As we expanded
our target to have a secure and privacy-preserving filesystem, we continued with
an investigation on several filesystems, focusing on their provided security features.
We summarize these studies starting from OSN tools to filesystems.
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5.3.1 Online Social Network Systems and Tool
Privacy on social networks can be discussed in different ways. A well-known
challenge is protecting users’ privacy against each other. However protecting users’
privacy against OSN servers and providers is also an important issue. Therefore,
attempts to improve privacy in centralized OSN systems appeared. Because of the
centralized architecture of most adopted OSNs, such as Facebook and Google Drive,
primary proposed approaches tended to be centralized in design. Lockr [TGS+08],
FlyByNight [LB08], NOYB [GTF08], Scramble [BKW11] and CP2 [RMJ13], all can
be counted as important and effective tools in this category. In addition to cen-
tralization, we can categorize privacy countermeasures and approaches in other
ways. Using cryptographic techniques or providing user-controlled privacy are
other effective features.
Lockr [TGS+08] and Scramble [BKW11] are browser plug-ins that restrict access
through user-defined access control lists. Although this feature makes a flexible
privacy scheme, it still suffers from storing plaintext data on OSN servers, in-
cluding user data and users relationships. FlybyNight [LB08] and CP2 (short for
“Cryptographic privacy protection”) [RMJ13] protect user data by some encryption
mechanism with this difference that CP2 can also protect the relationships between
users by determining the users with some unique pseudonyms. In NOYB [GTF08],
users’ profiles are partitioned into smaller clusters called atoms, and the atoms of
one user are substituted with atoms of another user in the same cluster pseudo-
randomly, and then the encrypted index of each atom is stored in a dictionary. The
authors of FaceCloak [LXH09], introduced a mechanism in which the users’ private
data is stored encrypted in a user-trusted third-party server, while some other fake
data related to encrypted data are stored in OSN servers in plain-text format. One
important point about using data encryption in communication with OSNs is that
these systems and their providers should allow encrypted messages and data to
be stored or transmitted. Moreover, data encryption should not affect OSNs’ main
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functionalities such as search use cases.
Another beneficial feature toward real privacy for users is user-controlled or
user-centered privacy. For example, Lockr, FaceCloak, and Scramble, allow users to
define and control their preferred privacy mainly through access control lists.
As it is stated above, the centralized nature of OSNs in which all users’ data
is accessible by a single entity, i.e., OSN provider, encourages the researchers to
change their mind about how to preserve users’ data, which leads to a shift from
client-server to a decentralized architecture coupled with encryption so that the
users can protect their data. Diaspora [BHG+12] is an example of such architecture
for OSNs.
In decentralized P2P systems, connectivity and high availability are other is-
sues that bring several other challenges to be discussed, along with other existing
problems such as privacy. PeerSoN (short for “P2P Social Networking”) [BSVD09] ,
Safebook [Str09] and Porkut [NPA10] are instances of decentralized OSNs that have
tried to come up with solving some parts of these challenges. PeerSoN [BSVD09]
tried to overcome connectivity and privacy limitations. The main properties of Peer-
SoN are encryption, decentralization, and direct data exchange. Safebook [Str09] is
another system that tried to protect users, from potential privacy violations, against
providers. It relies on the concept “peers”, which points to the cooperation between
users on the social network. Although Safebook has presented a decentralized
structure, it still relies on central servers that keep pseudonyms of interacting nodes
in the network. Also, there are criticisms of its privacy scheme. Porkut [NPA10], as
another example in this category, focuses mainly on data availability by replicating
users’ data on trusted friends’ storages. Also, a privacy preserving indexing mecha-
nism is introduced which facilitates content discovery among friends. The indexes
are stored on a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [SMK+01] in the form of (key, value)
pairs. As another different example, we can consider Cachet [NJM+12] which is an
improvement of DECENT [JNM+12]. Cachet proposed a decentralized architecture
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to be used in OSNs, which protects confidentiality by an attribute-based encryption.
It also provides integrity and availability by digital signature and gossip-based
social caching algorithm, respectively.
However, all the discussed decentralized approaches rely on distributed data
structures such as DHTs to enable the users to interact with each other and discover
other users and resources. The nodes which construct the DHT network should be
trusted to keep critical information about the users and the network topology.
To summarize, in both centralized and decentralized architecture of discussed
OSNs, we can still see unaddressed privacy, availability, and connectivity problems.
Despite all efforts done to overcome these restrictive issues, proposed approaches
seem superficial rather than beneficial, for our requirements. This matter leads
us to think about lower layers of the system, where we are involved with the
filesystem and its communication with applications in higher layers. If we can
provide confidentiality, data integrity, and availability at the same level as the
filesystem, higher level applications can benefit from these properties even while
interacting with the filesystem using standard POSIX APIs.
5.3.2 File systems
In most traditional filesystems, data integrity and availability is preferred over
confidentiality and privacy. For several years, the concept of privacy was something
beyond filesystems functionalities, and data writing and retrieval throughput was
the most important feature. As an example, (ZFS) [BAH+03] is placed in the group
of efficient widely adopted filesystems through Copy-on-Write (CoW) techniques.
Thus, distributed filesystems were introduced with the main target of providing
high availability along with the former feature. Examples of such filesystems are
Coda [SKK+90], Ivy [MMGC02] and Ori [MBHM13].
Coda [SKK+90] is one of the inspiring distributed filesystems with the idea of
shared data repositories. It retrieves data and resolves conflicts using the concept
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called accessible volume storage group (AVSG) as data replicas. Similar to Coda, Ivy
[MMGC02], as a multi-user peer-to-peer filesystem, has focused on data availability
with a different approach which relies on private snapshots from filesystem for
each participant. Ivy stores logs from the state of the filesystem in a distributed
hash table, called DHash [DKK+01]. A log constituted of the dedicated private
snapshot for each user, contains all user’s modifications to filesystem data and
meta-data. Thus, we can find signs of user privacy in Ivy’s approach, although
confidentiality has not been stated as its main feature. We can find these features
collected in Ori [MBHM13], plus its own data sharing mechanism, grafting, across
user multiple devices. Synchronization, failures handling and data recovery, are
expanded and emphasized in Ori more than two previous stated filesystems. Over
time, filesystems and other sharing stores expanded their functionalities, such as
content-addressing, based on new requirements in the community. As a modern
filesystem, IPFS [Ben14] synthesizes the key successful ideas behind systems such
as DHTs [SMK+01], BitTorrent [Coh03], Git [LM12], and SFS [MK98]. Moreover,
IPFS deals with encrypted mutable objects to improve confidentiality.
Like UPSS, Tahoe [WOW08] is a cryptographic filesystem that stores the content
encrypted in Merkle DAGs and provides access control by cryptographic capabili-
ties. In Tahoe’s design, both mutability and immutability is supported, which the
later case may cause data inconsistency in collaborative environments. The files are
encrypted with one symmetric key and they are erasure coded using Reed-Solomon
codes [Riz97] into N shares to be written to N servers. However, Tahoe is de-
signed for file sharing and archival storage; using Tahoe with POSIX-like read-write
workloads can cause “its performance to crawl to a halt” [tah20]. Having the files
encrypted with one key cannot provide the partial sharing/subsetting.
Having been inspired by discussed filesystems, we strongly believe that UPSS,
as a cryptographic content-addressable filesystem can serve typical filesystem
requirements associated with many of the modern requirements that are explained
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in Section 5.1. UPSS stores data in content-addressed fixed-length blocks and
controls block accessibility through its sharing module that supports both peer-to-
peer and client-server connections. The UPSS’s APIs, discussed in the Section 5.2,
provide a higher level of abstraction about the underlying storage model and enable
a variety of applications to use the system without any assumption about the
physical storage.
5.4 Conclusion
Distrustful information sharing is a common problem that is not well-addressed
by the existing state of the art. In online social networks, sharing any information
with friends requires sharing all information with a potentially-untrustworthy
provider. Countermeasures to the all-seeing provider are brittle, ineffectual or else
perform too poorly for general consumption. In the general social networking case,
users lose control of how widely their data is shared; the stakes are even higher
in censorship resistance scenarios. In environments with strong confidentiality
properties, conversely, a lack of secure sharing techniques stifles collaboration,
transparency and innovation. This is seen when organizations apply redaction
with no linkability to original data or when health-care authorities silo patient
information off from potentially-innovative applications.
One linkage among all four of these use cases is the need to share information se-
lectively and securely among parties without requiring complete trust. Any technique
for enabling such sharing must not be strictly one-way: it must provide the possi-
bility of reciprocation and collaboration. We have argued that all of these goals can
be met by recasting the above problems in terms of a privacy-preserving filesystem.
By decoupling storage from access control, a distributed user-centred filesystem
can provide confidentiality, integrity and availability properties to support systems
in all four of these use cases.
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Using encrypted fixed-length blocks in a content-addressable store, information
can be stored with untrusted providers, cached locally and/or distributed oppor-
tunistically via contact or peer-to-peer networks. Using convergent encryption and
Merkle DAGs, file and directory structures can be stored as immutable DAGs in a
manner that both preserves privacy and enables global deduplication. Higher-level
mutable filesystem objects can be maintained using higher-level sharing protocols
with application-specifiable authorization schemes. Finally, this filesystem can be
exposed to users via direct embedding within applications, via local Web frontends
or as a traditional filesystem within FUSE or a Unix VFS layer.
We are exploring these ideas in our prototype filesystem, UPSS: the user-centric
private sharing system. We believe that the availability of such a filesystem will
enable the development of applications and platforms that provide both strong
user privacy and rich collaborative sharing. Designing such systems may yet
demonstrate that sharing and security can go hand in hand.
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[BSVD09] Sonja Buchegger, Doris Schiöberg, Le-Hung Vu, and Anwitaman Datta.
PeerSoN: P2P social networking: early experiences and insights. In
Proceedings of the Second ACM EuroSys Workshop on Social Network
Systems, pages 46–52. ACM, 2009.
[Coh03] Bram Cohen. Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent. In Workshop
on Economics of Peer-to-Peer systems, volume 6, pages 68–72, 2003.
[DAB+02] John R Douceur, Atul Adya, William J Bolosky, P Simon, and Mar-
vin Theimer. Reclaiming space from duplicate files in a serverless
distributed file system. In Proceedings 22nd international conference on
distributed computing systems, pages 617–624. IEEE, 2002.
[DKK+01] Frank Dabek, M Frans Kaashoek, David Karger, Robert Morris, and
Ion Stoica. Wide-area cooperative storage with CFS. In ACM SIGOPS
Operating Systems Review, volume 35, pages 202–215. ACM, 2001.
[DVH66] J. B. Dennis and E. C. Van Horn. Programming semantics for multi-
programmed computations. Communications of the ACM, 9(3):143–155,
1966.
158
[GTF08] Saikat Guha, Kevin Tang, and Paul Francis. NOYB: Privacy in online
social networks. In Proceedings of the first workshop on Online social
networks, pages 49–54. ACM, 2008.
[JNM+12] Sonia Jahid, Shirin Nilizadeh, Prateek Mittal, Nikita Borisov, and Apu
Kapadia. Decent: A decentralized architecture for enforcing privacy
in online social networks. In Pervasive Computing and Communications
Workshops (PERCOM Workshops), 2012 IEEE International Conference on,
pages 326–332. IEEE, 2012.
[KB17] Martin Kleppmann and Alastair R Beresford. A conflict-free replicated
JSON datatype. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,
28(10):2733–2746, 2017.
[LB08] Matthew M Lucas and Nikita Borisov. FlyByNight: mitigating the
privacy risks of social networking. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM
workshop on Privacy in the electronic society, pages 1–8. ACM, 2008.
[LM12] Jon Loeliger and Matthew McCullough. Version Control with Git: Pow-
erful tools and techniques for collaborative software development. ” O’Reilly
Media, Inc.”, 2012.
[LXH09] Wanying Luo, Qi Xie, and Urs Hengartner. FaceCloak: An architecture
for user privacy on social networking sites. In Computational Science
and Engineering, 2009. CSE’09. International Conference on, volume 3,
pages 26–33. IEEE, 2009.
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Chapter 6
UPSS: the user-centric private sharing
system
(This chapter is submitted as a paper to ACM Transaction on Storage (ACM TOS),
June 2020)
Across a broad spectrum of use cases, there is an acute need for private storage and
sharing, with strong security and performance properties. Existing systems provide
security or performance, with strong protection or ease of user-directed sharing, but
a failure to adequately address “both-and” requirements forces users to settle for
systems that do not fully meet their needs. This is true in environments as diverse
as social networking, electronic health records and surveillance data management.
Online social networking applications present users with a difficult choice be-
tween centralized systems with high levels of performance but weak privacy proper-
ties and distributed systems that attempt to provide stronger privacy properties but
lack reliability and practical levels of performance. The desirable scenario for users
is to provide them the ability to easily share arbitrary quantities of content with
others while maintaining a private-by-default posture. In particular, it is desirable
for a social networking system to ensure that the operators of network and storage
infrastructure have as little visibility as possible into the social interactions of users.
Contemporary approaches to health records include thick perimeters and high
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levels of trust in selected organizations and individuals. Such approaches introduce
needless risk even in an age of small systems with known players, and they do not
scale up to enable innovative health care ecosystems that improve outcomes without
placing patient information at risk. It is desirable to be able to share minimized
information — or indirect references to information — in such a way that access
can be audited without revealing patient details even to auditors.
In surveillance and law enforcement, there is often a need to redact identifying
or other operational details from surveillance imagery. While performing this
redaction, however, there is also a need to maintain a demonstrably strong chain
of custody from an original source image or video through to a redacted image
presented in a legal proceeding. Confidentiality is important in this scenario, but
so is the integrity of multiple versions of content and the linkages among them. In
Section 6.5, we will discuss how UPSS can address this requirement.
In all of these cases, what is needed is a mechanism for least-privileged storage of
information that facilitates simple sharing of arbitrary quantities of content at users’
discretion. Such a system should provide strong confidentiality and integrity prop-
erties, such that it can rely on commodity cloud services from untrusted providers.
We have built such a system in UPSS: the user-centric private sharing system, a
cryptographic filesystem designed to be “global first”, with no assumptions made
about the trustworthiness of storage infrastructure (Section 6.1) or even on com-
mon agreed-on definitions of users or user identities. Relying on key concepts
from capability systems [DVH66], distributed systems, log-structured filesystems
(Section 6.1.1) and revision control, we have developed a new approach to filesys-
tems (Section 6.2) that offers novel features while being usable in ways that are
compatible with existing applications.
We demonstrate the utility of this new approach to privacy-oriented filesystems,
conceptually described in [BJA19], via four case studies (Section 6.3): a comparison
with conventional Unix filesystems, locally (Section 6.3.2), remotely (Section 6.3.3)
164
and globally (Section 6.3.4), and as the basis for a new model of private revision
control (Section 6.3.5). Through all of these case studies, we demonstrate that UPSS
provides a solid underpinning for new approaches to user-centric private data
storage and sharing, enabling users to benefit from both strong security and high
performance, with both private, least-privileged storage and simple user-directed
sharing.
6.1 Background
In this section, we define some concepts that are needed for a better understanding
of the remaining paper.
6.1.1 Preliminaries
In 1992, Rosenblum et al. designed a disk storage management technique called
Log-structured filesystem (LFS) [RO92] to improve the write performance of the
existing filesystems of the time, such as Fast File System (FFS) [MJLF84]. Log-
structured filesystems buffer large writes into memory and persist them to the disk
along with their metadata sequentially in big chunks called segments. In this way,
the disk rotation latency related to random accesses is avoided as all writes are done
sequentially. Therefore, the blocks related to a file are accessed sequentially.
Efforts on optimizing the procedure of writing on filesystems continued on
further popular filesystems such as ZFS [BAH+03], which employs the idea of
copy-on-write (COW), used in our filesystem, upss-fuse, as well. The main idea
of COW is to have immutable data, reducing the risks associated with concurrent
accesses to mutable state and enabling important techniques such as cryptographic
checksumming and greater parallelism. More specifically, when a data block is
needed to be copied from one address to another, a pointer to the source is created
for the target instead of actual copying, and the block is marked as read-only. In
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this way, all the read operations from the target are served by referring to the source
address. Upon writes in source or target, the block is copied to a new address,
and the pointers are updated. In this way, write procedures are postponed until
they actually are needed, which leads to performance improvement in the COW
filesystems.
Merkle DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph), which is a general version of a Merkle
tree, is a suitable data structure for managing files in filesystems such as ZFS
[BAH+03] and Btrfs [RBM13], or in version control systems such as Git. The nodes
of the Merkle DAG contain the cryptographic hashes of its children’s content, and
they also can contain some data. The root node can be used to compare different
Merkle DAGs. If the hash values of the root nodes of two Merkle DAGs would be
equal, it means that the two Merkle DAGs are identical. These features have made
Merkle DAGs useful to content-related procedures like data integrity checks on
filesystems.
6.2 UPSS: the user-centric private sharing system
UPSS is a private sharing system, which can provide confidentiality, integrity, and
availability properties. UPSS enables its users to share information selectively and
securely without requiring complete trust. The system is built from the best practices
of successful approaches such as version control systems, content-addressable
storage, and convergent encryption.
UPSS is designed in a layered architecture, shown in Figure 6.1. The block store
layer (Section 6.2.1) provides storage of immutable encrypted blocks. On top of
that, we have the immutable layer, described in Section 6.2.2, in which the relation
between the data items in various granularities is defined. Mutability is provided by
the in-memory mutable objects in the mutable filesystem layer (Section 6.2.3). The
public UPSS library API is the interaction point between applications and UPSS.
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Encrypted Block Store













Figure 6.1: The layered structure of UPSS.
6.2.1 BlockStore layer
As we have targeted UPSS to be used as a distributed system and to support
data sharing, its design includes a layer called block store, which is the API for
storing and retrieving data blocks, on and from the data storage. This layer has
a minimal interface, consisting of two main functions to read and write, and two
other functions for reporting the used blocks and outputting the block hashes. In
the current implementation, there is no garbage collector and this is left for future
work.
A block storage is a sea of encrypted blocks. This API supports local, remote, in-
memory and cloud data storage. We can have a local block store, which is writing
data on a local data storage, on a local system, or we can have a shared data storage
located on a remote system or on a cloud storage provider.
The write method accepts an encrypted block and generates the cryptographic
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hash of its content and a lookup operation is done on a map including the crypto-
graphic hashes of the previously stored encrypted blocks. The content is persisted to
the storage if its cryptographic hash does not exist in the map. This enables safe de-
duplication across many users even at a global scale. The generated cryptographic
hash is returned by the write method. The read method accepts the cryptographic
hash of a block and returns its corresponding encrypted block to the above layer.
The performance of read and write methods affects any other systems which are
using UPSS. We have implemented a caching block stores coupled with journaling
to write the blocks in faster block stores when possible. The caching block store
consists of two near and far stores, each of which is an implementation of the block
store. Upon finishing the writes in the near block store, the returned block pointer
is journaled to a local file and the write to the far block store, which is a more
expensive write, is done in background. In this way, we are providing non-blocking
writes in the caching block store and by journaling, we ensure that we are not
missing the expensive writes.
We have implemented a local block store for our system, which uses a local
file as the data storage. UPSS’ local block store can be a user’s storage medium,
or a temporary cache for other remote block stores, or permanent storage, such
as what is used in peer-to-peer systems in which everything is stored on the local
storages. It stores fixed-size encrypted blocks without any plaintext metadata.
Besides the local block store, we also have implemented amazon block store, that
is connected to Amazon S3 [AWS20] service, a remote block store, described in
Section 6.3.3.1, which is used as the storage integrated with our version control
system (Section 6.3.5), a memory block store for keeping everything in memory,
and a caching block store.
Listing 6.1 shows a caching block store that includes memory, local and remote
block stores.
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1 let memory_store = MemoryBlockStore ::new()?;
2 let local_store = LocalBlockStore ::new(file , block_size)?;
3 let remote_blockstore = RemoteBlockStore ::new(server_addr ,
block_size)?;
4 let l1_cache = CacheingBlockStore ::new(memory_store , local_store)
?;
5
6 let store = CacheingBlockStore ::new(l1_cache , remote_blockstore)?;
7
Listing 6.1: An example of creating a caching block store.
6.2.2 Immutable DAGs
In UPSS, each data item is stored as a set of fixed-size immutable encrypted blocks,
which are linked together in a DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph). For example, an
immutable file version can be represented as a tree of immutable blocks, a file’s
history as a DAG of versions and blocks, and a directory as a mapping from
names to files. Immutable blocks are encrypted using symmetric keys derived
from cryptographic hashes of their plaintext, a technique known as convergent
encryption [DAB+02, LCL+13, ASA17], and named using the cryptographic hash of
their ciphertext, a technique known as content-addressing. The name of a block and







In Equation (6.1), nB is the name of a block and kB is the key used to decrypt it.
A block pointer can thus be seen as a cryptographic capability [DVH66] to read a
block, though not necessarily to modify it. The block pointer to the root node of a
file or directory implies the ability to access arbitrary quantities of content, up to an
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entire directory tree in a filesystem. We integrate the convergent encryption with
optionally random padding to protect low-entropy block contents. UPSS supports
both deterministic and non-deterministic padding; De-duplication is only enabled
in the former case. UPSS defaults to SHA3 [Dwo15] algorithm for generating the
digests for the encrypted blocks, but the algorithm choice is not hard-coded in
the UPSS design and other hash functions can be used. We encrypt the blocks
using AES, which is a symmetric key algorithm. In the current design, we can
encrypt data blocks with 16, 24, or 32-byte keys using AES128, AES192, or AES256
algorithms, respectively. The hashing and encryption algorithms are embedded in
the block pointers to allow future cryptographic algorithm updates.
When fully convergent encryption is used (the UPSS default), de-duplication
is possible across multiple users, as the same content always hashes to the same
key, producing the same ciphertext. We reduce the data inconsistency problem to a
version control problem by defining blocks to be immutable. A content modification
causes a new version of the content to be created, and this modification affects the
parent block. This approach is similar to the update approach of copy-on-write
(COW) filesystems, which apply the updates all the way up until the root block.
UPSS keeps the old versions of content by storing a pointer to the previous version
of the modified content in their corresponding root blocks. Therefore, if the new
version of a block is not persisted to a block store yet, the older versions of the block
are accessible using the previous pointers until the updated version is ready to be
used.
6.2.3 Mutable Filesystem API
UPSS provides an object-oriented view of the underlying encrypted blocks and
enables the applications to interact with the system using the provided public API.
The traditional filesystem concepts such as files, directories, and directory trees














Figure 6.2: The corresponding in-memory objects related to each file and directory.
Each in-memory object contains a Blob that keeps a list of copy-on-write references
to immutable in-memory Blocks.
Directory contents are managed by a binary Blob structure, which maps data into
immutable blocks via copy-on-write references. Figure 6.2 shows how we relate the
in-memory objects to files and directories.
In UPSS, all the modifications are handled in the mutable layer by updating
the in-memory objects, unless UPSS asks for persisting the objects explicitly. For
persisting a File or Directory, the list of BlockReferences, each of which points
to a Block, are persisted and their block pointers are added to a MetaVersion
structure. The final step is persisting the MetaVersion and adding or updating its
root block pointer in the object’s parent. Having the MetaVersion structure enables
us to implement partial sharing and redaction with intergrity check. However,
this feature is not fully implemented and we postponed it to the furure work (see
Section 6.5.2).
The process of persisting a MetaVersion is different from persisting data blocks.
The MetaVersion, which holds a list of block pointers to the encrypted data blocks,
is chunked into fixed-size encrypted blocks if its size is more than the UPSS’s block
size. The encrypted blocks related to the MetaVersion are linked together in a
linked list in which each block’s block pointer is embedded inside its preceding
block. A history of object versions is kept by the Prev pointers.
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UPSS is implemented as a library that can be linked directly into applications; a
simple example of such integration is shown in Listing 6.2. Currently, applications
integrating the UPSS library access it via Rust calling conventions, as the library is
written in Rust [Tea20a]. However, in the future, we will support other program-
ming languages such as C, Python and JavaScript/WASM via foreign function
interfaces as described in Section 6.5.1.
1 let store = LocalBlockStore ::new(file , block_size)?;




6 let f = fs.new_file ()?;
7 f.write (& some_bytes)?;
8
Listing 6.2: An example of integrating the UPSS library directly into an application,
accessing FS objects via API calls.
6.3 Case studies
In this section, we demonstrate the practicality of UPSS via four case studies. Each
case study demonstrates UPSS’s qualitative ease of use as well as its quantitative
performance, with comparisons to other systems drawn where appropriate. These
four case studies are:
• UPSS as a local filesystem (Section 6.3.2),
• UPSS as a network filesystem (Section 6.3.3),
• UPSS as a global filesystem (Section 6.3.4) and
• UVC: UPSS as a version control system (Section 6.3.5).
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6.3.1 Benchmark description
We evaluated the cost of creating files and directories and reading and writing
from/into on-disk local and remote block stores. For evaluating file and directory
creation, we generated a user-defined number of files and directories, added them
to an ephemeral root directory and persisted the results into file-backed block stores.
For evaluating read and write operations, we generated 1000 files filled with
random data of size 4 KiB, the natural block size of our underlying storage, select a
file randomly and processed the sequential read and write operations on it.
We also implemented a macrobenchmark that simulates a web server behaviour.
We selected a file randomly from a file set and performed 10 consecutive read and
write operations with different I/O sizes: 4 KiB, 256 KiB, 512 KiB and 1 MiB. The
results of our macrobenchmark is discussed in Section 6.3.2.4.
The Filebench [fil16] framework gave us an idea about how to implement our
benchmark functions. We did not use the Filebench framework for our evaluations
as it did not provide the level of detail about filesystem’s behaviour during time
that is reported in Sections 6.3.2.2, 6.3.3.2 and 6.3.4.1.
We ran each microbenchmark function 1,000 times for the direct usage of UPSS
API and 5 times for the upss-fuse micro and macro benchmarks; the results are re-
ported as the arithmetic mean of the runs along with their standard deviations. We
ran the benchmarks on a 4-core, 8-thread 3.6 GHz Intel Core-i7-4790 processor with
24 GiB of RAM and 1 TB of ATA 7200 RPM magnetic disk, running Ubuntu Linux
4.15.0-72-generic (the machines’ configurations for the network filesystem evalua-
tions are different, explained in Section 6.3.3.2). The results of these benchmarks for
direct usage of UPSS API — as well as a comparison with benchmark results from
Sections 6.3.2.2 and 6.3.3.2 — can be seen in Figure 6.3. This figure clearly shows
the performance degradation caused by FUSE [VAM+19] in comparison with the
direct API usage.


























































api−local api−remote upss−fuse−local upss−fuse−remote
Figure 6.3: A comparison of the performance of UPSS when accessed directly via
the UPSS API and via upss-fuse connected to a local or remote block store. The
numbers reported as the average number of operations done in 60 seconds for 5
runs. Confidence intervals are represented with error bars.
as discussed in Section 6.2.3. Since in-memory data structures may be written many
times in a short interval, “dirty” blocks are only written to the block store when
explicitly requested (or, in the case of upss-fuse, every 5 s), which leads to a new
version of the block; only at this point are any cryptographic hashes computed,
blocks encrypted, etc. The cost of this process is illustrated in Figure 6.4; it is
superlinear due to the larger amounts of metadata required to describe larger
amounts of data. This relationship is also seen in UPSS’ total storage requirements,















Figure 6.4: The time required to persist files to a block store scales superlinearly with
the number of files, as larger amounts of data require larger amounts of metadata
to describe them (directory persist times are almost identical to those of files).
very slightly superlinear.
st = (1.09 + 0.001613s) s (6.2)
6.3.2 UPSS as a local filesystem
Direct usage of the UPSS API requires program modification — and, today, the use
of a specific programming language. In order to expose the benefits of UPSS to a
wider range of software, we have implemented a filesystem in userspace (FUSE) [fus19]
wrapper that exposes UPSS objects to other applications via a hook into the Unix
VFS layer. As shown in Figure 6.5, upss-fuse maps FUSE inode numbers to in-
memory UPSS objects to service VFS requests. This allows conventional applications
to access an UPSS directory mounted as a Unix directory with POSIX semantics,
though there is one unsupportable feature: hard links. Hard links are defined
within the context of a single filesystem, but UPSS is designed to allow any direc-
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tory to be shared as a root directory of a filesystem. Owing to this design choice, it
is impossible to provide typical hard link semantics and, e.g., update all parents
of a modified file so that they can perform their own copy-on-write updates (see
Section 6.2.3). Therefore, we do not provide support for hard links — a common















  /* … */
  .vop_fsync = …
  /* … */
  .vop_getattr = …
  /* … */
  .vop_lookup = …
  /* … */
}
impl Fuse for UPSSFS {
  /* … */
  fn lookup(…)
  fn getattr(…)
  fn readdir(…)
  fn mknod(…)
  fn write(…)




  fuse_vnops = {
ZFS
struct vop_vector











Figure 6.5: upss-fuse exposes a UPSS directory to POSIX applications via an in-
kernel FUSE device.
The upss-fuse wrapper exposes an ephemeral plaintext view of an UPSS’s di-
rectory underneath a Unix mount point, allowing conventional file and directory
access, while keeping all data and metadata encrypted at rest in a local or remote
block store (see Section 6.3.5). Unlike existing cryptographic filesystems such as
NCryptFS [WMZ03] and EncFS [LFS16a], no plaintext directory structure is left
behind in the mount point after the filesystem has been unmounted. The only meta-
176
data that is kept in the clear by the upss-fuse compatibility layer is the block pointer
of the root directory, which is automatically updated as the filesystem contents are
modified and the root directory is persisted to the block store. This block pointer is
currently kept in a plaintext file; we plan to protect it with symmetric or asymmetric
cryptography in the future (see Section 6.5).
6.3.2.1 Snapshots and consistency
As a copy-on-write filesystem, UPSS provides cheap snapshots. As a user-empowering
sharing system, these snapshots can be quickly shared with other users for read-only
access: a user need only share the block pointer to a file or directory with another
user, and that user will be able to retrieve the content from a block store and decrypt
it. To facilitate such sharing, upss-fuse exposes both cryptographic hashes (which
provide integrity guarantees over Merkle DAGs for blockchain-like applications)
and full block pointers (which allow content sharing) to users via POSIX extended
attributes, an of which is shown in Listing 6.3.
1 % xattr -p user.hash mnt/a-file -in-upss
2 sha3 -512: hdd3P80hjERoF1PO9ezuOEQQwG/Goey2Up5je ...
3
Listing 6.3: upss-fuse exposes UPSS cryptographic details to users via POSIX
extended attributes. This allows users to verify the integrity of a directory tree or to
share a directory’s contents via its block pointer.
UPSS creates snapshots whenever requested by asking for a directory’s crypto-
graphic name (which depends on its entries’ names, depending on their contents,
etc. — see Section 6.2.2). In order to provide data consistency, upss-fuse requests that
UPSS persist a “dirty” — i.e., modified — root directory every five seconds, or after
a tunable number of dirty objects require persisting. As described in Section 6.2.3,
persisting a Directory object causes its versioned children to be recursively persisted
(if dirty), after which the cryptographic block pointer for the new root directory
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version can be stored in the upss-fuse metadata file. As in other copy-on-write
filesystems, the cost of persisting an entire filesystem depends on the amount of
“dirty” content in the filesystem. The trade-off between the demand for frequent
data synchronization and the requirement for more frequent — though smaller —
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Figure 6.6: Trade-off of sync frequency vs performance. The average number of
operations (in five runs, each 60 seconds) that can be done per second for different
sync intervals are shown in y-axis (the content size in the write operations is 4 KiB).
Sync interval x means x objects are kept in memory until the next sync.
6.3.2.2 Performance comparisons
To illustrate the performance of UPSS when used as a conventional local filesystem,
we compared upss-fuse with the FUSE-based cryptographic filesystems CryFS [MRAMQ17]
and EncFS [LFS16b, LFS16a], as well as the mature, heavily-optimized ZFS [BAH+03].
The latter has been included because, although it is not a cryptographic filesystem
designed for fine-grained confidentiality, it is a log-structured filesystem with some
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common features such as copy-on-write updates and cryptographic hashes used to
name blocks. In contrast to upss-fuse, ZFS has been extensively optimized over the
past two decades to become a high-performance, widely-deployed filesystem.
We mounted each of these four filesystems on different paths in the Linux host
referenced in Section 6.3.1 and ran four microbenchmarks to test their speed in
creating empty directories (MakeDir), creating empty files (MakeFile), reading
randomly select files sequentially including 4 KiB of data (ReadFile) and writing
random data to files (WriteFile). Each of these four benchmarks was run for 60
seconds and the operations per second were calculated as the average of 5 runs;
the results are shown in Figure 6.7. UPSS outperforms EncFS and CryFS for all
operations, with performance especially exceeding these existing systems in the
critical Read and Write benchmarks. As might be expected, ZFS significantly
outperforms UPSS in three out of four benchmarks, with Read performance 6.176×
and Write performance 20.03× faster than upss-fuse, but upss-fuse does outperform
ZFS in one benchmark: MakeDir. In upss-fuse, creating files and directories have
the same cost, as they are both backed by empty collections of blocks, but ZFS is
optimized for the creation of files as the cost of directory creation speed. We also
note that upss-fuse performs 1.47− 8.2× more operations per second in various
benchmarks than CryFS and EncFS while also providing stronger security properties
(see Section 6.4).
Figure 6.8 shows a more detailed examination of the behavior of the four com-
parison filesystems. In these plots, a fixed number of benchmark operations were
performed; the x-axis represents the time needed to complete all 100k operations.
These plots show the bursty nature of real filesystems, and in the case of CryFS,
they reveal performance that scales poorly as the number of requested operations
increases.
Much of the bursty nature of these plots derives from how each filesystem




























































CryFS EncFS upss-fuse ZFS
Figure 6.7: Operations that can be performed per second by CryFS, EncFS, upss-fuse
and ZFS for our four microbenchmarks. The numbers reported as the average
number of operations done in 60 seconds for 5 runs along with their standard
deviations as error bars.
or when 64 MiB of data has accumulated to sync, whichever comes first. Similarly,
to provide a fair comparison, upss-fuse is configured to synchronize after 5 s or
15,000 writes (close to 64 MiB of data when using 4 KiB blocks). These periodic
synchronizations cause performance to drop, even on dedicated computers with
quiescent networks and limited process trees.
6.3.2.3 Deduplication
As stated in Section 6.2.2, UPSS’s convergent encryption provides natural de-
duplication for blocks containing the same content, even if they are saved and
encrypted by mutually-distrustful users. To evaluate the effect of de-duplication on
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Figure 6.8: Operations that can be performed per second by CryFS, EncFS, upss-
fuse and ZFS for our four microbenchmarks. The behaviour of the filesystems are


























































































































































































overall performance, we compared writing the same content and different contents
into files by measuring the amount of data that can be written per second. As shown
in Figure 6.9, upss-fuse and ZFS benefit from de-duplication. This effect becomes
more pronounced for ZFS as write sizes increase.
6.3.2.4 Macro-benchmark
We ran our macrobenchmark function discussed in Section 6.3.1 on upss-fuse, CryFS,
EncFs and ZFS, to evaluate upss-fuse in a a web server simulation in which consecu-
tive read and write operations with different I/O sizes are performed on different
files. The results are reported in Figure 6.10. As in previous benchmarks, ZFS
outperforms the other filesystems for different I/O sizes. upss-fuse achieved better
results than CryFS and EncFS for the 4 KiB case. However, as the I/O size increases,
CryFS outperforms upss-fuse. The reason is that the bigger files we have, the more
number of fixed-sized blocks are generated by upss-fuse, each of which needs to be
encrypted with a different key and then persisted. But in CryFS all the fixed-size
blocks related to a file are encrypted with one symmetric key. Therefore, the key
generation is done once per each file in CryFS and this cause a better performance
for larger files, and in the same time, makes CryFS inapplicable for partial file
sharing and redaction scenarios that are supported by UPSS. Also, several studies
have shown that the files in a filesystem are small with the mean size of only a few
kilobytes [RO92, BHK+91, LZCZ86].
6.3.3 UPSS as a network filesystem
Although UPSS can be used as a local filesystem, it is primarily designed as a
system for sharing data across networks with untrusted storage providers. Taking
advantage of UPSS’s unique properties requires an evaluation that is not directly
comparable to other systems. Thus, we have compared the performance of upss-fuse
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Figure 6.9: Performance of writing the same content compared with writing random
contents into files. The numbers are the average of KiB of content written per second














































































CryFS EncFS upss−fuse ZFS
Figure 6.10: Performance of CryFS, EncFS, upss-fuse and ZFS for the web server
macrobenchmark. The numbers are the average of KiB of I/O per second for five
runs, each 60 seconds.
the venerable NFS [SCR+03] (Section 6.3.3.2).
6.3.3.1 Remote block store
In UPSS, a block store caches encrypted fixed-size blocks on behalf of users. The
confidentiality and integrity of these blocks’ content is assured by cryptographic
operations performed by clients before blocks are sent to the block store, so the
underlying storage medium may be untrusted. The block store sees the blocks as
immutable ciphertext blobs, named by the cryptographic hash of their contents.
This approach allows us to build a block store in which a centralized server exploits
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high-quality network links and disks to receive and transmit large numbers of
encrypted blocks — the data plane — regardless of what block pointers are shared
between users — the control plane. Clients send a data block to be stored or request
to get previously stored data, identified by block pointers. This design is amenable
to multi-layer caching, with a system accessing a remote block store having the
option of caching immutable blocks in a local block store, and even caching those
results in memory.
6.3.3.2 Performance comparison
As in Section 6.3.2.2, we evaluated the performance of UPSS by mounting an
upss-fuse filesystem in a Unix mount point and comparing it to other filesystems
using four microbenchmarks. In this section, however, we connected our upss-fuse
filesystem to a remote block store and compared our performance results against
two other remote filesystems: the FUSE-based SSHFS [Tea20b] and the venerable
NFS [SCR+03]. Similar to Section 6.3.2.2, one comparison filesystem is primarily
designed for security and the other has higher performance after a long history of
performance optimization.
The remote block store server was run on a 4-core, 2.2 GHz Xeon E5-2407
processor with 16 GiB of RAM and 1 TB of magnetic disk, running FreeBSD 12.1-
RELEASE. The client machine, that runs upss-fuse, is a 4-core, 3.5 GHz Xeon E3-1240
v5 processor with 32 GiB of RAM and 1 TB of magnetic disk, running Ubuntu
Linux 16.04. Both the client and the server machines were located on the same
LAN, connected to each other via a Gigabit switch dedicated to test machines (and
therefore with little traffic). For our comparisons, we ran the benchmarks discussed
in Section 6.3.2.2 for 60 seconds and the operation per seconds are reported in
Figure 6.11. Figure 6.12 shows the behaviour of the benchmarked filesystems with
executing 100k MakeDir, MakeFile, Read and Write operations. In the network
environment UPSS outperforms SSHFS and NFS for MakeDir, MakeFile and Read
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operations and for Write, it achieves comparable results. For the Read benchmark,
upss-fuse has a slow start as the encrypted blocks are read from the remote block
store and are loaded into the memory. The Read benchmark generates 1000 files,
each of which of size 4 KiB, filled with random content. After the files being loaded
into memory, the other read operations are served from the in-memory objects.
This causes upss-fuse to be about 5× faster than NFS in the Read benchmark. For
a fair comparison, we also included the results of Read benchmark by clearing
the caching block store and the in-memory objects, shown as Read-CacheMiss in
Figure 6.11. More specifically, we generated the files on the remote block store, clear
all the related in-memory objects and remove the files from the caching block store.
Then we started reading the files from the remote block store and writing them to
the caching block store. The other two filesystems achieve better read results in
comparison with the Read-CacheMiss benchmark.
6.3.4 UPSS as a global filesystem
In addition to local and network filesystem, upss-fuse can also be connected to
untrusted cloud storage providers. To do so, we have implemented an UPSS block
store backed in the Amazon S3 service [AWS20] and compared its performance
with S3FS [GNr20] and Perkeep [LN18] (Section 6.3.4.1).
6.3.4.1 Performance comparison
We mounted upss-fuse backed with the Amazon block store (with and without
local caching), S3FS and Perkeep in a Unix mount point and compared them using
our four microbenchmarks. S3FS allows Linux and macOS to mount an Amazon
S3 bucket via FUSE without any security properties. Perkeep, formerly called
Camlistore, is a FUSE-based cryptographic filesystem that can be backed by memory,





















































Figure 6.11: Network performance comparisons. The numbers reported as the
average number of operations done in 60 seconds for 5 runs. The Read-CacheMiss
bar for upss-fuse shows the read Ops/s for the files that do not exist in the caching
block store and they are read from the remote block store and also are written to
the caching block store.
We ran the benchmarks discussed in Section 6.3.2.2 with 5k MakeDir, MakeFile,
Read and Write operations and the behaviours of upss-fuse-network, Perkeep and
S3FS during time are reported in Figure 6.13. In all of these cases, Amazon S3’s
response time is the bottleneck. To have a fair comparison, we ran the benchmarks
for upss-fuse with and without caching. With caching enabled, we write the en-
crypted blocks in a caching block store and journal the block names to an on-disk
file, then we write to Amazon S3 bucket by processing the journal using a back-
ground thread. This makes a large difference in the number of operations that can
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Figure 6.12: Operations that can be performed per second by upss-fuse-network,
NFS and SSHFS for four microbenchmarks. The behaviour of the filesystems are



























































































































be done by upss-fuse as a global filesystem in comparison with S3FS and Perkeep
(Figure 6.13a). In Figure 6.13b, we disabled caching and persisted the content just
before the benchmark script is finished so that the content is ready to be read from
the Amazon block store. Even without caching and having the content persisted to
the Amazon block store, upss-fuse outperforms the other two filesystems by factors
of 10-8000. These results show that the cryptographic foundation of UPSS provides,
not just strong security properties, but a foundation for aggressive caching that
would be unsafe in a system that does not use cryptographic naming.
6.3.5 UVC: UPSS Version Control System
Supporting data sharing on filesystems or storages, is a broad field of study, which
makes the system involved with challenges. Revision control, communication pro-
tocols, policies on user access rights, employing the underlying filesystem, are a few
of involved, argumentative topics in this chapter of studies. The most motivating
point of designing UVC: UPSS Version Control System is that even distributed
revision control systems depend on trusted storage systems, with versioned con-
tent stored in plaintext and access control provided by third-party providers. The
key point is that using UPSS, we can use an untrusted backend for bulk storage,
maintaining encrypted data, along with a secure authentication and authorization
mechanism.
Version control systems are a group of data sharing systems to facilitate users’
contributions and collaborations on shared units of data, known as repositories.
Git and Apache Subversion (SVN) are examples of today’s widely-used version
control systems. The mechanism of sharing revisions of data differs in each system.
The most straightforward case is a centralized approach, in which data is stored
on a shared remote server, and changes will be synced to it. The server manages
requests, revisions, user accesses, and data storages to use. UPSS’s design provides
a mechanism to support revision control. on UPSS’s filesystem objects, described
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Figure 6.13: Operations that can be performed per second by upss-fuse-global,
S3FS and Perkeep for four microbenchmarks. The behaviour of the filesystems are
reported for 5k operations during time. In Figure 6.13a, the sync interval is 15000,
means that the number of objects that are kept in memory before being persisted is
15000. The objects are synced to caching block stores and are journaled to an on-disk
file to be synced to an Amazon block store in the background. In Figure 6.13b, the
caching is disabled and the sync interval is set to 4999 to sync everything to amazon














































































































































































in Section 6.2.3. This makes us closer to the design of a distributed sharing system
relying on our cryptographic filesystem. As the first step, we have designed and
implemented a prototype of a centralized version control system, called UVC: UPSS
Version Control System’s prototype, UVC.
Various version control systems behave differently in detail, but they all support
some initial user stories such as: cloning shared data on a local machine, pushing
modifications to the sharing server, demonstrating repository statuses in terms
of sequences of modifications, etc. UVC, is a client-server program supporting
the mentioned initial user stories as the minimums of functionalities. Our version
control system constitutes of three principle sub-modules: the remote block store, the
version control server, and the version control client. The remote block store is a client-
server application that can be integrated with upss-fuse’s API as a BlockStore,
described in Section 6.2.1, to replace the local block store. In the following sec-
tions, we describe how our version control server and client, cooperate with this
application to manage our data sharing scenarios.
6.3.5.1 Version Control Server
UVC’s server is responsible for creating shared repositories, keeping track of
changes on them, validating and handling clients requests. A repository is a
directory, including a various number of files. As it is stated before, UPSS is a
content-addressable filesystem in which each object, either a file or directory, is
addressable through a global name called a block pointer. Any change on an UPSS’s
objects, results in a change in the content of the object’s data or its metadata, and
consequently, a new block pointer will be generated. We have benefited from this
feature, as each block pointer is a global identifier for a version of the shared direc-
tory. Hence, any change on the shared directory, like adding or removing files, or
altering their contents and names, results in a new revision of the shared directory.
The version control server tracks and manages these revision changes to provide
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users with collaboration on the shared repository. Each client’s request contains
a new block pointer for the modified directory, along with its previous revision’s
name, which is the block pointer of the previously synced revision, and finally,
required timestamps, and information about the user. The server investigates the
request considering the current status of the corresponding chain of revisions and
decides how to respond. It should be mentioned that authorization and authentica-
tion management are not supported in the current prototype and are considered as
our future developments to be added as a responsibility of UVC’s server. So, UVC
is designed to accomplish management policies and data transmission separately.
6.3.5.2 Version Control Client
UVC’s client is responsible for creating requests, communicating with the version
control server, keeping track of changes on the local machine, and retrieving modi-
fied data from, or writing it on, the remote block store. To clarify these processes
and the communication between the server and client, consider a push procedure:
Assume that the client has modified a file under a directory, which is cloned before,
and then runs the add command to add to the remote block store. To make the
stated procedure more sensible, it can be counted as Git’s behavior during add and
commit procedures together. However, the significant difference with Git’s logic is
that the modified data is synced to the remote block store before starting pushing
procedure. As the confidentiality of data is already guaranteed with the approach
of storing data encrypted, it is always safe to push it to the server speculatively. So,
the cost of pushing changes is even less than some of the existing systems, such
as Git’s protocol in which the data is not transmitted before push request. Making
data transmission and policy management elements separated in our prototype,
makes our version control system flexible to be expanded in the future with new
fine-grained access right policies, without affecting data transmission. When the
modified version of data is added to the remote block store, the block pointer of
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the new directory is sent to the server, wrapped in a new request associated with
other information. On the other side, the server validates a new push request and
investigate the revision sent, and then updates the intended chain of revisions and
sends a response packet back to the client. Figure 6.14 shows this procedure.
When the new revision of the shared directory is added to the server and
information is updated, other clients can pull it. A pull request will be sent to the
server in which the last synced revision is included. The server validates the request,
and returns a list of further revisions from the sent revision on, to the client. The
client application is responsible for fetching the last version from the remote block
store. Figure 6.15 demonstrates this process.
UVC is at the initial phases of development towards a sharing system built on a
cryptographic filesystem. The system is not parallelized or optimized yet. However,
we have evaluated this system in terms of execution time, comparing with Git,
another version control system that is used globally today. Section 6.3.5.3 describes
some of our observations.
6.3.5.3 Version Control System Evaluations
As it is mentioned in Section 6.3.5, to develop UVC, we were inspired by Git, which
is a widely-used revision control system. Our version control’s add command
is equivalent to Git’s add and commit commands together. Our push command
syncs changes to the server, like Git’s push command, without transferring data
during the push request. At the current state, our clone and pull commands almost
work in the same way, and both of them are fetching the new revision of the
shared directory from the remote block store. We have examined three of our most
essential procedures, including add, push, and clone commands, as our system’s
initial performance. Although UVC is an initial prototype, the main goal of our
evaluations was to find improvement opportunities.
For the evaluations, we started with an empty shared directory created by the
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Figure 6.14: The version control client program writes changes as a new revision of
the shared directory on the remote block store, and then sends a push request to
the version control server. Then the server validates the client’s request and will
update the corresponding revision chain’s information.
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Figure 6.15: The version control server validates the client’s request and responds
with the block pointer of the head’s revision. Then, the cryptographic hash included
in the head revision’s block pointer will be used to retrieve data from the remote
block store.
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version control server. Also, we made an empty repository on Git. In both cases,
the remote store was set on a local machine, to remove the cost of networking
connections. We have used the first 1024 files of the Linux kernel’s source code as a
pool of files. The size of the whole of the set was 18 MB. To evaluate the effect of an
increasing number of files, we began with one file to be added and pushed to the
server. Then we cloned the new revision of the shared directory. We repeated this
scenario, increasing the number of files, each time making the previous number to
the power of 2, up to 1024 files.
Figure 6.16 demonstrates the total time spent on push procedure for a different
number of files, comparing Git and UVC. By total push procedure, we mean all
commands run to sync new revisions to the server in both systems, which enables
other clients to pull updates. This includes add, commit, and push commands for
Git, and also, add and push commands for UVC. The preliminary result shows that
the execution time for add and push procedures are more than Git, as expected, but
we see the resulted latency is tolerable and growing linearly with a slow slope by
increasing the number of files. This performance is obtained without parallelism or
any performance improvements on UVC, as the initial evaluation from our system.
Beyond the comparisons between our system and Git, we tried to find the reason
for the latency resulted, investigating our add command and its internal phases
separately. We have found that the process of adding changes to the server, which
includes data writing to the remote block store, is the most time-consuming phase
of our push procedure. However, we found this delay tolerable for the current state,
especially as we have not made the system multi-threaded. The cost of in-memory
processes in UVC is demonstrated in Figure 6.16 as well. By in-memory data process,
we mean processing modifications happened to the local revision, and preparing
new revision, before writing changes on the remote block store. This procedure is





































● ● ●git add + git commit + git push UVC add + push UVC (in−memory)
Figure 6.16: Time spent on total push procedure in UVC and Git. In UVC, writing
changes to the remote block stores are included through add command. In-memory
data processing shows the time spent on UVC execution before writing changes
to the remote block store. Results are showing the average of 5 runs, along with
corresponding standard deviations.
Also, a similar comparison has been made running the clone command on both
systems, increasing the number of files. As Figure 6.17 shows, the result is similar to
what we obtained from previous scenarios, as expected, which originates from the
communication between principals and UPSS’s filesystem read and write requests.
This figure also shows how the increasing number of files impacts our client-side
application performance, which is responsible for fetching the new revision from
the remote block store.




























● ●git clone UVC clone
Figure 6.17: Cloning running time in UVC and Git. New version of a shared
directory is retrieved from the remote block store and version control server. Results
are showing the average of 5 runs, along with corresponding standard deviations.
separate layers. The first one is the client-server protocol used by the remote block
store and the other one in UPSS’s procedure of persisting data. As we stated
before, currently, version control server and remote block store server, handle
requests serially, and there is no optimized buffer or cache block store used in




The existing filesystems try to introduce a practical solution for data integrity and
availability but mostly ignore confidentiality and privacy. Moreover, they do not
provide a sharing mechanism that can serve users’ needs in multi-user environ-
ments, such as partial sharing and subsetting and automatic conflict resolving all
together.
CFS [DKK+01], Coda [SKK+90], and Ivy [MMGC02] filesystems provide avail-
ability for user data stored on dedicated servers in a distributed environment along
with other features such as disconnected operations, content-addressable storage
and log-structured systems. Coda introduced an automatic conflict resolution that
cannot detect some classes of conflicts, such as update/update (two different up-
dates on same objects), remove/update (removing an object from one replica and
updating it in another) and name/name (creating new objects with identical names
in one directory on different replicas). Ivy also introduced a conflict detector called
lc that notifies users about the conflicts.
The more the cloud storage became popular, the more efforts have been done to
introduce functional filesystems in the cloud settings, such as NCryptFS [WMZ03],
EncFS [LFS16a] and CryFS [MRAMQ17]. NCryptFS and EncFS are cryptographic
filesystems, which protect the content by encrypting the files, but leave the filesys-
tem metadata, such as the directory structure unprotected. CryFS solves this prob-
lem by splitting all filesystem data into fixed-size blocks and encrypting each block
individually, but with one key for all encryption. The creators of EncFS expanded
their work to make it a multi-user filesystem by applying Unix local permissions
to the encrypted files before being stored on remote servers [LFS16b]. However,
the both approaches are not practical solutions for multi-user environments with
non-local users, that need a secure, fine-grained and flexible sharing approach.
Ori [MBHM13], IPFS [Ben14] and Perkeep [LN18] (formerly known as Cam-
listore) try to connect different computing devices with the same filesystem and
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enable users to access their files everywhere. The authors of IPFS synthesize the
key ideas behind systems such as DHTs [SMK+01], BitTorrent [Coh03], Git [LM12],
and self-certifying pathnames [MK98] to create a peer-to-peer version-controlled
filesystem. Both Ori and IPFS reduce the data inconsistency problem to a version
control problem by storing new versions of files upon their modifications and the
former handles the updates with the CoW technique, which was introduced in
ZFS [BAH+03]. Synchronization, failures handling, data recovery and sharing
mechanism, or grafting, are the key features of the Ori filesystem. Perkeep is made
on a set of open source protocols trying to create a unified storage for keeping user
data from different sources such as their Twitter account or the their local hard
drive. Similar to upss-fuse, Perkeep can be mounted backed by a memory store, a
local store or a cloud account. However, none of Ori, IPFS and Perkeep provide a
mechanism for sharing or subsetting file and directory hierarchies for users with
different levels of access.
Tahoe [WOW08] is another cryptographic filesystem with the main goal of stor-
ing user data on untrusted storage servers. Like UPSS, Tahoe stores the content
encrypted in Merkle DAGs and provides access control by cryptographic capabili-
ties. Tahoe supports both immutable and mutable files in their design and for the
later case, it signs and verifies the files with a public/private key pair. The public
key and the verification key is stored as plaintext along with the files. Having
mutability in the file level can cause inconsistency if Tahoe is used in a collaborative
environment. The other difference between Tahoe and UPSS is that Tahoe encrypts
a file with one symmetric key and erasure code the ciphertext, using Reed-Solomon
codes [Riz97] into N shares to be written to N servers. However, Tahoe is designed
for file sharing and archival storage; using Tahoe with POSIX-like read-write work-
loads can cause “its performance to crawl to a halt” [tah20]. This approach cannot
provide partial sharing/subsetting and redaction, which is enabled in UPSS by
having cryptographic capabilities per each encrypted block.
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6.5 Future work
The very first thing that we need to do in the future is protecting the root block
pointer, that is the only information needed by upss-fuse to retrieve the root and
the entire directory tree. Currently, upon persisting the root directory, its block
pointer is stored in a file as plain-text. Instead, the block pointer can be secured by
user-defined credentials and be stored in a file or even in UPSS’s block store.
6.5.1 FFI
Although our prototype currently requires Rust linkage and calling conventions,
we are investigating the use of foreign function interfaces (FFI) to expose UPSS
to code written in other programming languages. We have been exploring Rust’s
excellent support for C FFI, including the explicit transfer of memory ownership, to
interface C code with Rust APIs. On top of this platform, we are exploring the use
of CPython extensions to further expose Rust APIs to Python modules. The use of
custom PyObject destructors allows the reference-counted garbage collection model
of Python to be combined with the more explicit memory models of C and Rust; we
have begun to explore this interface with prototype Rust code but have not yet built
a complete FFI for UPSS. Also, we have begun exploring the use of Rust/WASM
[was17] to provide UPSS functionality within client-side JavaScript code, e.g., in
a Web browser session. In the future, this will allow us to build UPSS-based Web
experiences in which user data is only decrypted within the user’s browser and
all communication with a remote HTTP-based block store is in terms of encrypted
blocks.
6.5.2 Expansion of Version Control System
As described in Section 6.3.5, our version control system does not currently support
authentication and authorization. Our next step to expand this system is to add
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mechanisms that enable users to define fine-grained and flexible access rights.
We will explore new types of access control and partial sharing, benefiting from
our cryptographic content-addressed filesystem. Having the MetaVersion data
structure that stores the block pointers of a file enables us to partially share a file
with another user by generating a new MetaVersion including the block pointer
(block name and its decryption key) of the blocks that we aim to share, the block
name without the decryption key of the excluded blocks, and the block name of
the main MetaVersion of the file. In this way, we can have a redacted version of the
main file along with its linkage. Having all the block names in the new MetaVersion
enables UPSS to provide the data integrity by comparing the cryptographic hashes
of the block names included in the new and old MetaVersions.
We can expand our version control system to be a configurable centralized data
sharing system in the future, towards which UVC is our first step.
6.5.3 Parallelism
Based on our evaluation results, we have observed latency that is mainly due to
the single-threaded implementation of the UPSS core. Currently, blocks are read
and written serially, leading to delays in higher-level operations such as directory
entry iteration. Adding parallelism to UPSS and UVC, and availing of the new Rust
Futures API is a way of decreasing such latency.
6.5.4 Structured files
Files and directories are meaningful in classical filesystems and are interpreted as
unstructured byte arrays. However, the internal DAG structure of UPSS blocks
should allow UPSS to naturally define structured files and directories. With struc-
tured files, we can guarantee data consistency for structured file content such as
unserialized application data structures as well as the directory tree of the filesystem
[ANMU12, TSR15]. In this way, multi-user data on different replicas are guaranteed
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to be in the same state, without data loss and without requiring users to resolve
conflicts manually. Automatic filesystem-level conflict resolution has been explored
before in filesystems such as Coda [SKK+90], but UPSS’ internal block structure
naturally lends itself to a reinvigorated exploration of these ideas, defining files as
Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDT) [KB17, SPBZ11b, SPBZ11a]. We have
started investigating CRDT structures that can be integrated into UPSS’ objects and
we will introduce a conflict-free version of UPSS in the future.
6.5.5 Hiding access patterns
Currently, UPSS can provide confidentiality, integrity and availability of data in the
block stores. However, some information may be learned from the access patterns
to the block stores. For example, an adversary would likely to be able to learn the
mapping between the client’s IP address and the accessed file by doing some traffic
analysis. UPSS is not secured against this threat in its current implementation. We
have started studying this problem and we believe that the client can be protected
against this threat by using a system such as Tor [DMS04]. The full implementation
is our other future work.
6.6 Conclusion
UPSS: the user-centric private sharing system is a decentralized cryptographic filesys-
tem that provides strong confidentiality and integrity properties while relying only
on untrusted backend storage. This filesystem is accessible as an embeddable Rust
library, a FUSE filesystem (with local or remote storage) or as the platform for a
novel confidential version control system. The performance of UPSS exceeds that
of comparable cryptographic filesystems and is within an order of magnitude of the
performance of a mature copy-on-write local filesystem ZFS. When using remote
storage, UPSS achieves almost the same results for write and cached read operations
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and better results for creating files and directories, compared to a mature network
filesystem NFS. UPSS’s performance exceeds that of an optimized global filesystem
Perkeep.
UPSS uses untrusted storage backends in which data is always encrypted at
rest as a sea of blocks: no file or directory structure can be discerned directly from
the contents of an encrypted block store. However, those information can be
learnt indirectly by traffic analysis, as we stated in Section 6.5.5. Along with
the confidentiality supported by encrypted blocks, UPSS is a content-addressable
filesystem, using cryptographic names that contain cryptographic hashes of blocks’
content, as global identifiers. This mechanism allows even sensitive user content
to be stored in commodity cloud storage without relying on centralized access
control. Convergent encryption can — at the discretion of individual users — be
used to enable de-duplication across mutually-distrustful users [PMÖL13, KBR13].
Cryptographically-named blocks can be combined into immutable DAGs of files
and directory hierarchies, with cryptographic capabilities, used to authorize access
to arbitrary quantities of data. UPSS provides a conventional filesystem API using
copy-on-write operations around immutable DAGs; this API is accessible directly as
an embedded library or proxied via a FUSE interface.
Using POSIX filesystem interfaces, we have compared the performance of UP-
SS/FUSE to other cryptographic filesystems, the mature copy-on-write filesystem
ZFS, the mature NFS filesystem, and Google’s global filesystem Perkeep. Using
modern cryptographic and copy-on-write techniques, UPSS demonstrates that it
is possible to achieve both strong security properties and high performance, even
with entirely untrusted storage. Furthermore, we have demonstrated the utility of
UPSS as a foundation for a novel distributed revision control system UVC: UPSS
Version Control System with inherent confidentiality properties that are not known
in contemporary revision control systems. UVC is our first step towards a secure
capability-based data sharing system to provide a fine-grained and flexible user
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authority management.
Whether used as a local, network or global filesystem, or the underlying filesys-
tem for a private revision control system, UPSS: the user-centric private sharing
system enables arbitrary quantities of data to be stored with strong confidentiality
and integrity properties on untrusted storage backends. UPSS’s performance is
comparable to — or, in some cases, superior to — mature, heavily-optimized filesys-
tems, proving that high standards of security in application or user storage need
not prevent practical performance. Wide adoption of UPSS and its techniques will
lay the foundation for future transformations in privacy and integrity for applica-
tions as diverse as social networking and medical data storage, providing better
opportunities for users — not system administrators — to take control of their data.
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Online Social Networks (OSNs) have a significant impact on our lives as they enable
individuals to communicate with each other in a way that in real life may not be
possible. They also serve as a medium for propagating ideas and thoughts and,
in some cases, act as an advertising platform for product owners. Viral marketing
is an example of this type, which is based on the word-of-mouth effect on OSNs.
But, such networks do not always operate in users’ interests, especially in cases
that user data is critically important and needs to be kept confidential, one of the
main requirements of a health care information system such as health care OSNs.
However, by designing a system that can guarantee integrity, confidentiality and
availability requirements while considering users – not system administrators –
as real data owners, we can address the existing concerns of information systems
while still benefiting from them.
For solving the influence maximization problem in OSNs, that was the start
point of this thesis, a graph structure is extracted from the data that is stored and
controlled centrally by the OSN providers. Such data can also be used for other
purposes, such as advertisement, without users’ explicit consent. This lack of control
over data by the users and violating their privacy encouraged me to concluded my
thesis by designing and implementing a privacy-preserving optionally-distributed
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cryptographic filesystem. The filesystem can be used to build applications that
enable rich and collaborative sharing without suffering from the cost of out-of-
control sharing on untrustworthy systems.
In Chapter 2, I proposed an efficient algorithm, called INCIM (Influential Nodes
using Community structure for solving Influence Maximization problem) for solv-
ing the influence maximization problem under Linear Threshold model, by using
the community structure of OSN graphs. The spread value of each node is calcu-
lated as a combination of its local and global spread values. The local spread value
is calculated per node inside the community it belongs to. In this way, I limited
the search space to communities that are sub-graphs of the main graph that leads
to better running time. Also, I considered the effectiveness of the communities
in information spread, which was ignored by other approaches. A new graph of
communities was constructed and the global spread value was calculated for each
community. INCIM finds the influential nodes in a reasonable running time even
for large networks. Starting the information spread from the identified nodes led
to higher coverage over the whole network in comparison with the state-of-the-art
approaches.
After doing extensive studies on the influence maximization problem, I started
thinking about realistic scenarios that are happening in our daily life and were
missed in the studies. The influence spread adoption is affected by the decisions
made by others and individuals are likely to be mindful of the preferences of
others. Therefore in Chapter 3, I proposed a new propagation model called DCM
(Decidable Competitive Model) for competitive influence maximization problem,
which is a extension of the Linear Threshold model. In competitive influence
maximization, two adversaries are competing to gain more influence spread by
choosing the minimum number of influential nodes not selected by the other. DCM
enables the nodes to think about the incoming influence from the adversaries and
after d timesteps, decide to adopt one of the influence spreads, which is accepted
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by the majority of its neighbors. Then I presented CI2 (Competitive Influence
Improvement) algorithm for solving competitive influence improvement under the
DCM model and proved its NP-hardness. The results of the experiments on both
synthetic and real-world datasets show the applicability of the CI2 algorithm.
The other primary path that I took in this thesis was thinking about designing
and implementing a secure system that can fulfill users’ needs and addresses their
privacy-related concerns. Such a system can be a potential replacement for current
online social networks. I started by investigating the privacy-preserving approaches
introduced for OSNs, that can be categorized based on the OSN architectures:
centralized, decentralized or peer-to-peer, and hybrid. The existing approaches for
each category are reviewed in Chapter 4. My investigations show that none of the
existing approaches can address privacy, availability, and connectivity problems
for OSNs, but decentralization or hybridization that also includes elements of
decentralization, is the right direction toward further studies.
I also studied four motivational use cases with different and, in some cases,
contradictory requirements: online social networks, censorship resistance systems,
document redaction systems and health care information systems (Chapter 5).
These use cases have overlapping needs for strong confidentiality, integrity, user
control, reliability and performance properties. Moreover, they need a mechanism
for sharing information securely and selectively without having complete trust
in central servers. The result was a prototype filesystem called UPSS: the user-
centric private sharing system in which the data storage plane is separated from the
control plane. Storing data as encrypted fixed-size blocks in a content-addressable
store makes UPSS functional on untrusted storage providers. Mapping the file
and directory structure to immutable Merkle DAGs and convergent encryption
preserves privacy and provides global deduplication.
I went beyond the ideas and implemented a functional filesystem, where its
main idea was seeded in Chapter 5. The implementation details of the filesystem are
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presented in Chapter 6. UPSS can be used as a traditional filesystem in userspace
(FUSE), can be interacted using the provided public API by other applications, or as
a platform for version control systems with fine-grained access controls. I backed
UPSS with local, remote and global block stores and the extensive evaluations show
that it is comparable and in some cases, superior to mature filesystems such as
copy-on-write ZFS filesystem, mature NFS network filesystem and Google’s global
Perkeep filesystem. The distributed revision control system, UVC: UPSS Version
Control System, which is build on top of UPSS, is the first step towards a secure
capability-based data sharing system.
7.1 Future work
The upss-fuse can be the backbone of other systems. However, implementing such
systems is beyond the time frame of this thesis and needs the effort of a team of
expert people. Examples of such systems that can be built on top of upss-fuse are:
A secure and private online social network We can build a private Online Social
Network (OSN) using UPSS as a library in which user data can be stored on local or
remote block stores (see Sections 6.2.1 and 6.3.3.1), where the content is protected
against adversaries, but the access patterns may be learned by traffic analysis (see
Section 6.5.5). Content sharing can be supported by UVC (Section 6.3.5). Having
local block stores, we can build a censor-resistant network in a peer-to-peer manner.
However, there are some challenges in designing and implementing such systems
that are identified and studied in Chapter 4. Also, another question is that how can
we allow users to voluntarily participate in aggregation when it benefits them in
such a private network for research and business purposes? Such data structures
are required for solving graph-based problems such as influence maximization (see
Chapters 2 and 3).
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Conflict resolving in filesystem level Having a distributed read-write filesystem
that supports flexible sharing (Section 6.3.5) needs a mechanism for resolving
possible conflicts in both filesystem directory tree and file content. This is possible
by adding data structures to the structured files in UPSS (see Section 6.5.4), but we
have not integrated such structures yet.
A storage manager system with confidentiality-preserved auditing In some sys-
tems like health care information systems, it is crucial to detect the malicious behav-
ior of authorized users. The systems that are responsible for detecting such users
rely on the audited accesses of their users to the resources. Such audits are fed into
the analyzer applications to detect anomalies. However, the audited logs should
not reveal any information about the stored content. UPSS can provide such audits.
UPSS can keep the root block name without its decryption key (see Section 6.2.1) of
the accessed blocks on a block store. Those block names are meaningless outside of
UPSS itself. Also, it is possible to define a list of permitted blocks that a user can
access and ask UPSS to audit the accesses other than those blocks. Currently, such
auditing is not implemented on UPSS core or as an auditing application that uses
UPSS.
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